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ABSTRACT
KELSEY M. SHOUB: Shifting Frames, Shifting Policy: How Frame Sets Influence Policy Making
in Congress
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner)
In this dissertation, I pose and answer three questions about the presence and role of policy
discussion in Congress: (1) why are some issues discussed more in the House and Senate than others;
(2) do the parties differ in how they discuss issues; and (3) why does that discussion influence bill
outcomes? First, I posit and show that parties are reactive to each other and pursuit of electoral
goals influence how much a general policy area is discussed. Additionally, I show that, while the
relationships appear to be the same across the two chambers of Congress, they are conditioned by
majority party status.
Second, I posit and show that pursuit of the party’s electoral goal not only informs how much
different issues are discussed, but also informs how they are discussed. I show that the parties differ in
which frames they use to discuss policy. In doing so, I present a new measure of frames in Congress
that using a set list of broad frames that facilitates comparisons across policy areas.
Finally, building from the first and second questions, I question whether the policy discussion
that occurs influences bill outcomes. I propose that the construction of policy discussion through
the selection of frames shapes the considerations of those evaluating proposed legislation, which
ultimately influences action (i.e. voting) in Congress. In doing this, I shift the focus from the use of
individual frames and their characteristics to the concept of the frame set, a holistic look at how the
issue is framed. Following from this, I posit and show that as the frame set changes more, policy
change (i.e. bill passage) is more likely.
To test these claims, I rely on large-N empirical analysis. I code the speeches in the Congressional
Record for the Comparative Agendas Project general policy areas using supervised machine learning.
Then, using unsupervised machine learning, I code the paragraphs within the speeches on policy for
how it discusses that policy area, the frame used.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Is the estate tax the rich paying their fair share or a burdensome and unfair death tax? Are
immigrants criminals sneaking into this country to steal jobs or are they seeking refuge, willing to
contribute to their new communities? Over time, the amount of discussion about these issues has
fluctuated and the answers to these questions have changed. With this changing rhetoric, the policies
and legislation that relate to them have also changed. For example, in the early and mid 1900s, the
estate tax was discussed as the way rich American families fairly contributed to a war effort. By the
early 2000s, the dominant frames used in the discussion depicted it as a death tax hurting American
families and business. Mirroring this change in framing came fluctuations in the policy: in the early
and mid 1900s, it was established and raised, and then it was slashed in the early 2000s (Scheve and
Stasavage, 2016; Meagher, 2013; Bittker, Clark and McCouch, 2015). In similar ways, immigration
policy seems to fluctuate depending on the depiction of immigrants. Depictions of immigrants
primarily as illegal, threatening, and “the other” reduce support for increasing immigration quotas
but increase support for building a wall along the US-Mexican border. Conversely, depictions of
immigrants as fleeing atrocities and disasters or as people who will contribute to the betterment of
society see increases in support for raising quotas and relaxing the process (Daniels, 2005; Monogan,
2013; Nevins, 2010; Wright, Levy and Citrin, 2016; Pe´rez, 2014).
Anecdotally then, whether and how we talk about issues matters; how issues are framed matters.
It seems to influence whether and when we think something is a problem to be addressed and how
it should be defined. Beyond influencing problem definition, it also structures proposed solutions
and informs how we should evaluate those solutions. Thus, it appears that frames have power.
Indeed this is what micro and macro studies of framing tell us when they examine how framing
influences attitudes and actions among individuals and groups and how it influences policy and
policy outcomes outside of Congress. At the individual level (micro framing), a plethora of studies
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have shown that framing can shape and influence the attitudes and opinions of individuals. Even
a subtle reorganization of the narrative structure of a newspaper article has been shown to shift
attitudes (Berinsky and Kinder, 2006). At the societal level (macro framing), a number of studies
have shown that as the general framing of an issue changes then the policy and policy outputs related
to it change. For example, as the debate surrounding the death penalty shifted from a focus on the
heinous nature of the crimes committed toward the possible innocence of those being executed, its
use decreased (Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun, 2008). Similar investigations have not been
conducted about their possible influence within Congress to affect policy. However, these studies
hint that how legislators discuss the bills and policies before them matter.
Not only do studies of framing in other contexts tell us that frames concerning policy might matter
within Congress, but others have posited and shown that information matters in the Congressional
policy making process. They have done so in a number of different ways and by adopting a number
of different approaches from game theoretic models to large-N analysis to interviews on the Hill.
However, these studies have essentially focused on whether and how much consideration takes place
through debate or deliberation rather than the content and construction of it.
While the role of framing—if any—in the policy making process of Congress is not well
understood, rich and nuanced literatures have developed explaining and exploring policy making in
Congress more generally. These emphasize how parties, gate keepers within Congress, procedure,
the tides of public opinion, and information processing influence policy making. Additionally,
studies that have specifically looked at whether or not individual bills pass have examined the role of
cosponsors and characteristics of the primary sponsor at different stages of the process. However, the
possible role of framing have not been included in these studies.
I propose that frames matter for policy making—even within Congress. By proposing that they
matter and can influence policy outputs (i.e. legislation) in Congress, I do not mean that previously
identified causes do not matter or even that it is more predictive than other explanations. Rather, I
am proposing that in addition to the other factors and processes previously identified, studied, and
discussed, framing also matters. In the pages that follow, I pose and answer three questions that build
on each other about the presence and role of policy discussion and framing in Congress: (1) why
are some issues discussed more in the House and Senate than others; (2) do the parties deferentially
use frames; and (3) does the changing use of frames in that discourse influence policy (i.e. bill
2
outcomes)? Specifically, I study the relationship between the changing frames used to discuss a
general issue area and policy change within that issue area. In answering these questions, I also make
two methodological contributions to the study of framing, and specifically to the study of framing in
Congress. I first present one low cost way to identify frames and their in the Congressional Record. I
then show that by shifting the study of frames from the use and characteristics of specific frames
to changes to the bundle of frames used, the frame set, greater traction on the question of how and
whether frames matter can be had.
By answering these questions, I take steps to directly incorporate framing into explanations of
when policy change occurs in Congress. I directly incorporate framing into explanations of why
some bills become law, while others fail. Further, I examine when more or less policy discussion
within Congress about different general issue areas occurs and whether the parties frame issues
differently. One related question that is outside of the scope of this dissertation is why and when the
frames used to discuss an issue area change. Here I narrow my focus to examine whether and why
changing the frames used to discuss an issue area changes policy outcomes.
To do so, I first examine the question of how much members of Congress may even decide to
talk about different issue areas (chapter 2). Drawing from previous research, I assume that public
discussion of issue areas are coordinated by the parties. I then posit that each party is reactive to the
other party and that electoral goals drive what each party in each chamber decides to talk about and
how much they say on that issue. As I will show, these claims hold true regardless of chamber, and
they are conditioned by majority party status.
I then examine whether how issues are framed vary in response to the each party’s dual goals of
achieving or maintaining majority party status and pursuing policy goals (chapter 3). To facilitate
this analysis, I present one way that frames can be detected in the Congressional Record in a cheap,
valid, and reliable manner. As I will show, frame use varies party and by issue area.
Finally, I question whether the set of frames used when discussing policy influences bill outcomes
(chapter 4). Specifically, I question whether the change in the frames used influences the change
in bill outcomes and policy. I posit that the construction of the framing set, through the selection
of specific frames and exclusion of others, shapes the considerations of those evaluating proposed
legislation, which ultimately influences action in Congress (i.e. voting). The frames used influence
both how members evaluate how the bill will be viewed by their constituents and whether it will be
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acceptable policy. If a legislative battle takes place over multiple Congresses, which often happens,
proponents of legislation will adapt their strategy to increase the likelihood of passage in each
successive iteration. This implies that as the frame set changes more between rounds of consideration,
then the probability that is passes in successive rounds of consideration increases. Note that in this
depiction the frame set rather than the individual frames is the focus.
To test these claims, I rely on a large-N empirical analysis. The empirical analysis relies on a
unique data set of the Congressional Record coded for general policy area and how that policy area
is discussed using a mixture of supervised and unsupervised text analysis. In the analysis, I provide
evidence that a party’s electoral goals influence which issues are discussed and how they are framed.
Additionally, I show that the changing construction of the policy framing influences whether or not
policy change via the passage of legislation occurs. Before discussing either the theory or tests in
more detail, it is important to clarify how this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the
role of framing in the policy process—specifically in the US Congress.
1.1 Previous Studies on Policy Change & Framing
Previous studies have much to say about the process of policy change, why and when framing
influences various outcomes, and how political parties constrain or exacerbate the patterns predicted
in theories of policy change. While scholars have made significant contributions to our understanding
of the broader political process within each of these literatures, all three rarely speak to one another.
As a result, there is an under appreciation and lack of understanding of the role of framing in how
policy is made within Congress. Conversely, few studies of framing have addressed how those
theories and findings translate to political elites operating within defined institutional structures. This
dissertation addresses and integrates these literatures.
More concretely, I build from three literatures. First, I build on the policy change and process
literature, with a specific focus on those that directly address Congress. Second, I draw on the
literature on framing. The term framing is used to mean a variety of related things. The focus in this
dissertation will be on issue framing rather than equivalence framing. Issue framing is the use of
statements aimed at altering which dimensions of evaluation and consideration are used. In contrast,
equivalence framing is the substitution of words that mean the same thing but elicit different reactions.
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Third, I draw on the literature on political parties in the US. I do so because party constrains the
behavior of its members. This is especially true in an era of relatively strong parties and a decreased
focus on the individual legislator in favor of the party or caucus.
1.1.1 Policy Making & Change in Congress
When making and monitoring policy and policy outcomes in Congress, members face a problem:
there is not enough time to address every possible problem. Rather, attention must be allocated to
some issues, while others are ignored or allocated minimal attention. In Congress, this typically
takes the form of allocating more or less attention to specific bills, because bills are the primary
vehicle by which members can change policy. Given this problem—too many possible problems
and bills and not enough space on the agenda—many have sought to explain whether, why, and the
extent of policy change enacted by Congress. The two standard explanations of how policy change
occurs are incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theory. Incremenetalism claims that policy
change happens slowly over time. This is because policy makers, in this case members of Congress,
make small adjustments at regular intervals to the status quo policy (Lindblom, 1959; Hayes, 1992;
Wildavsky, 1964). However, this underestimates and ignores that most major policy change occurs
suddenly, often in landmark pieces of legislation, such as the Bush era tax cuts in 2002 and 2003 or
the Affordable Care Act of 2010. Conversely, punctuated equilibrium theory says that policy jumps
from one equilibrium point to another. On average, from year to year, the same policy is in effect. It
hovers around an equilibrium point. However, from time to time that point suddenly and drastically
shifts. It is those shifts that symbolize and indicate policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 2010).
The existence of this pattern and process has been replicated across branches of the government and
countries (Jones et al., 2009; Baumgartner et al., 2009).
Each of these theories describes the process of how policy change occurs, but does not necessarily
explain why and when we should observe small versus large policy change. In each a build-up of
pressure—or the accumulation of error in the system in the Baumgartner and Jones framework—
eventually leads to policy change when that pressure and error can no longer be ignored. The greater
the pressure the greater the opportunity for policy change. Central to this idea is that attention, focus,
and framing correlate with policy change. However, each produces the expectation that why and
when (big) change occurs is essentially random. Since the initial introduction of incrementalism
5
and punctuated equilibrium theory, many have sought to explain why, not just how, policy change
occurs—or does not occur. Often, these studies do so in the context of questioning why policy change
occurs in a seemingly gridlocked system rife with polarization and dysfunction.
Adler and Wilkerson (2013) propose that one way members of Congress force themselves to
still make and update policy is through recurring legislation. Essentially, in the version of the bill
that becomes law, members of Congress incorporate a date at which a bill’s provisions expire unless
Congress votes to extend or amend and extend the bill’s provisions. Each time a law is reconsidered
members of Congress are required to re-evaluate and update that specific policy. Additionally, these
laws typically allow for Congress to consider the funding structure and main provisions governing
a specific agency periodically rather than every Congress. Theoretically, this allows them to make
space on the agenda for other issues that need to be addressed. Examples of this type of legislation
include the agriculture bill or bills concerning the estate tax. Their book relies on the idea that each
policy and each general policy area has a history and occurs in an iterative process, where members
of Congress are allowed to update their views of and orientation toward specific policies. Adler
and Wilkerson are not the only ones to rely on such an assumption. Rather, it is commonly used in
theories of policy change and the changing landscape of ideology, such as by Carmines and Stimson
(1989).
Another explanation of when policy change is expected to occur centers on the role of information
in the process. Multiple researchers have examined this connection in a number of different ways and
by adopting a number of different approaches. Austen-Smith (1990) shows that the injection of new
information near points of consideration can change the expected outcome using a game theoretic
approach. Baumgartner and Jones (2001, 2015) show that how Congress searches for and processes
information about policy influences what policy change is attempted and occurs. They highlight
that on average members of Congress today have too much rather than too little information about
issues. Because of this, members resist change until there is enough information flagged as relevant
that highlights the same problem to address it. As a result, most policy sees long periods of stasis or
incremental change with periodic bursts or punctuations of activity and change. They use a large-n
approach relying on data coming from their Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). Additionally,
Curry (2015) presents evidence of the power of information and the importance of controlling it by
examining the procedural tactics the Congressional leadership in the House take to limit the diffusion
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of information. Additionally, he documents the awareness of its potential power to derail a bill’s
progress through the process by the members and the leadership through interviews on the Hill. Thus,
the level and control of information is inextricably linked to the probability of a bill becoming law
and whether policy changes. However, these studies have focused in one way or another on whether
discussion and consideration of specific policy and general issue areas occurs, rather than examining
what the content and construction of that discussion might be. Similarly, none of these studies seeks
to understand why issues are discussed at differing levels, which shapes how much information
already exists about an issue and how much information is likely to be injected into the conversation.
Additionally, researchers have sought to explain and predict whether specific bills in Congress
will or will not pass or become public law. These studies are relevant to this discussion because the
main vehicle in Congress by which policy changes is through legislation. The underlying theme
to all of these studies is that a bill actually becoming law is difficult. To start down the road of
the legislative process on Capitol Hill means accepting that it is highly unlikely to actually be
passed. These studies have found effects for relationships between campaign promises and party
brands (Sides, 2006; Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 2010; Bawn et al., 2012; Pe´try and Collette, 2009),
sponsor characteristics (ex. whether they chair a committee and ideological distance to the speaker)
(Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; Wilson and Young, 1997), and public
opinion and media attention (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Maestas, 2000; Page and Shapiro, 1983;
Burstein, 2003) on the probability of bill passage. Additionally, they have found mixed effects for
the relationship between the number of cosponsors and the passage (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier
and Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; Wilson and Young, 1997; Krutz, 2005; Carson, Lynch and Madonna,
2011). A unifying theme throughout these studies is that if a bill actually makes it to the floor for
final consideration, it is likely to become law (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007).
From these studies and different approaches, four general observations can be made. First, policy
change follows an explainable if not always predictable pattern. Second, pushing for policy change
is often a quixotic quest for its proponents, where the status quo almost always wins. To change
policy, proponents must exert significant effort and experience a bit of luck. This is especially true
in Congress where the vast majority of bills do not pass, very few see actual consideration in any
venue within Congress, and even bills required to keep the government open occasionally do not pass.
Third, almost all policies have a history, and all policy areas operate within a broader context. In the
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context of policy change as legislation, this means that, while within a single congress a bill may be
introduced and fail, it may be reintroduced again and again until it is finally passed. Examples of this
can be seen in efforts to reform health care with the continual introduction of measures to establish
universal health care in the US until the passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010. Essentially,
rather than being a static, one-shot game, it is an iterative process that is dynamic. Or to put it in the
framework of Carmines and Stimson, issues evolve (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Fourth, as shown
by the studies on the role and power of information in Congress, what members of Congress discuss
influences policy change in some way.
However, those studies do not explore why information influences outcomes or the extent to
which changes in the information available influence policy change or outcomes. This dissertation
seeks to make a contribution by doing just that: connecting the content of discussion to policy change
and outcomes. Specifically, I do so in the context of bill passage in Congress, where bill passage is a
proxy for policy change.
1.1.2 Issue Framing & Policy
As in studies on policy change and policy making, there is a rich literature on framing that has
made many important contributions to our understanding of the role and effects of framing. Many
researchers across multiple fields, such as political science, psychology, and sociology, have studied
framing in a multitude of ways. In combination, they provide robust evidence that framing can influ-
ence individual attitudes and opinions. However, both across and within these different disciplines,
the terms frame and framing have a variety of (slightly) different definitions ascribed to them. At
its core, framing is meant to mean the process by which the use of some specific words or phrases
rather than others in a discussion about an issue changes how that issue is evaluated. The specific
construction of a frame and what constitutes different frames rather than the same frame varies. I use
Druckman’s (2001) definition of framing. He defines the process of framing with relation to shaping
individual attitudes and opinions as: “...a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant
considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinion”
(1042, Druckman 2001). This is sometimes called issue framing rather than equivalence framing.
In this study, I expand this definition slightly to include groups as well as individuals. However,
regardless of the specific definition, studies show that in many situations, at many levels framing
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influences opinions, attitudes, actions, and policy outcomes. These studies typically do not expand
their focus to environments where political elites both shape and receive frames nor to the inner
workings of political institutions.1
Initial framing studies showed that a connection exists between frames and attitudes and opinions;
namely that frames can influence attitudes and opinions (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1993).
Since then, framing studies have shown that the strength of the frames used matter (Druckman,
Peterson and Slothuus, 2013), the type of frames—such as a moralistic or an economic frames—used
matter (Jerit, 2008; Ryan, 2014; Baumeister et al., 2001; Wright, Levy and Citrin, 2016), and that
source cues matter (Druckman, 2001; Druckman and Nelson, 2003). Across these studies, two of
the most relevant findings for this dissertation are: (1) the effects of frames have limits; and (2) one
way that they shape attitudes and opinions is by shifting which (internal) evaluative dimensions are
used to make the decision. These two findings are especially important, because they provide the
microfoundations for a theory of how the use and non-use of frames among elites might work—after
all we are all still human—while providing a clue as to what the magnitude and limits of those
effects might be. Namely that the effect will be substantively small and on the margins, because it is
expected to be constrained by what choices are even presented to different individuals and groups in
the first place.
Some researchers have sought to extend these studies of individual behavior to macro-level
theories of the role of framing both generally in society and specifically in the policy making process.
They have shown that the support for framing effects found in the lab can also be found in the wild.
One stark example of where frames changed policy is the debate regarding the death penalty in
the U.S. As the use of the innocence frame rose over time, the use of the death penalty declined
(Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun, 2008). Similar studies have shown that the process can be
repeated: frames and framing can influence public policy (Rose and Baumgartner, 2013; Scheve and
Stasavage, 2012; Armstrong, 2003; Schrad, 2010; Meagher, 2013). Other studies have shown that
media framing of different issues can influence macro-opinion, attitudes, evaluations, and behavior
of the public (Kellstedt, 2003, 2000; Soroka, Stecula and Wlezien, 2015; McCall, 2013). These
1In addition to the studies discussed here that propose and test a process, many informative works within the framing
literature seek to build typologies of frame types and structure. Examples of these include but are not limited to: Stone
(1989) and Schneider and Ingram (1993).
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studies show that either by directly or indirectly effecting the public macro-opinion, policy, and
policy outputs can change. However, they have been conducted in arenas that are largely free of
constraints as individuals and groups face when operating within a governmental institution.
Fewer have sought to test whether and how these findings and processes operate within political
institutional environments. Those that have examine shifts in the paradigms in how members of a
legislature or the government generally conceive of issues (Smith, 2007; Hall, 1993). One exception
to this is William Riker’s work. While not using the direct terminology of frames and framing, he
studied the role of rhetoric and herestheic (Riker, 1986, 1996), which at its heart is the study of
frames and their effects. As he says, “Rhetoric is concerned with the persuasion-value of sentences.
And heresthetic is concerned with the strategy value of sentences” (Riker 1986, x). He shows that
rhetoric and heresthetic inform campaign strategy and the outcomes of a campaign by shaping the
considerations of those watching (Riker, 1996). Since his studies, scholars have applied and further
developed his theories as they apply to modern electoral campaigns such as gubernatorial elections
(Carsey, 2009) and congressional campaigns (Sides, 2006). Each of these studies either emphasize
the role of frames in the campaign or the choice of issues on which to campaign.
As in the studies of framing at the individual level, Riker and those using his framework assert
that by manipulating which aspects of an issue—or which issues—are presented then the related
attitudes and opinions of onlookers may change, and that the related outcomes themselves may
change. In this dissertation I do just that: transport and expand Riker’s ideas into the legislative
process in Congress and put it in conversation with the constraints that come along with that process
(ex. party politics). Additionally, I question whether political parties use different frames to discuss
issues in an attempt to shape how their relationship with that issue area is perceived by they public.
1.1.3 The Constraints of Political Parties
Alluded to in the previous two subsections is that policy making and framing do not happen in a
vacuum. Instead, they occur within an institutional context. One important facet of that context is
the constraints political parties place on policy making and on the effects of framing, which is the
subject of a wide and diverse literature. From this broad literature, two points should be highlighted.
First, the common assumption throughout the literature is that both parties in Congress want
to be in the majority. To achieve that, the majority party orients its strategy towards maintaining
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the majority, while the minority party orients its strategy towards becoming the majority. Two
ways they do so is through coordinated messaging campaigns and by introducing and passing a
publicly coherent legislative agenda. Organizing each party’s overall strategy is the construction
and maintenance of its brand or label. However, the degree to which a legislative agenda plays into
these strategies varies by theory, and the degree to which they gamble with a legislative agenda
varies. According to Conditional Party Government, the majority party will actively seek to pursue
their voiced legislative priorities (Rohde, 2010; Aldrich, 1995). While Cartel Theory makes no
claims about the positive power of the party to actively pursue a legislative agenda, it does claim
that the majority party will protect itself from being rolled; it will exercise negative agenda setting
power. By negative agenda setting power, I mean halting bills and issues from reaching the stage of
formal consideration. Essentially, it is the theoretical exposition behind what is commonly called
the Hasterert Rule; the practice that no bill is brought to the floor if it will pass and over half of the
majority party is against it (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007). Whereas, Strategic Party Government
posits that there will be a calculated trade off where the majority party attempts to maximize passing
legislation that furthers its policy agenda while holding onto the majority. However, the parties and
their members prioritize getting out their message over actually passing policy (Lebo, McGlynn and
Koger, 2007; Carson et al., 2010; Koger and Lebo, 2017).
In each case, however, parties do choose to pursue policy goals through legislation. Each
attempts to change the status quo through legislation. Barring actually changing the status quo, they
might be expected to publicly talk about those issues that further its message and attempt to frame
issues in ways that provide them an advantage. These expectations as to what and how issues are
discussed have been studied in campaigns. However, expectations on what is discussed and how it is
discussed within Congress have gone untested. Additionally, implicit in these these expectations and
theories is the assumption that the party leadership has the power to hold members accountable when
they deviate from the party line. The degree to which they can do so varies over time and across
issues. This implies that parties will coordinate within their ranks.
Second, there is a tension between the strategy guiding the party as it seeks to achieve or
maintain majority party status and the individual members of the party, who are reelected by their
local constituency. As highlighted by Strategic Party Government theory, there is a calculated trade
off in pursuing a policy agenda both rhetorically and legislatively that maintains that majority and
11
ensuring every individual member of Congress of the party gets reelected (Carson et al., 2010; Koger
and Lebo, 2017). This means that even with the ability of the party to punish, individual members
may still defect from their party’s strategy and either form temporary alliances with the other party
or seek a third option. As a result, there are marginal members who can be persuaded to defect—at
least sometimes.
However, there has been little research done on the motivations and constraints of the party may
manifest themselves in coordinated speech on the chamber floor. Additionally, there has been little
work on whether possible framing effects may influence enough legislators to alter policy outcomes
(i.e. bill outcomes). Essentially, the parties literature has not often been put in conversation with
the policy process and making literature. Further, the extent to which the parties literature has been
put in conversation with the framing literature is the extent to which studies on information span all
three literatures and when studying electoral campaigns for office. In the theory that follows, I do so
by treating parties as a coordinating and constraining force in the process. I then study how parties
inform how much different issue areas are discussed, differences in how issues are framed, and how
each might influence policy change.
1.2 When and How is Policy Discussed?
If framing can influence policy outcomes, then party leadership and the core coalition pushing for
policy change are right to be afraid of extended consideration, deliberation, and debate of a bill. The
more time spent on public discussion of a bill or a policy area more generally then it becomes more
likely that new frames and information may be introduced. In turn, the new frames and information
may derail the progression of the proponents of legislation through Congress. Thus, if the majority
party wants to pass policy in a certain area, they may try to suppress the discussion of that policy area
on the floor of either chamber. However, the desire of individual members to publicly take stances on
issues that might assist in their personal reelection efforts conflicts with the desire of majority party
leadership to keep legislation on track.
As a result, before turning to the specific question of why framing influences policy in Congress,
a more basic understanding of what shapes policy discussion in Congress is needed. This prompts two
questions: first, why and when will policy areas be discussed more; and second, what informs which
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frames are used in policy discussion? The answers to these questions provide a better understanding
for when framing effects may even be felt and what informs them.
Previous research provides some answers to this question. First, research has shown that member
characteristics influence the propensity for a member of Congress to speak on the chamber floor
(Maltzman and Sigelman, 1996; Morris, 2001; Pearson and Dancey, 2011). The leadership in each
party (majority/minority party leaders, committee chairs, ranking committee members, etc.) and
outsiders (ex. ideological extremists, junior members, etc.) speak more than rank and file members
willing to toe their party’s line.
Second, speakers aim to increase their personal diffuse support through speeches (Hill and
Hurley, 2002; Proksch and Slapin, 2014). One way they do so is by publicly taking stances on issues
central to their party’s brand and prioritized in their platform. By doing so, they can show that they
are working towards the policy goals that they promised they would work on in their campaigns.
Further, another way they do so is by attacking the other party, framing the issue as partisan and
political. However, these studies have not pushed passed examination of whether a member is “on
message” or using partisan attacks to more broadly examine which issues are discussed and how.
Third, although the majority of studies on who speaks on the chamber floor have focused on the
individual member, others have shown that parties significantly coordinate the delivery of speeches.
They have shown this by focusing on “unstructed” time in the House. By “unstructured” time, they
typically refer to time not governed by a rule, and they specifically analyze one-minute speeches in
the House (Hughes, 2016; Harris, 2005).
Public speech is typically a coordinated activity at least within caucuses and typically among a
party. A party’s messaging team provides talking points and sometimes even the text of the speeches
themselves (Harris, 2005; Hughes, 2016; Curry, 2015). As a result, not only should how individual
members treat the chamber floor be understood, but also what influences the overall strategy of how a
party uses the chamber floor. Some researchers have done just that. Hughes (2016) posits and shows
that the minority party can influence the majority party’s agenda by placing more or less emphasis
on different issue areas in the House using one-minute speeches. Additionally, he shows that the
reverse is also true: the majority party influence the minority party’s agenda by placing more or less
emphasis on different issue areas.
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Beyond the Hughes (2016) study, Strategic Party Government (SPG) theory and Conditional
Party Government (CPG) theory provide additional insights into how parties may use Congressional
floor speech. To benefit all members in the party, parties seek to build and maintain labels or brands.
A label or brand can be used as a heuristic for voters, so that, even if they do not know everything
about a candidate running for office, they can still quickly evaluate whether or not they like the party
(Koger and Lebo, 2017; Rohde, 2010; Aldrich, 1995; Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007). In pursuit
of building and maintaining the party’s brand, parties will coordinate floor speech around the issues
the party prioritizes and discuss issues in ways that benefit the party.
For example, if a party is perceived as better at safe guarding the nation and its core voters are
more attentive to possible threats, that party may highlight issues of national security and rely on
frames that highlight threats to security across issue areas. Conversely, if a party is perceived as
better at taking care of vulnerable populations in society and its core voters are more attentive to
issues of inclusion and fairness, that party may talk about social welfare more and use frames that
highlight how policies affect specific vulnerable populations more than the other party.
A number of questions linger. Two in particular will be the subject of further study. First, do
the same patterns that are seen at the individual level hold at the party level? Second, do the same
patterns that appear in the House appear in the Senate? In the analysis to come, I first address these
questions and test whether the expectations developed from previous studies that were focused solely
on the House and on one type of speech generalize to the Senate other public speech on the chamber
floor viewed holistically. The exploration and explanation of when more or less policy discussion
occurs by general policy area is important, because actually discussing policy is a necessary condition
for framing to have any effect.
1.3 A Theory of Framing & Policy Change
Next, I ask: why and does framing influence policy change in Congress? My argument in its most
condensed form is simply that which frames are used to discuss a policy area, the framing set,
highlights different dimensions of consideration for those deciding what to put on the agenda and
how to vote. Depending on which evaluative dimensions are used to judge legislation, a bill may or
may not progress through the process, be passed by either chamber, and become law. Thus, as the
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frames used change—as the frame set changes—policy changes. However, if the frames used do
not change, then policy is less likely to change. Further, this occurs within a broader context and
institutional system. Changes in the broader context and system may also and will influence policy
change. I should highlight that this explanation relies on changes to the bundle of frames used rather
than on the use, strength, and characteristics of specific, individual frames. This is a shift from how
traditional studies of framing effects connect frames to change. An abstracted, brief, summary of the
story told and tested in this dissertation is presented in figure 1.1.
The frames used do not necessarily persuade onlookers on the merits. Rather they either
implicitly or explicitly help members of Congress evaluate whether or not their constituents will react
to the bill at all, whether that reaction will be positive or negative, and whether it might hurt their
constituents. To put this another way, while occasionally the frames used may shape the evaluations
on the merits, more often the public discussion of policy is a public relations game riddled with
cheap talk and coded language. The frames chosen and the overall discourse—the sum of frames
chosen—to discuss a general policy area (ex. health) and a specific policy (ex. the Affordable Care
Act) serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, public statements allow members of Congress to stake
out policy positions to signal to their constituents and other members where they stand. On the other
hand, public statements provide information to other members about how shifts within that policy
area and the passage or failure of specific pieces of legislation might be more generally received and
affect their reelection prospects.
To further build this explanation, I proceed in two steps. First, I present a theory of how framing
influences policy change in the abstract, where the only constraint on an individual’s action is to vote
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Theoretical Argument
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in line with their policy preferences and the primary goal is to make the best possible policy. While
these conditions and this environment are never truly experienced, it is helpful to discuss the link
between framing and policy change in its simplest form before complicating that explanation. Then,
I turn to the complications introduced when the abstract is placed in the context of the US Congress,
where individual members and the parties they belong to have to seek to achieve two (sometimes
competing) goals.
1.3.1 Framing & Policy Change in the Abstract
The policy making process begins, both in this abstraction and in Congress, as a series of informal
discussions and formally begins once legislation begins to be drafted. Eventually, it may be introduced.
Once introduced, legislators are given a binary choice: to pass it into law or not. How this is done
and the associated time line may vary, but the choice is the same. As a result, three groups form:
proponents of passage, opponents of passage, and those who are undecided. Opponents of passage
by definition are also protectors of the status quo; they do not want the current proposed change to
that status quo to pass. The goal of the proponents and opponents (or status quo protectors) is to
attract as many of the third group—the undecideds—to their side as possible. To do so, proponents
and opponents first clearly stake out and define their positions.
From this bird’s eye view of the landscape, I turn to better defining how discourse about a policy
is constructed and how that construction can influence whether or not a proposed bill passes—the
status quo changes. The proponents and opponents stake out and define their positions. When
considering legislation, in its simplest form, legislators consider two alternatives: passing a proposed
bill and changing the status quo policy or failing to pass a proposed bill and maintaining the status
quo policy. While the choices themselves are easily identified, they are not so easily defined in the
decision space. Position and choice A, in this simplified process, is passing the proposed bill. Position
and choice B, in this simplified process, is failing to pass the proposed bill in favor of maintaining the
status quo. Each position is identified relative to one or more dimensions. Dimensions themselves
are the evaluative criteria used to place and judge a given alternative—in this case a bill. Individual
legislator preferences and where each position falls are fixed along these dimensions. However, more
than one dimension can be associated with the possible alternatives. Thus, rather than thinking of
evaluations being tied to a lone dimension, positions are evaluated in a multi-dimensional space
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defined by a dimension cluster, which is the relevant subset of dimensions used (Riker, 1996; Jones,
2001). This prompts another question: How are positions tied to dimensions?
The answer is frames. Frames are a justification for the position that contain relevant information
about the policy (Riker, 1996). They are made to provide a clear connection between the position
taken (ex. HR 318 should be passed) and evaluative dimension (ex. how fair HR 318 is). By manip-
ulating which frames are used, the decision space changes. The frames made and the importance
placed on them provide a mapping between positions and dimensions. While there are an infinite
number of possible frames that could be used, only a small subset of them actually are. A small
number are made because time is scarce (i.e. Baumgartner and Jones 2010 and Adler and Wilkerson
2013), which means that there is not enough time to use every possible frames even if desired, and
legislators are rationally bounded (i.e. Jones 2001 or Miller 1956), which means they are cognitively
limited in how many frames they can process and utilize.
For a pictorial depiction of these connections, see Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.2, you can see the
three component parts: the possible dimensions, the frames, and the positions. The three horizontal
lines represent the possible dimensions, 1, 2, and 3. The density plots along each scale indicate
the distribution of the preferences of the undecided legislators along each dimension.2 The two
rectangles represent the two alternative positions: bill passage (A) and bill failure or maintenance of
the status quo (B). The arrows indicate the individual frames mapping alternatives to dimensions, a1,
a2, a3, b1, b2, b3.
As can be seen in the figure, arrows connect each position to a point on each dimension. The
vertical dotted and dashed lines indicate the point on the dimension that belongs to position A, while
the dashed lines indicate the point on the dimension that belongs to position B. In this scenario,
depending on which pair of frames are made (a1 and b1, a2 and b2, or a3 and b3) shapes how the
positions are connected to dimensions. The location of each position is different for each dimension.
Additionally, depending on which set of frames are used, different dimensions are used to evaluate the
choices, and a different number of undecided legislators will be attracted to each side. This assumes
legislators side with the position that lies closer to their preference. For example, if frame pair 1
(a1 and b1) is used, then the positions are mapped to dimensions 1. In this case a majority of the
2Distributions are randomly generated.
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Figure 1.2: Frames Connecting Position to Dimensions
undecideds lie closer to position A. Conversely, if either frame pair 2 or 3 is used, then the positions
are mapped to dimensions 2 and 3 respectively. In either of these cases, position B succeeds.
However, this is rarely the case. Typically, multiple frames mapping positions to multiple
dimensions are used. In this case then, it is the frame set rather than the individual frame or frame
pair that matters. To manipulate the frame set, proponents and opponents rely on strategies of rhetoric
and heresthetic. The goal of each type of strategy is not to alter someone’s preference along a given
dimension. Instead, it is to carefully use certain frames while not using others to talk about the
issue so that the distance between someone’s preference point and the choices changes. When using
rhetorical strategies, groups alter how they articulate frames and the weight they place on each but
not which frames they make. Heresthetic is the use of speech to construct the evaluative dimensions—
which frames are used changes the dimensions that are invoked. In turn, those dimensions shape
how that binary choice is made for undecided members. In this way, the set of frames, selected using
strategies of rhetoric and heresthetic, of each group is aimed at persuading onlookers to join their
side; they attempt to shape the dimensions used to structure choice. Therefore, emphasis on different
frames, change the dimensions that are used to identify policy positions, which in turn shape which
choice lies closer to them.
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To illustrate this further, the three hypothetical combinations of frame mappings from above
can be examined. These are presented in Figure 1.3. Each axis represents one of the three distinct
dimensions. Each combination shows how the positions map onto the decision space when each
combination of frames are used. Solid black lines indicate the placement of the proponent’s position
along each dimension, while dashed gray lines indicate the placement of the opponent’s position
along each dimension. The intersection of the lines is the position of each choice in the specified
and identified decision space. Finally, the points in each graph indicate the positions adopted by the
undecided members given the dimensions identified by the frame sets. Black circles indicate that the
position held by the undecided legislator is closer to the proponent’s position, while gray triangles
indicate that the position held by the undecided legislator is closer to the opponent’s position.
In the series of sub-figures shown in figure 1.3, the proportion of undecideds falling into each
camp varies depending on the set of frames used to determine the decision space. In the sub-figures a
and c, the majority of undecideds are closest to the position of the opponents, while in sub-figure b
the majority are closest to the proponents. This highlights how the frame set—which frames are used
to tie positions to dimensions—matter, at least in the abstract.
Taking this explanation one step further, assume that the the issue with alternatives A and B is
considered twice at two different time points. In each round of consideration, assume that only two
frames can be used. At the first time point (t1), opponents and proponents use frames 2 and 3 to
discuss the policy alternatives, which map to the first and second dimensions of consideration. In this
case, the opponents win the day: position B is preferred, and the status quo policy is maintained. At
the second time point (t2), the proponents decide to change one of the frames used, because they
lost in the first round. As a result, at t2, opponents and proponents use frames 1 and 3 to discuss the
policy alternatives, which map to the first and third dimensions of consideration. In this case, the
proponents succeed: position A is preferred, and the status quo policy has changed. Thus, changing
the frame set—which two frames are used to discuss the issue—changes the policy outcome by
changing which dimensions of evaluation are used. However, if the same frames are used, no policy
change would occur. In sum, by changing the composition of the frame set, the probability of policy
changing increases.
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(a) Frames Used Emphasize Dimensions 1 and 2 (b) Frames Used Emphasize Dimensions 1 and 3
(c) Frames Used Emphasize Dimensions 2 and 3
Figure 1.3: Changing Proximity of Preferences to Choices in Different Decision Spaces
Note: Solid lines indicate the placement of the proponents’ position and the dashed lines indicate the placement of the
opponents. In 3.2a, there are 4 who lie closer to A and 96 who lie closer to B. In 3.2b, there are 57 who lie closer to A and
43 who lie closer to B. In 3.2c, there are 6 who lie closer to A and 94 who lie closer to B.
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1.3.2 Framing & Change in Congress
In this abstracted view of how framing influences policy, choices are made in a vacuum, where
the individual actors are not constrained except by their personal preferences and evaluations.
Additionally, these abstracted individuals wish to make the best public policy possible. However,
policy change rarely if ever occurs and is considered in such an environment. Policy change typically
occurs in venues where there are constraints placed on those voting for (or against) proposed policy
alternatives. Not only does policy change rarely occur purely based on the merits, the individuals
making the decision are rarely completely altruistic; making the best possible policy is rarely the
sole motivate of members of Congress. In Congress, three characteristics of the institution and those
operating within its walls in both chambers complicate the connection between the effects of the
frame set and the policy outcomes. These are: the possibly conflicting internal goals of the parties,
conflict between individual and party goals, and an institutional facet of Congress. Additionally,
there are many other strategies that those pushing for or against a policy change via legislation may
adopt. By focusing on how the frame set influences policy change, I do not mean that nothing else
matters, but that in addition to all of those other strategies and explanations, the set of frames used
also matters.
We do not live or operate within that abstracted world. While there are still core coalitions
of proponents of policy change and opponents protecting the status quo, these actors operate with
a partisan context and may or may not include the party leadership of either or both the majority
or minority party. Further, instead of being completely autonomous seekers of implementing and
maintaining the bets policy possible, individuals typically belong to political parties, who coordinate
strategy among its members to achieve the party’s goals. The parties (and their individual members)
must attempt to satisfy two goals simultaneously: an electoral goal and a policy goal (Koger and
Lebo, 2017; Carson et al., 2010; Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007). On the one hand, the leadership
of each party attempts to guide their party such that their party either retains or gains the majority
in their chamber; this is the party’s electoral goal. They do so by coordinating legislation, to show
that they have done something while in office, and by coordinating messaging strategies or position
taking, to communicate why their party and its ideas are better. On the other hand, while seeking to
retain the majority, the majority party will attempt to pass a legislative agenda that is in line with
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its professed policy preferences (Rohde, 2010; Aldrich, 1995; Noel, 2014). Additionally, at the
very least, the party leadership will aim to block any piece of legislation or general proposed policy
change that might split the party (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007). However, this is a secondary
goal, because being in the majority is essentially a necessary condition to working on their legislative
policy agenda. In other words, to attempt to change policy through legislation they need to be in the
majority. This is because the majority party essentially controls agenda access at every point in the
process (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007).
To pursue these goals, they must communicate to the public and to each other information about
proposed policy changes, policy changes that are sought, and where they stand on those issues. In
crafting those messages, the parties—and more specifically those actively engaged with the issue as
active proponents and opponents—chose which frames to use; they build their frame set. In doing so,
they construct the decision space within which they operate both generally for the issue area and
distinctly for each bill. This duality of the levels of discussion exists because the broader conversation
about the general policy area informs how specific bills within that policy area can be discussed.
Through the public construction of the decision space, the proponents of a bill within the majority
party hope to increase the probability of their bill passing. Note that I am talking about the public
discussion of the general policy area and specific bills, not what is said behind closed doors. Behind
closed doors, the discussion may be more explicitly about electoral concerns than about policy or
not occur in a substantive way. However, publicly positions and actions need to be explained and
justified.
Because there is a constant, latent, dual consideration for every bill—whether or not the policy
seems acceptable and how enacting that policy might influence reelection prospects—frames either
implicitly or explicitly map to dimensions associated with each consideration. As a result, their
communication and messaging must also assist members of their own party (and sometimes of the
other party) to evaluate how changing the status quo generally in a policy area and specifically through
a bill will affect both their electoral and policy goals. Thus, the chosen frames either explicitly or
implicitly inform a member’s evaluation of how the public will view the issue and/or specific bill,
how that might effect reelection prospects, and specific evaluation of that policy change. For example,
on the chamber floor a member may highlight that the public wants the proposed change. While not
explicitly saying that voting against the proposed change will hurt reelection prospects, it is implied.
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With this party-centric view of Congress, the individual member of Congress has been obscured.
While, on average, each individual member may agree to toe the party line and see the benefits of
doing so, there are sometimes points at which the goals of the party and of some individual members
are at odds. Just as each party has electoral and policy goals, individual members do as well. The
primary goal of individual members is to be reelected, which is their electoral goal, and secondarily
to enact policy that shifts the status quo closer to their preferences or those of their constituents. If the
same legislative strategy could get everyone in the same party reelected, then there would possibly
be no tension between the goals of the party and the goals of each of its members. However, this is
not the case; passing some pieces of legislation may significantly damage the electoral prospects
of some of their members (Carson et al., 2010). As a result, individual members may sometimes
break from the party line; they may vote against the wishes of the party. Anecdotal evidence of this
conflict and the occasional break between party goals and individual action has been very publicly
seen multiple times in recent years. One example is the public break from the party that Senators
Collins (R-ME), Murkowski (R-AK), and McCain (R-AZ) made during one attempt to repeal the
Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare, in 2017.
Thus, there are two ways policy change via legislation may be advanced or blocked: convince the
party leadership to intercede if they are not already involved or identify and target the few legislators
on the margin who would fall on the other side of the issue given a modestly different decision
space. Those actively pushing for change in a policy area and those actively protecting the status quo
against those changes can use the public discussion aiming to do so. Each can attempt to construct
the decision space in a favorable manner, such that they can it increases the probability that they see
their desired outcome. This is complicated further, because as a bill progresses through the process,
however, who uses and relies on this strategy shifts. With each step down the legislative process (ex.
considered in committee, reported from committee, etc.), the probability of passage increases. As a
result, those actively pushing a bill forward might rely on other tactics to continue the momentum of
their bill. Conversely, the active opponents to a bills passage—those who prefer the current status
quo policy over the proposed change—will attempt to shift the set of frames used in public to shift
the decision space.
Finally, in addition to complications introduced due to party, the construction of the institution
itself matters; namely the size of each chamber and proportion is needed to make decisions. On
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the one hand, the size of the chamber might complicate the relationship between frame use and
outcomes. Smaller chambers may see a more immediate influence of shifts in the frame set than
larger chambers. This is because only one or two legislators may need to be convinced to join a either
the proponents or opponents in a smaller chamber, as in the Senate. However, in larger chambers,
many more legislators may need to be convinced, as in the House. It takes time to do so. As a
result, it may take longer for the influence of shifts in the frames used to discuss issues to be felt
in the House than in the Senate. On the other hand, the proportion of the venue needed to make
a decision might complicate the relationship between frame use and outcomes; high levels delay
the connection. The higher the proportion need, the longer it takes to reach a point where a vote
can be taken delaying action. This is because with a higher threshold comes a greater role for the
individual member and a reduced ability of the party to exert influence. The result is a delay in action,
because defection from a small number can deride steps toward passage. Delaying action results
in a delayed felt effect between a change in the frame set used and eventual outcome for a bill. In
Congress, higher thresholds are characteristic of the Senate rather than the House. In the Senate,
most legislation requires passage of a unanimous consent agreement to facilitate consideration on the
floor and in the modern Senate 60 votes are needed to invoke cloture during most deliberation.
As a result, conflicting expectations emerge as to the role of institution in delaying or facilitating
the influence of frames used in the discussion on bill passage. However, regardless of how long it
takes for frames to influence the outcome, this still implies that changes in the frames result influence
the probability of bill passage. These considerations condition rather than obstruct the connection
between change in the frame set used to discuss an issue area and the passage (or not) of bills
associated with that policy area.
1.3.3 Implications of a Connection in Congress
This theory generates a number of implications that if they are observed would imply that a connection
exists. First, opponents rather than proponents of a bill, or more generally those opposed to the
overall proposed changes to the status quo of policy in a given issue area, should be more likely to
attempt to shape the decision space through framing. Further, if a snapshot of the policy process
is taken, those relying on and attempting to manipulate the decision space are most likely those
attempting to halt the progress of a bill. This is because if an item actually reaches any part of
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the Congressional agenda beyond simply being introduced then the probability of eventual passage
steadily increases. As it gets closer to being considered on the floor, the greater procedural power
over the process the party leadership may wield. Because there are limited procedural maneuvers
that members who oppose the passage of a specific bill can fall back on they turn to other avenues.
One such avenue is publicly making speeches about the issue in an attempt to shape the decision
space. As a result, observed shifts in which frames are used should decrease the probability that bill
is passed, because the opponents are seeking leverage. However, identifying the set of frames used
for every bill and connecting that speech to that bill is incredibly difficult, approaching impossible.
As a result, instead of focusing the efforts of this dissertation on the first implication, I turn my
attention to the second major implication of this theory.
Secondly, if an over time view of the policy process is taken, then the shifting frame set used
by those attempting to change the status quo and those seeking to protect it will have strategies.
Proponents seek to change policy, which is a difficult task. As a result, they update their strategy;
in this case that strategy is the choice of which frames they use, the construction of the frame set.
Proponents will seek to increase the probability of bill passage by selecting frames that will shape the
decision space favorably. Conversely, opponents seek to maintain the status quo policy. As a result,
until they are faced with possible failure of maintaining the status quo, they do not shift their strategy.
On average, opponents will not change the frame set used. In the face of possible failure—policy
change—opponents will seek to decrease the probability of bill passage by selecting frames that will
shape the decision space in their favor. Taken together, this implies that greater change in the frame
set overall will result in greater policy change or an increased likelihood that bills in the related issue
area pass. Additionally, due to the varying institutional structures at different stages in the process
and in the different chambers, framing effects may take a longer or shorter amount of time to affect
outcomes. On the one hand, if more legislators are needed to make a decision, then framing will
take longer to have an effect. On the other hand, if a higher proportion of those making the decision
are needed to make a decision and/or to pass a bill, then framing will take longer to have an effect.
This is because it simply takes longer to conduct business. These implications are explored in greater
detail in chapters 3 and 4 and is tested in chapter 4.
Additionally, two frames should be common across all issue areas: (1) connection to the
American public; and (2) policy implication and evaluation. Each of these should be common across
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all issue areas, because members are trying to both implicitly and explicitly signal to each other
why voting for or against specific bills or general types of policy will hurt their probability of being
reelected or damage their standing with possible allies and donors. In public, the most explicit way
to do so is to explicitly talk about the opinion of the people and how a given policy will affect the
lives of the people. However, these are not the only frames that should be used: others should be
explicitly about the policy or process, and implicitly connect proposed policy changes to an individual
member’s reelection calculus and to a party’s estimation of their probability of retaining or gaining
the majority. I will return to this discussion in chapter 3, when I discuss how members of Congress
talk about issues in greater detail.
1.4 How Can Discourse and Framing be Measured?
In order to test each part of this theory, I need to identify and measure what and how members of
Congress publicly discuss general policy areas. Because I cannot gather every statement, speech,
and discussion about policy that members of Congress make, I identify a source of text as a proxy
for the broader public discussion that members of Congress are having: the Congressional Record.
The Congressional Record is the official account of what is said on the floor of both chambers and
extensions of those remarks. As a result, it captures speeches given during time both governed by a
rule or unanimous consent agreement (UCA), which is restricted to the discussion on a specific bill
or bills, and other time (ex. one minute floor speeches in the House), which can be about anything.
Additionally, it contains the daily non-policy related business, such as the pledge of allegiance and
morning prayer. Because I am concerned with policy speech, I identify and isolate which speeches are
actually about policy (ex. education, health, etc.) in the Record. However, simply by identifying the
speeches actually on policy does not fully isolate policy speech. To do this, I classify the paragraphs
within the speeches as either being policy oriented or strictly procedural (ex. “I yield the floor” or “I
motion to table the amendment”). I then discard the procedural statements, leaving only the policy
paragraphs in the data set. Finally, for the remaining policy oriented paragraphs, the frame they use
is identified.
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To do this, I use a mixture of supervised and unsupervised machine learning, which is discussed
in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.3 Supervised machine learning is a method of classifying a data
set according to a known codebook by identifying a subset of the desired data set whose labels are
known, and using them to train the computer to label the remaining unlabeled observations. I do this
to identify the over policy issue area. I code the speeches according to the Comparative Agendas
Project’s major topic coding scheme. Unsupervised machine learning is a method of extracting and
identifying concepts latent in documents. With text, these methods identify latent concepts using
individual words and strings of words. Because I use a data set that ranges over a decade and am
thus worried that concept drift may occur, I fit a separate dynamic topic model for each policy issue
area (Greene and Cross, 2017).
Due to my focus on the Congressional Record, I should clarify three underlying assumptions in
its use beyond that it is a representative proxy for the broader discourse occurring within Congress.
First, speech on the chamber floors at best represents the intended message and the public strategy
adopted—speech is strategic. While this may be obvious when considering the use of procedural
tactics, it is less so when considering discussion of policy. This means that by studying the text
alone sincere policy positions may or may not be recovered. Rather, speech on the floor presents the
message and information that is intended to shape perceptions, persuade onlookers, and structure
choice (Proksch and Slapin, 2014; Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov, 2009; Austen-Smith, 1990). Second,
coordination on the floor occurs. Individual members of Congress do not necessarily randomly
appear and talk. Rather it often is a coordinated effort by a party caucus or of another caucus (ex.
the Freedom Caucus or the Progressive Caucus). Third, coordination and strategy may vary across
policy areas and over time. In sum, speech is a coordinated strategy used to further goals.
1.5 A Brief Overview of the Dissertation
Essentially, this dissertation will work through each of these question in three separate chapters.
Additionally, across those three chapters the dataset is slowly built: first, I introduce the Congressional
Record as a data sources and discuss how speeches are coded for what issue area they discuss (chapter
2); then I address how frames are identified in the Congressional Record (chapter 3); and finally, I
3Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview and intuitive explanations of the process. For technical information, see the
associated appendices at the end of the dissertation.
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introduce a measure of change in the frame set between two time points using the Congressional
Recorded coded for issue area and frame use (chapter 4).
In the second chapter, I pose and answer the question: why and when are some issues discussed
in the House and Senate more than others? I explore how party goals and interactions with each
other shape how much different issues are discussed. I propose that the parties use the chamber
floor in both the House and the Senate to promote and build their brand by discussing those issues
they prioritize. Additionally, I propose that the parties react to one another in what they talk about
and that what is on the legislative agenda informs their choices of what to talk about. To test these
claims, I introduce the main data set used throughout the dissertation: the Congressional Record from
the 104th through the 112th congress (1995-2012) coded for what general policy topic each speech
discusses. I discuss how the policy area being discussed and whether a given paragraph discuss
policy is identified.
Building on the findings and dataset presented in the second chapter, in chapter 3, I question
whether the parties not only discuss issues at different rates but also discuss them in different ways. I
propose that in pursuit of further building their brands parties strategically frame issues in ways that
benefit them. In order to explore this, I present a cheap and reliable way to identify frames in the
Congressional Record using machine learning techniques. I show that frames are used at different
rates by the two parties and across issue areas.
Finally, in chapter 4, I turn to the primary question posed: does and why does discourse about a
general issue area and about a specific bill influence bill outcomes? I propose that as the set of frames
used to discuss an issue are between rounds of consideration changes, then the probability increases
that a new bill passes. Essentially, I test the central claim of this dissertation: the set of frames used
influences what bills pass. To test this, I focus on whether a bill proposed in two separate congresses
sees a different outcome given changing discourse and changing context. Additionally, I present
a measure of change in the frame set between two time points, which can be calculated using all
available data or on subsets of the data such as by group (i.e. for the proponents and opponents of a
bill). In doing so, I shift the focus from tracing individual frames to the set of frames used. I find that
even when controlling for surviving the winnowing process, sponsor and cosponsor characteristics,
and the changing context framing influences policy change.
28
Chapter 2
Reaction, Reelection, & Public Discussion
Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX) officially introduced what would come to be known as
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on November 2, 2017. Within two months both chambers had passed
it, and President Trump had signed it into law. Because the construction of the final bill took only
a few months, public knowledge of its contents was limited before passage. What discussion and
speculation did take place occurred in the media—on television news shows and in newspapers—not
within Congress. In fact, very little meaningful debate or deliberation directly on the bill occurred
due to the strategic choice by the Republican leadership to constrain the time frame for introduction
and consideration. In response to this process, Senator Durbin (D-IL), along with many of his fellow
Democratic senators, tweeted his displeasure about the process. Upon the Senate passing the initial
bill, he tweeted “On the floor of the world’s greatest deliberative body. @SenateGOP rammed
through a bill without even reading it.”1
However, the Republican party of both the House and the Senate had been drawing attention to
the issue of tax reform for years. Additionally, various previous reforms had been proposed both as
distinct pieces of legislation and in the general discussion beforehand. As a result, while the bill itself
and the specifics within it may have been rushed, the broad strokes had been shaped and informed
by multiple years of discussion. Similar complaints and comparisons could be drawn about the
Affordable Care Act of 2010, also known as Obamacare, whose process was also rushed, if less so.
The complaints raised by the Democrats during the (brief) consideration of the tax reform bill—and
by the Republicans during the debate on health care reform—may be justified, but those complaints
obscure part of the larger discussion and broader considerations that did take place and were raised.
1Other tweets included “Let’s talk about how today Senate Republicans will force a vote on a bill that neither of them
has read.” and “Trying to review the #GOPTaxScam but they are making hand-written changes to brand new text as we
speak, can anyone else read this?”
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This prompts the central question of this chapter: why do some issue areas see more discussion than
others?
How much the parties publicly discuss issues is important for a number of reasons. First, attention
allocation is indicative of the search for problems and solutions that informs and occurs before setting
the legislative agenda. By influencing what is publicly discussed, parties can simultaneously signal
what problems they are actively working on before and without being tied to specific pieces of
legislation, and they can influence what problems will even be addressed. Examples of this can be
seen in the numerous speeches that were given advocating for a repeal of the Affordable Care Act
before specific legislation was proposed and seriously considered. In shaping how problems are
identified and defined, each party can influence the eventual winnowing of agenda items (Kingdon,
2011; Baumgartner and Jones, 2015), which any specific bill needs to survive in order to become law
(Krutz, 2005). Second, public discussion of issues systematically informs what is done to address
those policies by setting “general themes that transcend a particular incident, structuring the content
of political discourse and policy making over a relatively long period of time” (Sulkin 2005: 45). This
provides a constrained set of considerations that influence which solutions (ex. bills) are proposed to
respond to problems that arise within general issue areas. Additionally, issue areas refer to broad
policy domains, such as education, the environment, or immigration. Third, beyond influencing
which issue areas see greater activity, public discussion of issues can influence the prospects of
specific bills. It can do so either by affecting public opinion, which then influences the considerations
of the parties, or by highlighting different aspects of an issue pertinent to individual members, such as
whether the passage or failure of a bill could damage reelection prospects. As a result, Congressional
leaders strategically attempt to control the amount of discussion that occurs (Curry and Lee, 2017;
Austen-Smith, 1990). Together these points suggest that the public discussion that occurs within
Congress matters.
During periods of high levels of polarization between the parties in Congress, as is the case
today, the ideological distance between the two parties is high, and there is seemingly little to agree
upon. As a result, in these periods, one concern about the process may be that only what the majority
party allocates its attention to in public discussion matters. Compounding this concern in the House
of Representatives is the reality that legislative rules severely limit the ability of the minority party’s
ability to affect policy outcomes in legislation (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007). As a result,
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possibly the only party that really matters is the one who controls access to the legislative agenda,
which ranges from establishing the parameters for debate to controlling committee outputs to which
version of a bill is actually voted upon (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007; Stiglitz and Weingast,
2010; Miller and Overby, 2010).
While many prognoses of the current operation of both chambers of Congress often look bleak,
recent studies have shown that Congress may be modestly less dysfunctional than much of the media
coverage, research by academics, and those working within Congress have depicted. Recent studies
of the House of Representatives, where the prognosis has been the most dire, have shown that more
legislative collaboration occurs than is commonly thought. One study has shown that bills today see
the same levels of bipartisan support as in early periods, at least for those bills that receive serious
consideration or pass in the House of Representatives (Curry and Lee, 2017). Using Dear Colleague
Letters, another study has shown that members in the House of Representatives still use and seek out
bipartisan coalitions to craft and pass legislation (Craig, 2018). Additionally, not only have studies
examined the direct incorporation of the minority party into the legislative process, but Hughes
(2016) shows that the parties are reactive to each other in what they choose to publicly discuss on
the Congressional floor using one-minute speeches in the House. These studies and other work
currently being conducted do not claim that either or both chambers of Congress are smoothly run
institutions; neither chamber operates in the same way that they did in the 1950s, 60s, or 70s. Rather,
they highlight that there is still a role for bipartisanship and the minority party in today’s Congress.
However, these findings have not been extended to studies in the Senate. Thus, studying how both the
majority and minority parties operate and how they apply to the Senate should be better understood.
Specially, I examine each party’s allocation of attention in in the discussion of issues on the
floor of each chamber. While practitioners and watch dog groups have raised concerns about the
amount—or lack—of policy discussion in Congress, it has been understudied within our discipline.
This prompts the central question for this chapter: why are some issues discussed more than others
on the House floor and on the Senate floor?
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I discuss the insights previous studies provide into
the process behind how parties choose what to discuss by drawing on studies explicitly on speech
on the chamber floors in Congress. I also draw from more general theories of how political parties
behave and what issues they choose to direct their attention towards. From this, I develop a set of
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expectations as to when different issue areas are discussed at different rates. Additionally, I propose
that what bills are actually proposed, considered, and voted upon influence what is discussed even
when parties are not constrained to talking about specific pieces of legislation. Second, I address
how I measure policy discussion on the floor using the Congressional Record, which has been coded
according to the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) major topic codes using supervised machine
learning. Finally, I test the expectations drawn from previous studies. Similar to Hughes (2016), I
find that the parties are reactive to each other; if one talks about an issue area, the other will also
talk about it. Additionally, I find that the issues that parties prioritize in their election platforms see
greater discussion than those that see less of an emphasis. This follows from expectations drawn
from theories that tell us parties will seek to build and maintain a party brand (Aldrich, 1995; Lebo,
McGlynn and Koger, 2007; Koger and Lebo, 2017; Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007). Additionally,
as expected, I show that the legislative agenda conditionally influences how much attention either the
majority or minority party discusses different issue areas even when they are not required to discuss
specific pieces of legislation.
2.1 How Much are Issues Discussed in Both Chambers?
Previous studies provide expectations for why some issue areas see greater discussion than others
in Congress. They fall into two camps. First, there are those studies directly on how parties and
individual members use the chamber floors of the House and Senate. Within these, the vast majority
of the attention has been placed on the House floor and specifically one-minute speeches. One-minute
speeches are one of the few times in the House, where the topic of the speech is not constrained by
the agenda. They can be about any topic ranging from congratulating a football team on winning a
championship to impassioned speeches on policy. Second, are studies and theories more generally
meant to explain how parties in Congress behave. Once again, these theories have typically been built
around and tested on party behavior in the House, but here I expand them to the Senate. Additionally,
I discuss how the bills proposed and considered in a chamber drive the discussion even when members
are not constrained to discuss specific bills or issue areas by the rules. Put in other words, what is
discussed and the degree of discussion could simply be reflective of the broader legislative agenda of
Congress, rather than strategic decisions by the parties on a behavior distinct from legislation.
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2.1.1 Studies of the Congressional Floor
The only study of congressional floor speech that focused on party strategy rather than individual
member behavior is by Hughes (2016). He proposes and then shows that the minority party can
influence the majority party’s agenda, at least in what is discussed in the House of Representatives,
He also shows that the reverse is true. Issue agendas of each party in the House converge on each
other, because parties are responsive to the same broader forces (ex. public opinion and the media).
As a result, to appear responsive, both parties must address the same issues. Additionally, because
attention across different venues is likely endogenous, one party talking about an issue may increase
the the amount of attention the media gives the issue and the importance the public places on the
issue. In turn, this induces the other party to talk about the same issue. This is true even if it is only to
discredit the other party’s claims about the issue area. These connections and this reactive process is
reinforced and amplified, because the electoral fortunes of individual members of Congress are often
intrinsically tied to their party’s label or brand. As a result, individual members accept coordination
in what they discuss by the party leadership (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Aldrich, 1995; Lee, 2009).
While his study focused on the House, similar processes may be at work in the Senate. While
the institutional rules vary between the two chambers and each has distinct histories, the same forces
influence behavior in each and members have to periodically run for reelection in each. This produces
the first hypothesis to be tested, which is:
H1: If one party allocates more time to discussing an issue area, then the other party will
allocate more time to discussing that issue area as well.
In addition to Hughes (2016), many others have studied how individual members talk on the
House floor, and a few others have studied how individual members speak on the Senate floor. In the
House, researchers have focused their examination on the use of one-minute speeches, while in the
Senate, researchers have studied symbolic speech during morning business. Across each of these
studies, the typical theoretical starting point is the assumption that the primary goal of individual
members is that they want to be reelected, and that beyond their goal for election they want to shape
public policy. To pursue the reelection goal, they want to increase their diffuse support among the
public and specifically in their constituency. Studies show that as a member’s margin of victory in
the most recent election shrinks, she/he speaks more, the more likely she/he are to be on-message
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when she/he speak, and the more likely she/he are to give partisan speeches (Hill and Hurley, 2002;
Morris, 2001). Additionally, in pursuit of both their reelection goals and in an effort to inform policy,
more ideologically extreme members speak more and are more likely to give off-message speeches
(Harris, 2005). In sum, pursuit of reelection influences whether individual members speak and what
they say when they do.
Unfortunately, there are two problems with trying to directly extract implications from these
studies. First, these studies focus specifically on whether speeches were given, whether they were
policy oriented, and whether they were partisan. They do not evaluate what policy area they discussed.
Second, these studies focused on individual members of Congress rather than the party, which is
the subject of this chapter. Making this additional step is not problematic, because parties organize
and coordinate floor speech at almost every point—both during periods governed and not governed
by a rule or in committee on the whole in the House or by a Unanimous Consent Agreement or in
executive session in the Senate. As a result, one reason policy discussion may vary is due to electoral
considerations of each party rather than the individual members. The question then is how and why.
2.1.2 From Partisan Priorities to Policy Discussion
While the specific literature on what is said on the floor of either the House or Senate cannot directly
provide expectations based on electoral considerations, the broader literature on how parties behave
can. More specifically, those theories that produce expectations as to how the parties construct their
agendas are most informative. For this, I turn to Cartel Theory and Strategic Party Government for
an answer. The starting place for each theory is that each party in Congress seeks to retain or gain
majority party status. This means that electoral considerations constantly shape party strategy in
every form, which is in line with the findings in previous studies on individual members of Congress.
From this, I can generate analogous expectations as those in previous studies but for the party rather
than for the individual members.
One way that parties pursue their electoral goals is by building and maintaining a party label
or brand. By providing voters with a set of associations with the party that they can quickly make
a decision based on, a party label or brand assists individual members of a party get reelected. As
a result, party leaders attempt to maintain and enhance the party’s brand by strategically building
it. Typically, this has been studied through the legislation they propose, their votes on legislation,
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and the positions they publicly take. However, it may also inform what they choose to talk about.
The majority party consistently attempts to suppress bills that might divide the party (Cox and
McCubbins, 2005, 2007; Koger and Lebo, 2017) and occasionally seeks to propose and pass bills in
line with their brand (Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 2010). While the typical application of this logic is to
the proposal and consideration of bills, it can be applied to other areas of Congressional activity as
well, if the party can be assumed or shown to coordinate action in that arena.
Parties coordinate speech making on the chamber floor. As a result, a similar logic to what bills
are proposed or suppressed should apply to what is discussed. The issue areas discussed should
highlight the issue areas that are prioritized by the party, while those that are not prioritized should be
discussed less. This does not mean that what each party publicly discusses or the amount of attention
different policy areas garner must correspond to what is on the legislative agenda. Speech on the
floor of either chamber is an easier activity and less risky activity than the construction and passage
of bills. As a result, attention in the different venues may or may not vary.
If parties are seeking to build and maintain their respective brands both through the proposal
and pursuit of legislation and by publicly taking positions in speeches, a possible tension emerges
(Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007; Carson et al., 2010; Koger and Lebo, 2017). On the one hand, a
party needs to achieve some policy goals to show that it can deliver at least partially on its promises
and be modestly functional. On the other hand, it needs to facilitate a sufficient amount of position
taking to occur to communicate what the party and its members stand for. However, with more
discussion comes the increased risk of new considerations emerging, which might derail a bill’s
progress through the process (Baumgartner and Jones, 2015; Curry, 2015). As a result, these two
tactics are possibly in conflict with each other.
However, as Koger and Lebo (2017) show, when allocating attention, the parties prioritize
position taking over problem solving. As a result, this possible tension gives way to a preference for
facilitating public discussion on those issues prioritized by the party. Thus, building and maintaining
the party brand or label continues. Second, the overall amount of discussion may fluctuate depending
on the margin of control the majority party has and the degree of party unity. Essentially if the party
is highly unified, then more speech is expected. This is because the party leadership can expect that
its members are more likely to toe the party line. Conversely, if the margin of control of the majority
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party is slim, then less discussion is likely to occur. This is because greater discussion by members
of a party that is not unified may detract from and confuse the party’s brand.
From this discussion, an expectation emerges as to why some policy areas are discussed more
than others based on the party goal of attaining or retaining the majority in the chamber. These are:
H2: If an issue area is more highly prioritized by a party, then the party spends more time
discussing that issue area.
2.1.3 The Pull of the Legislative Agenda
Finally, what is publicly discussed may simply be a reflection of the legislative agenda. There may
be no or minimal strategy as to what is or is not publicly discussed, beyond what strategy has already
been put in motion with regards to their legislative agenda. Instead, the parties may simply be
discussing the bills introduced, considered in committee, and on which they vote. In many ways,
the construction of discussion on the floor of each chamber provides some indication that this might
be the case. This is because only limited types of floor speech in either chamber occur outside of a
bill introduction or explicit consideration of a bill. Further, much explicit policy discussion occurs
during final deliberation in the House, which is governed by strict procedures and time constraints.
Final deliberation in the Senate is much less constrained even when governed by rules associated
with consideration of a budgetary bill, by a Unanimous Consent Agreement (UCA), or post cloture.
Due to these varied constraints on what can be discussed, I focus on the choice parties face
when deciding what issue areas to discuss in one-minute speeches on the House floor. One-minute
speeches are the most frequently used type of speech in the House whose content is not restricted by
germaneness rules. Other types include special order speeches and 5-minute speeches. However, in
the Senate, I focus on all speech on the floor. Even during floor debate in the Senate, members have
a certain amount of discretion as to what they discuss. This is because very little debate in the Senate
is constrained by germaness rules. Instead many members, begin speeches during debate by pointing
out that they should be talking about the bill but will discuss something else or that what they are
about to say is off topic. As a result, on average, the parties in each chamber decide what issue area
to discuss within these types of speech.
From this, an alternative expectation is generated:
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H3: If a party allocates more attention to an issue area on their legislative agenda, then the
amount that issue area is discussed should increase.
The legislative agenda could be manifest in a number of different ways: the bills proposed, the bills
considered in committee, and/or the bills that receive consideration on the chamber floor. However,
this does not necessarily rule out party strategy outside of the legislative agenda. Instead each
possible explanation may coexist. Coexistence of each explanation is possible, because, while what
is discussed may be linked to what is on the legislative agenda, distinct considerations govern how
much different policy areas are discussed.
2.2 Identifying Speech
To measure how much time parties spend discussing different issue areas in each chamber of Congress
by party, I use the text of the Congressional Record from the 104th through 112th Congress (1995
through 2012). The Congressional Record is the official account of what is said on the floor of each
chamber and the extension of those remarks. This includes commemorative speeches (ex. recognizing
the work of a girl scout troop in the member’s district), policy speeches, legislative debate, and daily
business (ex. prayer, pledge of allegiance, or schedule for the day). Nested within the policy speeches
and policy debates is explicit discussion and execution of procedure and construction of the rules
for considering policy in legislation. Within the Congressional Record, I focus on policy speeches
rather than commemorative speeches or general daily business to capture the division of attention on
procedure on the one hand and actually discussing the policy area on the other.
Additionally, as discussed above, I focus on different types of speech in each chamber. In the
House, I focus on one-minute speeches. In the Senate, I aggregate together all policy speeches and
statements within each chamber by party, which means that statements made during periods of time
on the floor governed by a rule or UCA are treated in the same manner as speeches and statements
made outside of those points in time. This aggregation does not make sense to do in the House,
because final debate is so highly restricted and constrained. However, this is not true in the Senate.
Within these speeches, I identify how much time is spent on discussing policy. I do so by
identifying which paragraphs within speeches are about policy. Here I briefly unpack how I do so
below from acquisition of the Congressional Record to what members of Congress are talking about
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to identifying how they speak about those issues. For additional information, see the associated
appendix.
To acquire the Record, I download it from the Government Printing Office (GPO).2 Then I
apply policy topic codes matching those used in the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) in three
stages to the downloaded speeches, which include all possible speech types. I chose to apply
Comparative Agendas Project major topic codes, because: (1) they capture the concept of issue areas
as broad policy domains; and (2) their use facilities easy integration of data on other key variables of
interest such as information about bills by issue area or party platforms coded for issue area. The
twenty (general) major policy topic codes are: macroeconomics, civil rights, health, agriculture,
education, environment, energy, immigration, transportation, law and crime and family issues, social
welfare, community development, banking, defense, science and space and technology, foreign trade,
international affairs, government operations, and public lands. The policy topic codes applied are
the major topic codes from the Comparative Agendas Project with an additional code for “no policy
topic discussed.” The “no policy topic discussed” category is important, because many speeches
are delivered to commemorate or acknowledge the work of constituents or are procedural speeches
necessary for the functioning of each chamber but do not contribute to the discussion.
I apply these codes to the speeches in three steps. First, I assigned known policy topic codes in
two was: (1) I matched speeches to a previously coded data set of one-minute speeches given on the
House floor (Hughes, 2016); and (2) by identifying speech content via the speech title (ex. direct
mentions of a bill in the title). Second, the speeches whose topic of discussion—if any—is known
are then used to train a supervised machine learning algorithm to classify the remaining speeches
into the possible policy topics (or lack thereof). Third, I use the trained algorithm to assign issue
area labels to the remaining speeches. The overall accuracy of the classification algorithm is 94%.
Additionally, the accuracy for any specific issue area never falls below 88%, and all but one issue
area has an accuracy of 90% or higher. For an extended explanation of the identification of where
the data came from and how policy topic labels are assigned to it, see the associated appendix at the
end of this paper. After classifying the speeches into policy topics, only those speeches actually on a
policy topic are included in the analysis.
2To download the Record from the GPO, I initially used a parser built by Judd et al. (2017) and then further cleaned the
data.
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Once the speeches are classified into policy topics, I break them down by paragraph to identify
whether the given paragraph discusses the issue area, and, when relevant, how the paragraphs talk
about the issue area. Speeches are broken down by paragraph to facilitate their identification, because
a single speech can contain multiple arguments about a given policy. Across those paragraphs, I expect
some to be oriented towards procedure—either making making procedural motions, responding to
procedural motions, or are the perfunctory statements necessary to move the conversation along—
while other paragraphs should be oriented to actually discussing the issue area. There are 4,261,184
paragraphs in the data set. The mean number of paragraphs for any single issue areas is 213,059
with a standard deviation of 157,363. The number of paragraphs ranges from 66,983 to 672,748 for
a single issue area. At the broadest level, paragraphs are classified as falling into one of those two
types: procedurally or policy oriented. All procedurally oriented paragraphs are dropped from the
analysis, to facilitate a focus on the time spent discussing policy.
To identify where in this general typology paragraphs—policy or procedure—fall, I fit a dynamic
topic model (DTM) for each policy area. In each dynamic topic model, speech paragraphs are treated
as the individual documents and Congresses are the time unit (Greene and Cross, 2017). Dynamic
topic models are specific form of topic models. Topic models use the co-occurrence of words in
documents to identify latent linguistic structure, commonly called latent topics. Dynamic topic
models divide the data by time period, fit individual topic models for each of those time periods, and
then smooth across those periods to connect identified latent topics over time. For those unfamiliar
with topic models, this process is akin to factor analysis and more specifically evolutionary factor
analysis. They identify k latent topics within the text that are constant over time. The number of
overall topics identified varies by policy topic.3 The two general types of speech detailed above
emerge from the dynamic topic models as meta categories with multiple latent topics fit within each
general type. While in this chapter, only the general typology is used (policy or procedure) to filter
out the procedurally oriented paragraphs, in the following chapters the specific latent topics identified
are discussed in greater detail and used.
3To identify the number of latent topics, I first fit individual topic models by time period and allow the computer to tell
me what number of topics maximizes coherence from a range of topics from 3 to 30. Next, using the best fitting number of
topics for each period, I fit a dynamic model across the time periods and allow the computer to tell me what number of
topics maximizes coherence from a range of topics from the maximum number of topics in an individual period to 60
topics.
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Table 2.1: Paragraphs from “PROPER AND LEGITIMATE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT”
Orientation Paragraph
Policy Meanwhile back at the ranch we have all kinds of people, well-intentioned people,
who are saying, “This has to be off limits. Of course that has to be off lim-
its. We cannot touch this, we cannot touch that.” I hope those of us who vote for
a constitutional amendment to balance the budget recognize, as we must, that not all of us,
maybe not a majority of us, will be here serving in the U.S. Senate and the House
of Representatives in the year 2002. Yet we are mandating what people will do then.
We, therefore, in my view, have the responsibility to plow a straight furrow, to tell
the people exactly what the situation is, to put the pain and suffering that is go-
ing to take place in making these cuts so they are clearly understood–to recognize
that, of all things, we may even have to raise taxes sometime before 2002 to accomplish the ends
we are about to vote for. When you mention the tax word around here, though, that is a no-no.
Procedure Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Note: Portion that is in bold to emphasize why paragraph fell into the given category. Portion that is
underlined emphasizes why the speech is categorized as macroeconomics.
As with factor analysis, I must apply labels to the found latent cluster—in this case latent topics.
To identify these general types and labels for each individual latent topic that emerges, I use the
twenty most informative terms (i.e. those terms that best distinguish that topic from the others) for
each identified latent topic. To validate that the correct general type is attributed to each latent topic
for each issue area, the researcher and two undergraduates separately applied the codes without
discussing them with each other. The result is a high level of inter-coder reliability; in other words,
the general types identified appear to be consistent.
For an illustrative example, take two example paragraphs, presented in table 1, from a single
speech on the floor by a single speaker. These statements were delivered by J. Exon on January 4,
1995. The overall speech is classified as being about macroeconomics and an example of each speech
type is presented. In these statements, the portions that are underlined emphasize what makes this
speech about macroeconomics (balancing the budget and the balanced budget amendment), and the
portions that are in bold emphasize what makes each speech a member of its overall type. As can be
seen, the policy being discussed is a balanced budget amendment and more generally achieving a
balanced budget. The first example is a policy oriented paragraph, while the second is a procedurally
oriented paragraph. Between the paragraphs, the main difference is whether or not the majority of
the paragraph directly addresses the policy considered.
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Rather than looking at sample of example paragraphs, I can examine the top twenty words
used to classify these latent topics. Continuing the example from above, the latent topics with their
associated list of “most informative words” of the paragraphs above are:
• Policy: people, american, american people, congress, country, people want, speaker, america,
believe, deserve, american people want, washington, american families, give, work, people
country, people know, working, families, understand
• Procedure: yield floor, yield, floor, president yield floor, president yield, chair yield, chair
yield floor, thank chair yield, thank chair yield floor, yield back, thank chair, yield floor suggest,
floor suggest, yield floor suggest absence, yield floor suggest absence quorum, floor suggest
absence, floor suggest absence quorum, president, thank, yield minutes
In the first example, which presents the top twenty words from the latent topic of the first paragraph
presented in the table, the words indicate a latent topic centered on working for the American
people, which indicates that the paragraphs are geared toward general discussion about the issue
area. Paragraphs categorized as this latent topic within macroeconomics, might be being used to by
members attempting “go public” or to indicate other members of Congress that to vote in opposition
to their prescribed policy position would hurt their electoral changes. In the second example, which
presents the top twenty words from the latent topic of the second paragraph presented in the table,
words that explicitly and solely focus on yielding the floor are seen. This is an action taken to move
floor business along. Thus it is classified as being procedurally oriented. The procedurally oriented
paragraphs are discarded in the ensuing analysis, which means only those paragraphs oriented
towards policy are included. For additional information on the dynamic topic modeling process and
validation, see the associated appendix.
2.3 Explaining Policy Discussion
2.3.1 Data
Using the one-minute speeches from the House and aggregated speech data from the Senate floor
on policy, I can then test the expectations laid out earlier in this chapter concerning the relative
discussion of different issue areas on the House and Senate floors. However, the specific variables
still need to be operationalized, and the actual tests still need to be described. I run a set of four
hierarchical linear models; each of which seeks to explain the amount of time spent discussing
41
different issue areas. In the ensuing analysis, the data is subset in a number of ways. Specifically,
separate regressions will be run for each chamber by party status. Separate regressions are run for
each chamber, because each chamber has distinct institutional history and are governed by different
rules. Additionally, while the expectations are the same for both the minority and majority parties,
the magnitude of the effect may be different, and the overall process by which each party sets its
strategy may be different. Within each regression, observations are defined by the issue area (ex.
education, health, etc.) and by year. As a reminder, this analysis spans 1995 through 2012, and data
divided by year captures the entirety of a session of Congress but not the entire Congress. This allows
for strategies to change midway through the Congress. Regressions are not specified with respect
to individual political party (i.e. one for Republicans and one for Democrats), because the theory
to be tested is concerned with the institutional effects of party status and chamber—not about the
individual, distinct political parties. Additionally, this is the same construction of the test (majority
versus minority rather than Republican versus Democratic party) as Hughes (2016).
Using the speech data, I generate four dependent variables. To operationalize how much each
party discusses the different issue areas by year and party, I calculate the number of sentences used
to talk about a given issue area, in a given year, by a party of a specific status. Sentences are used to
measure the time spent discussing an issue area, because they are the smallest units within a speech
that still transmits information. It takes at least a sentence to actually transmit some sort of meaning,
information, or frame to someone. Alternatively, I could have used the number of paragraphs or
number of words.4 However, neither alternative operationalization captures the concept quite as well.
Then I take the log of that number. The log of the number of sentences is taken for two reasons: (1)
each additional sentence matters less for the overall amount of attention allocated to that issue area
in that year by that party; and (2) the log is taken to ensure predicted estimates are bounded between
0 and positive infinity. For example, one observation in the data set may be the number of sentences
spoken about macroeconomics by the majority party in 1995 in the Senate. Table 2.2 summarizes the
raw values (un-logged) of these variables. As can be seen in the table, the number of sentences said
about a given policy area in a given chamber by a given party varies widely. This is true both across
the issue areas within each subset, and across the four subsets of the data.
4To ensure that the regressions are robust to the estimation of the dependent variable, I re-run the models using
paragraphs and words to calculate the dependent variables. The results are the same regardless of the specification.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for the Dependent Variables
Chamber Party Status Minimum Mean Maximum Standard Deviation
House Minority Party 164 2,417 16,492 2,288
House Majority Party 110 2,270 16,990 2,090
Senate Minority Party 35 2,578 21,249 2,536
Senate Majority Party 78 2,413 18,261 2,248
One note on the construction of this variable: I have aggregated all types of speech that are on
policy in the Senate. This means that speech not governed by a UCA or rule and speech governed by
a UCA or rule are aggregated together. In the Senate it is almost impossible to distinguish between
the two, because even if the discussion is governed by a UCA the discussion that occurs during that
period may or may not be about the bill. Additionally, deliberation can weave in and out of other
issues to be considered on the floor that day depending on how the time is structured, construction of
the UCA, and procedural motions made. One example of this phenomena was Senator Cruz’s (fake)
filibuster in the lead up to the passage of the vote to remove a provision in the budget proposed in
2013 to defund the Affordable Care Act (ACA). He did not talk about policy and he did not talk
about the ACA. However, he did talk for 17 hours. However, in the House this flexibility does not
exist, so I focus on one-minute speeches. As a result, the total number of sentences provides a broad
indication of the strategies of each party on what they do or do not spend time discussing.
With the dependent variable explained, I can now turn to the task of operationalizing the predicted
explanatory variables. These fall into three general categories of concepts: (1) the strategy of the
other party in that chamber, (2) the party’s priorities, and (3) the legislative agenda of each chamber.
Following this, I discuss the control variables to be included in the model.
First, I turn towards operationalizing the strategy of the other party. To do this, I simply include
the logged number of sentences delivered by the other party in that chamber. For example, if the
regression is predicting the logged number of paragraphs spoken by the majority party in the House,
then the variable would include the logged number of sentences delivered by the minority party in
the House. This is analogous to the measurement strategy used by Hughes (2016). However, I use
the number of sentences rather than the count of speeches; this is because the length of the speeches
in his case were all the same, whereas here they can be very different. One concern in using this
variable is that the coefficient will consistently be one; it will by construction indicate a one to one
correspondence. However, because there are a mixture of speech types, this concern is mitigated.
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Essentially, what is predicted is the amount of speech where the parties can discuss or not discuss
different issue areas.
Second, I turn towards measuring the priorities of each party. I use the proportion of the number
of sentences in each party’s platform on each issue area. The raw data for this comes from Christina
Wolbrecht’s American Party Platforms data set through the Comparative Agendas Project (2016).
This variable ranges from 0—is not mentioned—to 0.25—a quarter of the platform. The mean
proportion of a party’s agenda is 0.05 with a standard deviation of 0.04.5
Third, I operationalize the legislative agenda for each chamber. I do so in a series of three
variables: the number of votes taken relevant to the issue area by year and chamber, the days a
committee met to discuss the relevant issue area by year and chamber, and the number of bills
introduced relevant to the issue area by year and chamber. The number of votes is divided by 100, so
that the variable itself is the number of votes in 1000s. It is drawn from the roll call data set coded
for CAP major topic codes. The days in committee is also divided by 100 and is also drawn from the
CAP data sets. Finally, the number bills introduced is divided by 1000, so that the variable itself is
the number of bills introduced in that year in that issue area in 1000s. Bills are coded according to
the CAP major topic codes and drawn from the Congressional Bills Project. This will allow me to
test the relationship between the legislative agenda and what is discussed.
Finally, I include a number of control variables, which the literature suggests may be important.
The first set of variables I need to include as controls are variables to capture what is going on outside
of the walls of Congress need to be measured. Two outside forces were hypothesized to matter: the
media environment and the concerns of the public. Each is important, because, as I mentioned briefly
in the discussion of previous studies and the literature on party strategy and behavior, media attention
and public opinion are endogenous to the process. As a result, each might influence the amount of
discussion different issue areas receive. To measure the media’s attention, members of Congress may
be especially sensitive to the salience of the issue topic in the media. To do so, I use Boydstun’s
New York Time’s Index, which is a part of the Comparative Agendas Project. It is a normalized
index indicating how much attention the NYT has given to different issue areas based on how many
5Alternatively, the specific legislative priorities expressed at the beginning of each Congress and classify them by CAP
topic. This is not done, because the only data sets to have collected this information at this point only contains data for the
majority party (Curry and Lee, 2017; Curry, 2015). However, here I am concerned with the priorities of each.
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stores are written about them each Congress. This variable ranges from 0.71 to 1.52, with a mean of
1.08, and a standard deviation of 0.22. To measure the concerns of the public, I include the mean
proportion of respondents saying a given policy topic “is the most important problem” facing the
US from Gallup surveys. This data is drawn from the Comparative Agenda’s Project. The modal
response is that the issue is not the most important problem (172 of 720 observations), the values
range from 0 to 0.53, the mean is 0.05, and the standard deviation is 0.08.
Further, I control for whether the majority party of the given chamber is same as the president,
whether the majority party of the given chamber is the same as the other party, and whether or not
it is unified government. This is because what they choose to talk about may change dependent on
whether the parties of each chamber work in concert with each other or not. Additionally, I control
for whether or not the party is the Republican party. Once again, this is a binary variable. Each party
may adopt different strategies, and the leadership of the parties may have differing abilities to restrict
who gives floor speeches and what they say during them. Additionally, I control for whether the
Congressional session is an election year or not. This is important, because Congress is typically in
session fewer days in an election year, its second session of the Congress, than in non-election years,
its first session. Finally, I include random effects for year and policy topic.
2.3.2 Analysis
With the concepts operationalized, I turn to the tests of the hypotheses. As a reminder, to test the
hypotheses, I fit four regressions.6 Each predicts the logged number of sentences delivered on
different issue areas by year given specific institutional constraints (i.e. by chamber and by majority
party status). Table 2.3 presents the results of the regressions; each column presents a regression
on a distinct subset of the data. The first column presents the regression explaining the amount
the minority party in the House discusses different issue areas, the second column presents the
regression explaining the amount the majority party in the House discusses different issue areas,
the third column presents the regression explaining the amount the minority party in the Senate
discusses different issue areas, and the fourth column presents the regression explaining the amount
the majority party in the Senate discusses different issue areas. Each model explains the vast majority
6To address concerns of heterogeneity, I have also fit the models using bootstrapped standard errors. The results do not
change.
45
of the variation in the dependent variable, with R2 values ranging from 0.70 and 0.89. Additionally, a
quick overview of the models indicates that trends appear to be consistent between the two chambers,
but vary in distinct ways by majority party status.
Turning away from the general discussion of the regressions, I turn to evaluating the proposed
hypotheses. The first of these came from the Hughes (2016) study and states: if the other party
discusses an issue more, then the amount of time the given party discusses that issue area increases.
Supporting evidence for this hypothesis would be seen if the coefficients associated with the log
of the number of sentences spoken by the other party are positive and are found to be statistically
significant. This is precisely what is found across all four models, which indicates that regardless of
party status and chamber the parties are reactive to each other. This echoes the findings present in the
Hughes (2016) study. However, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the what the other
party talks about and the given party talks about. Instead, other factors influence how much an issue
area is discussed.
In addition to being reactive to one another, I hypothesized that parties will discuss those issues
that they prioritized more than those that they do not. If this hypothesis finds support in the tests,
then the coefficient for the proportion of the party platform variable should be positive in each
of the four regressions and statistically significant. This is essentially what is found: across all
four models in table 2.3 the coefficient is positive. In all four regressions, the coefficient reaches
statistical significance at the 0.05 level. This provides evidence that even when controlling for party
characteristics, the allocation of attention on the legislative agenda, the broader context, and a variety
of other possible determinants partisan priorities matter.
Third, I proposed that discussion of an issue area is shaped by that chamber’s legislative agenda.
Unlike the first and second hypotheses, this hypothesis finds conditional support. It appears that the
allocation of attention on the legislative agenda conditionally influences the how much issues are
discussed. Generally, the number of bills introduced in a given issue area in a given Congress do
not influence the amount different issue areas are discussed. Additionally, the number of days in a
committee hearing sees almost no relationship with how much an issue area is discussed except by
the minority party in the House. As committees discuss a given issue area more in the House, then the
minority party in the House spends more time discussing that issue area in its one-minute speeches.
However, the number of votes taken in an issue area in a given year does conditionally increase the
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Table 2.3: Explaining the Amount of Time on Policy by Issue Area, Log(Number of Sentences)
In the House In the Senate
Minority Majority Minority Majority
Intercept 2.41∗∗ 2.15∗∗ 1.36∗∗ 2.49∗∗
(0.34) (0.42) (0.34) (0.30)
The Other Party’s Agenda
Log(Number of Sentences, Other Party) 0.43∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.74∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Party Priorities
Proportion of the Party Platform 3.19∗∗ 6.03∗∗ 2.10∗∗ 1.91∗∗
(1.61) (1.78) (0.79) (0.81)
The Legislative Agenda
Number of Bills Introduced (Per 1000) 0.07 0.23 0.05 0.07
(0.22) (0.21) (0.11) (0.10)
Days in Committee Hearings 0.35∗ 0.30 0.04 0.01
(0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.10)
Number of Votes (Per 100) −0.20 0.49∗∗ 0.08 0.65∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18)
Control Variables
MIP Proportion 3.85∗∗ 1.01 1.07∗∗ −0.53
(0.79) (0.75) (0.41) (0.37)
NYT Index 0.70∗∗ 0.32 −0.17 0.07
(0.23) (0.29) (0.16) (0.15)
President & Majority, Same Party < |0.001| −0.13 0.07 −0.18∗∗
(< |0.001|) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06)
Both Chambers, Same Party −0.53∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.21∗ −0.12
(0.17) (0.22) (0.12) (0.11)
Unified Government −0.01 < |0.001| < |0.001| < |0.001|
(0.09) (< |0.001|) (< |0.001|) (< |0.001|)
Republican Party < |0.001| 0.07 −0.69∗∗ −0.53∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07)
Election Year −0.01 0.07 −0.10∗ 0.04
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05)
Year Y Y Y Y
Issue Area Y Y Y Y
AIC 772.01 717.06 342.93 299.37
BIC 887.61 862.11 478.10 435.22
Log Likelihood −356.04 −320.93 −136.64 −114.68
R2 0.79 0.81 0.89 0.88
Num. obs. 350 350 358 358
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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amount an issue area is discussed. This only true for the majority party however. Conversely, there
is no statistically significant relationship between the number of votes and the amount the minority
party discusses an issue, unless it is indirectly by the attention that the majority party pays that issue
area. As a result, while the alternative explanation that what and how much different issues areas are
discussed is a function of what is on the legislative agenda cannot be wholly rejected, I can claim that
above and beyond what the legislative agenda might indicate should receive attention on the House
floor and on the Senate floor the other party’s discussion on the floor and its own issue priorities
inform what is discussed and how much.
Finally, a number of interesting associations emerge among the control variables. Three findings
appear to be consistent across the models: (1) the Republican party consistently talks about policy less
than the Democratic party in the Senate; (2) whether the government and/or chambers of Congress
are of the same party appear to have no consistent statistically significant relationship with the amount
of policy discussion by issue area; and (3) there appears to be no statistically significant relationship
between media attention as measured by an index of NYT stories by issue area with the amount
of discussion a given issue area sees. Beyond this, both the election year and proportion of Gallup
respondents saying an issue area is the most important issue facing the US today produce conditional
effects. For both, they appear to be related to the amount an issue area is discussed by the minority
party. As the proportion of the public who says that an issue is the most important issue facing the
US today increases, then the amount the minority party talks about that issue area increases.
2.4 Conclusion
So, when are some issue areas discussed more than others? The answer seems to be in reaction
to the other party, in pursuit of building and maintaining the party brand to pursue the electoral
goals of each party, and to discuss the legislative agenda. Additionally, it appears that the majority
and minority parties respond to modestly different inputs: the majority party’s relative attention to
different issue areas is in part driven by what bills come up for a vote, while the minority party’s
relative attention is part driven by public opinion. Somewhat surprisingly, these results held true
across the House and the Senate. Despite different institutional rules and histories, the same patterns
in the amount of attention different issues areas see are observed across the chambers. Additionally,
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in pursuit of answering this question, I introduced a new data set using an approach aimed at lowering
the costs of large scale text analysis. I showed how a combination of supervised and unsupervised
machine learning can be used to identify concepts of interest in the Congressional Record.
However, in today’s Congress, where more steps towards have been taken to curtail public
discussion have been taken, this does not produce a rosy outlook. Rather, it feeds into the fears
expressed by Senator Durbin in the introduction of this paper. Additionally, it does not give hop
that there will be an increase in discussion of the issues anytime soon. However, simply because the
leadership and members are wary of public discussion of some policies and pieces of legislation, it
does not necessarily mean that anything would change if more discussion occurred.
This examines only one side of the concerns raised by those currently and formerly in Congress
and in the media. Senator Durbin, in the tweets quoted at the beginning of this chapter, did not just
lament the lack of discussion, but he also implied that if there had been more discussion the outcome
would have been different. This prompts another set of questions to be studied: does discussion
of policy matter; are the leadership’s fears warranted; can discussion alter outcomes? In the next
chapters, I explore these connections.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Frame Use in Congress
While some attention has been given to understanding when and how much different issues are
discussed by political elites, fewer have sought to study whether the two parties frame issues in similar
or different ways when talking about the same issue. To better understand how issues are discussed
and whether it systematically varies by party, look no further than today’s political environment. Take
for example the discussion on immigration that took place during the 2016 election. Then candidate
and now President Trump repeatedly focused on the threat of immigration and immigrants to national
security and the damage to the economic prospects of average Americans. Hillary Clinton, on the
other hand, discussed reforming the immigration system and protecting vulnerable populations, such
as Dreamers. Each talked about immigration in fundamentally different ways: threat as opposed to
the protection of vulnerable populations. During the election, each proposed substantially different
policies. Additionally, in the election, those talking about immigration in these different ways
attracted substantially different voters (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2017; Schaffner, MacWilliams and
Nteta, 2018; Wood, 2017).
So why study how issues are discussed? By better understanding how political elites talk about
different issues, new and additional insights might be made in a number of literatures. For example,
possible contributions range from better understanding who “follows the leader” in the public opinion
literature by allowing a more comprehensive study on how different frames may influence the
macropolity. Additionally, by better understanding how issues are discussed a better understanding
of which possible policy alternatives are considered and evaluated can occur.
To move beyond examining what is discussed in Congress to how it is discussed, a significant
measurement problem must be faced: the identification of frames across multiple issue areas over
many years. One reason this is a problem is that the traditional process of identifying and measuring
frames is extremely costly. Traditional identification and measurement of frames requires many
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documents to be read and coded according to an extensive codebook. Additionally, coders typically
must go through rigorous training to ensure sufficient levels of intercoder reliability. However, this
traditional process is extremely time intensive and costly, which makes it an intractable approach to
use to identify frames across twenty issue areas over eighteen years in millions of paragraphs. The
problem remains intractable if moved to a stratified random sampling of the documents is drawn:
100 speeches by 20 issues areas over 18 years results in 36,000 speeches that would need to be coded.
For one person working twenty four hours a day and only spending a minute on each speech, it
would take just under a month to read and code a sufficient random sample. Alternatively, if put on
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where workers are paid $0.25 per speech and three Turkers read each
speech, it would cost $27,000. However, for each this would be the best case scenario: for in person
human coders, it would almost certainly take more than one minute per speech, they would only
work on the project 10-20 hours a week, and multiple coders would need to read the speeches; if
using MTurk, more than three people would need to read each speech to converge of accurate labels,
which drives up the cost further.
To lower these costs, I turn to unsupervised text analysis. More specifically, I further leverage
the information emerging from the dynamic topic models introduced in chapter 2. As a reminder,
unsupervised text analysis uses the co-occurrence of words to identify patterns in the documents.
Complicating this problem is that a common coding scheme for frames over time and across
issue areas needs to be identified and used. This is challenging because the same frame used in
multiple time periods can use different language. For example, if black Americans are discussed
as a part of a frame, identification of that frame is difficult because the language used to refer to
black Americans has changed over time. Further, ideally, when comparing frames across issue areas
a common coding scheme for them would be helpful. This is because a common set of general
frames facilitates direct comparisons between issue areas. To address this, I adapt the general frames
codebook from the Media Frames Corpus, which developed a near complete set of frames that
transcends issue areas for newspaper articles (Card et al., 2015, 2016). The frame codebook was
developed by a team of computer scientists and political scientists. Additionally, I fit dynamic topic
models, which account for linguistic drift over time, to identify latent topics in each of the issue areas
(Greene and Cross, 2015, 2017).
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I address these measurement problems, the costliness of frame identification and concept drift, in
two steps. First, to measure the frames used in policy discussion in Congress, I once again turn to the
Congressional Record. As discussed in chapter 2, I identified when general issue areas are discussed
and identified policy-relevant paragraphs within these speeches. I did so using unsupervised text
analysis, and specifically by fitting a separate dynamic topic model for each issue area. I delve further
into the policy oriented latent topics that emerged in the dynamic topic model in this chapter. I use
the top twenty words characterizing the latent topics to identify which frames are used. The selection
of frames comes from a list of 17 based on the Media Frames Corpus codebook. This allows me
to classify the latent topics into a set of already defined and developed general frames. Second, I
validate the use of the latent topics as measuring frames in two exercises. I show that the process
introduced here recovers the frames previously identified in another study and that humans identify
the same connections between documents as the computer—at least when using the process on the
Congressional Record.
In this chapter, I develop a measure of frame use in Congress over time and across issue areas
using the Congressional Record. I also test expectations as to how those frames are used by each
party in Congress based on expectations of how each party talks to further their brand. This is
the first large scale analysis of how parties talk within Congress focusing on frame use rather than
whether “political” speeches are given or in civil rhetoric is used. First, I posit and then show that
across almost all issue areas members of Congress use a policy evaluation and implications frame
and a frame invoking what is best for the American people and what they want. Second, I posit and
then show that the parties will use different frames at different rates to maintain and further their
general brands. Specifically, I test whether the Democratic party uses frames centering on vulnerable
populations more than the Republican party. Additionally, I test whether the Republican party uses
frames centering on economics, or the costs and benefits of policies, and threats to safety more than
the Democratic party. I show that they do. In the next chapter, chapter 4, I continue to build on
this analysis by introducing a theory as to why the changing use of frames should influence policy
change, and specifically how changes to the set of frames used to discuss an issue area affects the
probability of bills passed within that issue area. I test whether a change in the frame set influences
policy change.
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3.1 Policy Discussion on the Chamber Floor
Discussion of policy occurs frequently and everywhere: “in formal and informal meetings between
members, constituents, lobbyists, and administrative officials; in committee and subcommittee
meetings and hearings; in party committees, task forces, and caucuses; in the media; and on the floor”
(Smith 1989, 240). While discussion can occur anywhere, only a fraction of it is observable, and
only a small proportion of that can actually be collected to be analyzed. One notable type of speech
that cannot be observed by political scientists is what is said behind closed doors—what is said in
private. The distinction between what members publicly and privately say is important, because the
considerations that they highlight may be different. For example, in private, party leadership may
more explicitly discuss electoral strategy in relation to what issues to focus on and how members
should (or should not) vote on different bills. However, in the public discussion these considerations
must be coded if they wish to transmit them. While this private discussion of legislation and policy
more generally cannot be observed, other forms regularly occur and are made public. Due to this, I
once again focus on one of these venues: the Congressional floor.
I focus on speeches on the floor of each chamber for a number of reasons. First, floor discussion is
most proximately related to the final outcome of the bill since the discussion takes place immediately
before the vote, and often summarizes the reasons for a vote. Additionally, the floor is where
members are provided the first formal opportunity to market their bill to others and the public, if
they read a formal introduction statement. Not only is it the first and last place a bill may receive
formal public attention by members of Congress, committees provide summaries of their activities
and the bills they report on the floor of the associated chamber. At every stage, speech on the floor
is coordinated by party leadership, the messaging teams, or bill managers, and it is highly scripted
in both the House and the Senate (Smith, 1989; Oleszek, 2013). As such, speeches on the floor are
essentially symbolic and theatrical. As a result, speeches on the floor provide a platform for parties
and individual members to legitimize the options being chosen between and educate other members
of the implications of legislation that is being considered (Smith, 1989; Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2006;
Curry, 2015).
In using speeches on the floor for these purposes, members and parties may reveal how they
want others—in the public, the media, and even in the chamber—to view a specific or general issue
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area. They may introduce new considerations that may in rare occasions shift the outcome of a bill.
Additionally, they highlight new implications of the legislation either as it relates to the policy itself
or subtly address how it may relate to the reelection chances of other members.
Second, the floor provides members and parties with the opportunity to reach audiences external
to Congress. Clips from speeches on the floor may be replayed on television, quoted in articles,
shared on social media. In talking to the public from the floor, members seek to structure how the
public views the issues under consideration, and by extension indirectly influence the behavior of
their compatriots in the chamber. Essentially, the floor allows members, caucuses, and parties to
“go public” on issues. It allows them to publicly take positions and claim credit. In doing so, they
can seek to mobilize external audiences who can in turn further influence the process (Smith, 1989;
Proksch and Slapin, 2014; Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2006).
Treating speech on the floor in this way, some scholars have studied what informs how members
talk. They have focused on what issues are discussed (Hughes, 2016), whether that speech is
commemorative or substantive (Hill and Hurley, 2002; Polletta, 1998), and whether that speech is
uncivil or overtly political (Hill and Hurley, 2002; Monroe, Colaresi and Quinn, 2008; Morris, 2001).
However, they have not examined whether frame use systematically varies, which is what this chapter
turns to.
Thus, while discussion on the floor may not always be complete, sincere, or meet idealized
norms of deliberation, it still informs discussions and reflects something important. In fact, its
highly symbolic, structured, and strategic nature makes it particularly valuable as an indicator of
how the relevant actors seek to portray their votes, actions, and preferred course of public policy. As
Austen-Smith (1990) showed through a game theoretic model, “...having a debate stage turned out to
influence final outcomes in some circumstances...”(145).
3.1.1 Variation in Frame Use in Policy Discussion
How issues are discussed on the floor of the House and of the Senate can vary in three important
ways: by issue area, by party, and over time. Framing defines and describes how issues are discussed.
Frames are statements aimed at altering which dimensions of evaluation are used when considering
alternative options. Within Congress, those alternative options are policies nested within bills and
the status quo. When speaking to broader audiences, members and parties aim to shape how the
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public and media perceive issues and the bills being considered to hopefully boost their probability
of reelection. In Congress, how issues are discussed, or which frames are used to discuss issues,
are influenced by the goals of each party. As discussed in the first chapter, both parties in Congress
pursue two goals simultaneously: an electoral goal and a policy goal. The electoral goal of each
party is to retain or gain majority party status, while the policy goal of each party is to drag the status
quo of various policies closer to the party’s preferences (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007; Aldrich,
1995; Rohde, 2010; Koger and Lebo, 2017).
In pursuit of these goals, parties need to transfer information to members about bills that indicate
how proposed policy changes relate to their preferences, and how the passage or failure to pass
specific bills helps or hinders reelection. Additionally, they want to do so in a way that gives them an
advantage on that issue and adheres to their brand, which is discussed in greater detail below. As a
result, two pressures shape which frames are used: (1) what needs to be discussed to carry out the
business of Congress, and (2) electoral concerns for the party.
As a result, while which frames are used to discuss different issues may vary, certain frames
should be universally used across issue areas—especially in the context of policy discussion on the
Congressional floor. The three pieces of information that consistently need to be communicated and
discussed on the floor are: (1) a description and possibly evaluation of what policy and/or bill is
being considered; (2) how that bill or policy will be considered and (partisan) evaluations of that
process; and (3) an indication of how the public perceives that bill and how it might effect them.
To do so, parties and members use frames to transmit that information. Three types of frames
should be universally, or near universally, used regardless of issue areas are: (1) policy evaluation
and implications, (2) the political process, and (3) concerns about the public or American people. A
“policy prescription and evaluation” frame is defined as discussion and consideration of the goals of a
proposed policy, the specific policies aimed at addressing problems, and specific evaluation of them.
A “political process” frame is defined as discussion and consideration of how things happen within
Congress and government more broadly, politics, and politicians. A frame centered on “the public”
is defined as discussion and consideration of what the public wants and public opinion. Each should
be near universally used, because when evaluating legislation members and parties need to evaluate
how proposed policy in legislation effects both their policy goals and electoral goals. Additionally,
in final floor debate on bills, the parties and individual members need to explain and raise concerns
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about the policies contained within them. This discussion prompts the following hypothesis about
frame use across issue areas:
H1: Virtually all issue areas should see the “policy prescription and evaluation” frame, the
“political process” frame, and a frame centered on “the public.”
In addition to the pursuit of carrying out their jobs in Congress, the electoral goals of the parties
should deferentially influence which frames the two parties use. In pursuit of their electoral goals,
the parties build and maintain a brand, which helps voters quickly and easily distinguish between
the parties, identify what each party stands for, and what they may do if they hold the majority in
Congress (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007; Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 2010; Koger and Lebo, 2017).
Traditionally, implications of the pursuit and maintenance of a party brand have been extended to
which issue areas candidates may talk about in the campaign, which issue areas see legislation, and
which issue areas do not see legislation.
Not only can the choice of issues for legislative introduction inform their brand, but how the
parties choose to discuss issues may reflect and inform their brand as well. By carefully choosing
which frames to use to discuss issues, the parties can manipulate how issues are perceived and which
party has an advantage on that issue. They can manipulate how their party is perceived by altering
the dimensions by which issues and the parties are evaluated. If they can shift the perception of an
issue to be more aligned with what is perceived as that party’s strong suit, then members of the public
may be more inclined to rate that party as more capable on that issue.
If this is true, then what should be observed? Stereotypical depictions of the parties can inform
expectations of how the parties may deferentially use frames when discussing policy regardless of the
general issue area. Using the mommy-daddy stereotypes of the parties is helpful in this respect (Rule
and Ambady, 2010; Egan, 2013; Staff, 2010b). The Democratic party is often depicted and thought
of as the “mommy” party, which seeks to take care of those in need and in vulnerable situations. It is
thought to be warmer than their Republican counterparts. This produces one hypothesis:
H3: Democrats will use a vulnerable populations frame more than Republicans.
The Republican party is often depicted and thought of as the “daddy” party, which seeks to secure the
nation and its citizens against threats both physical threats and economic threats. It is characterized
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by stronger or more powerful than their Democratic counterparts. To leverage these stereotypes in
their favor, Democrats should frame discussions of issues in reference to vulnerable populations,
while Republicans should frame discussions of issues in reference to possible or real threat—both
physically and economically. This produces two hypotheses:
H4: Republicans will use a threat to security and safety frame more than Democrats.
H5: Republicans will use a economic frame more than Democrats.
3.1.2 General versus Specific Policy Discussion
In addition to the general considerations of whether and why study policy discussion on the chamber
floor, a distinction in the scope of policy discussion is important. The scope of policy discussion
can be defined in two ways: specific and general. Specific policy discussion concerns a single
bill, package of bills, or program. General discussion concerns an entire issue area. Three things
characterize general discussion on the floor: (1) participants engage with and refer to each other both
directly and indirectly; (2) general discussion occurs over an extended period of time and possibly
across multiple venues (ex. on the chamber floor, in the halls, in the media, etc.); and (3) it is about
a general policy issue area (ex. social welfare) rather than specific bill or program (ex. TANF). It
is defined by the set of frames that different groups, including the parties in Congress, use in the
discussion. Specific discussion outside of the floor consideration of a specific bill rarely happens
except for major pieces of legislation.
How policy is discussed during specific discussion is structured by the general discussion in
that issue area. This means that the frames used within specific discussion of a bill or policy are a
subset of those in the general discussion about the issue area. Thus, general discussion is important
because it structures how members of Congress generally evaluate legislation in a specific Congress
in a given issue area.
In this chapter and those that follow, I focus on the broader form of discussion: general discussion
about an issue area. I do so for three reasons. First, it is the more common manner of policy discussion.
Second, no specific discussion occurs in isolation; rather it is nested within the context of the general
discussion occurring at that point in time. Third, not all specific issues, policies, and programs
generate specific discussion. As a result, spectators must rely on what they know about and how they
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consider the policy area generally to evaluate them. These considerations also include their party’s
stance and possible electoral ramifications. This comes from the general discussion.
3.2 Identifying and Validating Frames by Issue Area
If general discussion—and specifically which frames are used—matter, how can they be identified
and traced in issue area discussions over time? To associate frames with issue discussions, I build
on the data set constructed in chapter 2 by digging further into the policy-relevant paragraphs.
Paragraphs are assigned to one of seventeen general frames using the same process that allowed me
to bin paragraphs into policy-relevant and not policy-relevant categories.
To code for frames, I primarily rely on the frame typology developed by Card et al. (2015). The
Media Frames Corpus was created by an interdisciplinary team of computer scientists focused on
natural language processing and machine learning and political scientists whose primary research is
on the effect of frames and the media. Both their scheme and mine focuses on issue frames, which
are statements aimed at altering which dimensions of evaluation and consideration are used. Because
I am focused on a different platform for speech and discussion—speeches from the Congressional
Record rather than newspaper articles—I make modest changes to their original framework. The
frames used are essentially the same across issue areas.
In this section, I discuss the process in greater detail, showing how the latent topics identified by
the dynamic topic models are assigned to the appropriate, general frame. Additionally, I validate my
claim that general frames are identified by the model.
To validate that the latent topics identified correspond to the seventeen frames identified in the
adapted form of the frame codes in the Media Frames Corpus, I walk through two tests. First, I
show that this technique is successful at recovering frames previously identified as used in two
policy debates within Congress. These are drawn from a study on the quality of debate in Congress
(Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2006). Second, I show that the latent topics group paragraphs together by
frames. I present an association exercise to evaluate how often humans cluster the same paragraphs
together as the computer when instructed to group paragraphs by argument. Taken together, each
validation exercise presents support for my claim that the concept identified is the general frame.
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3.2.1 Identifying Frames
As a reminder, the data set includes speeches in the Congressional Record from the 104th (1994/1995)
through the 112th (2011/2012) Congresses on policy. Additionally, general issue areas are coded
according to the Comparative Agendas Project major topic codes.1 Once classified by issue area, I
break down the speeches within each issue area by paragraph. Then I fit a dynamic topic model to
identify the latent topics present. For the dynamic topic model, paragraphs are treated as documents
and congresses are treated as time units.
A topic model identifies latent concepts or topics in text by identifying which terms or words
cluster together. Additionally, it estimates the probability that a document belongs to the identified
clusters. Latent topics are the clusters identified by the model. There are different types of topic
models that one can use to do this. I specifically fit a dynamic topic model that uses non-negative
matrix factorization (Greene and Cross, 2017, 2015) rather than a topic model fit using latent Dirichlet
allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003; Grimmer, 2010) or a structural topic model (STM)
(Roberts et al., 2014). I do so because the language used may change even though the frame or
general topic of discussion used remains constant. This problem is called linguistic drift. Dynamic
topic models allow for and model this possible fluctuation by fitting separate topic models for each
time period (here for each Congress) and then smoothing across them. Either of the other models
does not incorporate this smoothing process.
For each issue area, I fit a separate dynamic topic model, which allows for different numbers of
latent topics being identified for each issue area. Between 15 and 43 policy relevant latent topics are
identified for each issue area.2 For the policy relevant latent topics, the latent topics are then assigned
to what frame each uses. As a result, multiple latent topics can be assigned to a single frame, and not
every frame is used to discuss every issue area. Each paragraph is then assigned to one latent topic,
and the frame assigned to that latent topic is attributed to it.
Put another way, within the policy-relevant latent topics for each issue area, each is assigned to
a general frame. The general frames transcend issue area, which means the same set of seventeen
general frames are used across the issue areas. There are a number of benefits to the development of
1For a longer discussion of how the Record is acquired and then coded for policy topic, please see the discussion in
Chapter 2 and the appendix at the conclusion of the dissertation.
2Between 25 and 59 latent topics are identified in total per issue area.
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a general scheme that transcends issue area, just as the Comparative Agendas Project provides issue
area codes that transcends venue and agenda. The two primary benefits to this approach are: (1) it
provides a coding scheme that allows for the direct comparison of the use of frames across different
issue areas; and (2) it provides a near complete coding scheme with which almost all documents
and paragraphs can be classified. However, one drawback is that individual, particular frames are
obscured by the broader categories. These are presented in table 3.1, which provides the name of the
frame and a brief description.
I make two modest changes to the list of frames used by the Media Frames Corpus. First, three
additional frames are added: “Linked to another issue,” “Vulnerable populations,” and “Placing
blame.” The first of these, “Linked to another issue,” is included to indicate discussion in a given
paragraph of a different issue area than the one the majority of the speech addresses. As a reminder,
issue area labels are assigned at the speech level, while frames are identified at the paragraph level.
In Congressional discussion, this might occur for a number of reasons, such as a member, coalition,
or party seeking to tie two or more issues together, two or more issues already being tied together in a
single piece of legislation, or error in the classification of the speeches into the CAP major topic codes.
The second two, “Vulnerable populations” and “Placing blame,” indicate specific subpopulations that
members may want to highlight as vulnerable or at fault, such as highlight the vulnerable position
of small family businesses or as blaming Fannie Mae for the recession. These are drawn from the
framework developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993) and used by Boushey (2016). Finally, the
“public opinion” and “quality of life” frames in the original scheme have been collapsed and re-named
“the public.” This was done to capture the broader discussion that may occur concerning what the
American people want or how Congress and its members works for the American people.
Using the twenty most identifying words for each latent topic within each issue area, each latent
topic is categorized into one of the 17 frame categories. This means that multiple latent topics within
a single issue area are associated with each frame. To determine how reliable this classification
process is, two independent coders identify whether or not a latent topic is on policy and then what
frame it is associated with. The inter-coder agreement is at least 90% across the issue areas. This
process means that multiple latent topics within in a single issue area may be classified as using the
same frame and that some frames may not be used in every issue area. Once all of the latent topics
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Table 3.1: Adjusted Categories of the Media Frames Corpus
Frame Description
Economic Discussion and consideration of the costs, benefits, and eco-
nomic considerations and trade-offs.
Capacity & Resources Discussion and consideration of the availability of physical,
human or financial resources, and capacity of current systems
to carry out policy.
Morality Discussion and considerations of the religious or ethical impli-
cations and virtue (or lack) of what is being considered.
Fairness & Equality Whether or not the current law, proposed law, current circum-
stances, or potential circumstances is fair. Considerations of
who a bill or policy works for or against.
Legality & Constitutionality Protection of rights and freedoms of individuals, corporations,
and the government.
Policy Prescription & Evaluation Discussion and consideration of the goals of the proposed
policy, the specific policies aimed at addressing problems, and
specific evaluation of them.
Implications of Laws Discussion and consideration of the effectiveness of a law, its
enforcement, and implications of passage.
Security & Defense Discussion and consideration of threats to the safety of the
nation, community, or individual.
Health & Safety Discussion and consideration of health care, sanitation, and
public safety.
Vulnerable Populations** Discussion and consideration of social groups that are viewed
as particularly vulnerable.
Placing Blame** Discussion and consideration of who is to blame for the current
problem.
The Public* Discussion and consideration of what the public wants and
public opinion.
Cultural Identity Discussion and consideration traditions, customs, or values of
a social group with a relation to the issue area.
Political Process Discussion and consideration of the process, politics, and politi-
cians.
Size of Government Discussion and consideration of the size and scope of govern-
ment.
External Regulation & Reputation Discussion and consideration of the international reputation,
position, and foreign policy of the US.
Linked to Another Issue** Nested discussion of another issue area.
Other Miscellaneous and unidentified frames used.
Note: * indicates that “public opinion” and “quality of life” codes from the Card et al. (2015) have
been collapsed. ** indicates new codes.
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Table 3.2: Five Example Latent Topics and their Assigned Frames from Macroeconomics
Latent Topic Frame Top 20 Terms
D01 Policy Prescription &
Evaluation
tax, cuts, cut, tax cuts, tax cut, income, taxes, estate,
relief, credit, pay, tax relief, estate tax, families, middle,
tax credit, income tax, increase, code, class
D03 Political Process budget, resolution, budget resolution, balanced, spend-
ing, balanced budget, fiscal, balance, committee, con-
gressional, congressional budget, balance budget, office,
budget office, budget committee, congressional budget
office, president budget, republican, chairman, priorities
D04 Morality work, hard work perseverance, work perseverance, perse-
verance essential, develop work, levels strive education,
ethic guide rest lives, guide rest lives, levels strive, de-
velop work ethic guide rest, dedication demonstrated,
hard work perseverance essential, essential students lev-
els, education develop work, work ethic guide, strive
education, strive education develop, perseverance es-
sential students levels, students levels strive education
develop, work ethic guide rest,
D08 Size of Government government, federal, federal government, spending,
money, taxes, state, programs, spend, local, government
spending, congress, private, revenue, spent, pay, dollars,
taxpayers, washington, control,
D11 The Public people, american, american people, congress, country,
people want, speaker, america, believe, deserve, ameri-
can people want, washington, american families, give,
work, people country, people know, working, families,
understand,
are assigned to a general frame, paragraphs are assigned a general frame based on which latent topic
is assigned by the dynamic topic model.
To illuminate this process a little more, I return to the sample of the latent topics from macroeco-
nomics. Table 3.2 presents the top twenty terms and assigned frame for five latent topics. For each,
latent topic the top twenty words are drawn, and a frame is assigned.
3.2.2 Validation Exercise 1: Recovering Frames
While the identification and classification of frames has been described, concerns over what was
identified by the models may linger. In the first validation exercise, I look to see whether the dynamic
topic models recovered the same general frames identified in a previous study for two policy debates.
Each policy debate is the final consideration of a specific bill that occurred on both the House floor
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and Senate floor by Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006). Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006) evaluate the quality
of the debate that occurred during floor debates on estate tax repeal and welfare reform by identifying
the central arguments to the debate and then evaluating those arguments. To bring the arguments
they identified in line with the scheme used here, I recode their arguments according to the frame
codes used to categorize the Congressional Record.
The first of the policy debates they study is the debate on the bill to repeal the estate tax in 1999
and 2000 in the House and Senate. The consideration of the estate tax repeal, which falls into the
macroeconomics issue area, studied by Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006) occurred during the 106th
Congress. Both chambers debated and passed a tax package that drastically scaled back the estate tax,
but President Clinton vetoed the law. With the election of President Bush the following Congress,
essentially the same bill was passed again amidst essentially the same conversation and was signed
into law. However, the bill included sunset provisions that subsequent Congresses would repeatedly
try to extend.
The second policy debate considered here is the debate surrounding the bill that would reform
the welfare system. This policy belongs to the social welfare issue area, as the US knew it up to that
point in 1995 and 1996. The policy debate on welfare reform resulted in the establishment of TANF,
or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
In their study, Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006) identify arguments used in each debate and then
evaluate their validity. To make their identified arguments equivalent to what is studied in this
dissertation, I classify the arguments they identify into the general coding scheme for the frames used
in this dissertation. I then see whether the dynamic topic models detected the same frames during the
same Congress for each issue area—macroeconomics in the 106th Congress and social welfare in the
105th Congress. If at least those same frames are detected, then the dynamic topic model process can
be said to have recovered frames rather than a different concept.
Table 3.3 shows the results of these comparisons. The first column provides the frame the
arguments belong to, the second column provides the identified arguments that use that frame, and
the third column indicates whether or not it is identified by the dynamic topic model. In each case,
the dynamic topic model and classification process recovers the same information as identified in the
previous study.
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Table 3.3: Identification of Frames in Congressional Debates
Frame Argument(s) Identified?
Estate Tax Repeal (’99/’00)
Economic (1) Impact of repeal on economic performance.
(2) Costs of compliance with the law.
Y
Capacity & Resources (1) Impact of repeal on revenue collection. Y
Fairness & Equality (1) Impact of repeal on the distribution of the
tax burden. (2) Whether the estate tax consti-
tuted double taxation.
Y
Policy Prescription & Evaluation (1) The rate paid by estate taxpayers. Y
Vulnerable Populations (1) Impact of the tax on the survival of family
farms and businesses.
Y
Implications of the Law (1) Impact of repeal on charitable contributions. Y
Welfare Reform (’95/’96)
Policy Prescription & Evaluation (1) The prevalence and causes of long term
welfare dependence. (2) The effects of welfare
on rate of out of wedlock births.
Y
Implications of Laws Prospects for welfare recipients to become em-
ployed.
Y
Vulnerable Population (1) Risks to the children of welfare recipients. Y
Note: Arguments come from Mucciaroni and Quirk (2006). Arguments re-coded according to the
frame codes used in this chapter and by Card et al. (2015).
3.2.3 Validation Exercise 2: Content of the Argument Clusters
In the second validation exercise, I question and test whether the identified associations between
paragraphs by the computer are by frame rather than by another latent concept. To do so, I test
whether the associations between paragraphs identified by the computer can also be identified by
humans if humans are instructed to group provided paragraphs by frame. Put another way, I test
whether, when instructed to group paragraphs by frames, humans will identify the same groups as
the dynamic topic model did. A number of aspects of this task make it difficult. First, because the
computer is not provided possible labels but is provided the number clusters that should be produced,
the by-hand clustering will be done in the same way: coders will not have frame labels to guide
their paragraph grouping, rather they are told how many groups there should be. Additionally, they
will only be provided with simple instructions to make groups based on the frame, and they will not
receive extensive training.
Not only is it a difficult task, but it is a different type of validation task than typical reliability
checks on human coding. As a result, a baseline expectation for how well or how poorly humans
should be at grouping paragraphs with a specific characteristic is unknown. To address this, a baseline
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expectation needs to be established, so that I can test whether those doing the task do significantly
worse than expected. In the next subsection, I discuss how I establish baseline expectations by having
coders repeat this same task using a data set that was hand coded by humans rather than a computer
for frame use.
In this exercise, coders are presented with a set of four paragraphs. They are instructed to
group the paragraphs into two sets, where each set should have two paragraphs. The criteria that
should be used to do so is the frame used in each paragraph. This means that each screen provides
simple instructions on what to do, four paragraphs, and two boxes. The order of the four paragraphs
presented is randomized. The specific instructions given are:
Place the paragraphs that share the same underlying argument or frame together.
Two paragraphs should be placed in Group 1, and the other two paragraphs should be placed
in Group 2. You must sort all of the paragraphs, and you must place two paragraphs in each
group.
Additionally, the survey is constructed to force respondents to sort all four paragraphs into the two
groups, and it requires the coder to sort two paragraphs into each box. Here the respondents are the
author and an undergraduate research assistant. This task is repeated for many sets of paragraphs. For
an example of what this looks like, see figure 3.1. In the figure, two paragraphs have already been
sorted, and the remaining two need to be matched. The instructions, bins, and paragraphs are shown.
In the figure, the paragraphs shown are part of the immigration topic. The paragraphs beginning
with CREC-1998-05 and CREC-1998-09 are grouped together by the computer. Each is labeled
as using the “implications of laws and their enforcement” frame. Each paragraph discusses how
the status quo policies affected the economy. Additionally, the paragraphs beginning with CREC-
1996-04 and CREC-2007-07 are grouped together by the computer. Each is labeled as using the “the
public” frame. Each paragraph centers on illegal immigrants and the threat they pose to the economic
and physical safety and security of the American public. In figure 3.1, two paragraphs have already
been sorted into two different groups and the two remaining paragraphs have yet to be sorted. Both
human coders coded this set of four correctly.
This process is repeated on two different random samples of paragraphs drawn from the Congres-
sional Record data set used in this dissertation. The first sample is a random sample of 100 paragraph
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Figure 3.1: Example Screen shot of the Clustering Process
sets drawn solely from the immigration issue area. This sample is drawn to directly test against the
baseline, which is set using news articles on immigration coded for frame use and is discussed in
greater detail in the following subsection. The second is a sample of 200 paragraph sets where 10
sets are drawn from each of the 20 issue areas. This sample is drawn to test the generalizability of the
findings based solely on the immigration paragraphs are. To draw the samples, within an issue area,
I first randomly select two frames (ex. economic and vulnerable populations), and then randomly
select two paragraphs for each randomly drawn frame (ex. the 1st and 10th paragraph that uses the
economic frame and the 31st and 1000th paragraphs that use the vulnerable populations frame).3
Two coders code all paragraph sets.4
3To ensure that paragraphs will fit on the screen and are comparable to each other, I filter the paragraphs by length
based on the number of words: the paragraphs that are randomly chosen from fall between the 10th and 90th percentiles.
If I do not do this, paragraphs that are too short to provide information are included. Additionally, paragraphs that take
up the entire screen are included. This impedes the ability of a coder to quickly sort through the paragraphs and make
connections between them.
4The two coders are the author and an undergraduate research assistant.
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To evaluate how well or poorly the coders perform, an agreement rate is calculated for each
sample. The agreement rate is the proportion of paragraph sets that the computer and the human coder
grouped in the same manner. This will range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates completely different
groupings in every case, and 1 indicates the exact same groupings in every case.
3.2.3.1 Establishing a Baseline
With this set-up, a question emerges: how good is good enough? Because this is a stylized test to
this specific task, there is no commonly recognized threshold or statistic for what a “good” or “bad”
proportion is outside of classifying all of them incorrectly is terrible and correctly sorting all of them
is excellent. Looking to possible measures of validity and inter-coder reliability, different possible
thresholds are revealed, which might provide different answers to the question in this circumstance.
To establish thresholds for what would be considered a high enough proportion to be seen as reliable
or valid, one perspective would be to categorize this as an inter-coder reliability task. The tweak
on this classical comparison would be that the computer is treated as one coder, and a human is
treated as the other coder. In this perspective, then I could simply calculate the accuracy of the two
coders, Cohen’s kappa, or Krippendorf’s alpha; each of which ranges from 0 or negative infinity to
1, but whose interpretation is different (Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken, 2002; Krippendorff,
2004). However, each of these assumes the task at hand is determining whether a given document (or
other object) belongs to a given class or type or not—not whether the same clusters are identified.
Additionally, these metrics are not typically used for how well a computer mimics the classification
that a human would have done. Typically, the accuracy, precision, recall, or f-score of a computer
to classify documents in the same manner as humans is calculated. However, these comparisons
assume that the task to be evaluated is whether or not a single paragraph belongs to a given class or
type—not whether the same clusters are identified.
Rather than use ill-fitting metrics and calculations, I establish a baseline rate of agreement that
should be seen by having the same coders perform the task described above on an equivalent set of
paragraphs that were assigned frames by hand. To do so, I use newspaper articles from the Media
Frames Corpus that are hand coded from frame use and use essentially the same frame codebook as
used in this dissertation. The Media Frames Corpus is the data set associated with the work done by
Card et al. (2015). Specifically, I use the corpus of articles on Immigration published between 1988
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and 2012, which amount to 5500 possible articles. Articles are broken down by paragraph and the
primary frame identified is associated with that paragraph.
As in the process described above, 100 paragraph sets are randomly drawn, and for each set
coders are instructed to group paragraphs together by frame. The same two coders that sorted the
paragraphs in the two random samples from the Congressional Record also preform this task. This is
important, because it is possible that different people have differing levels of ability to correctly bin
the paragraphs.5
Because this process is a duplicate of the task conducted with the frames emerging from the
dynamic topic model, it provides a more accurate and more direct evaluation of whether the agreement
rates calculated for the samples coming from the Congressional Record indicate whether the dynamic
topic model identifies frames. This is because it imposes minimal assumptions as to how the values
should be understood. If the proportion of clusters identified by the human coders as the computer
identifying latent structure is statistically indistinguishable from the proportion of clusters identified
by the human codes as humans coding frame use in articles, then the computer and human can be
said to cluster the paragraphs in a similar manner. Values statistically significantly lower would
indicate that the process described in this chapter performs worse than if done by humans and
possibly identifies a different concept. Values statistically significantly higher would indicate that
the computerized process performs better than when done by humans. Further, because coders are
tasked with sorting paragraphs by frame and frames are the underlying unifying concept connecting
paragraphs in the corpus used to establish a baseline rate, I can claim this tests whether the identified
latent topic is the frame used.
Two characteristics of this set up make it difficult regardless of where the sample is drawn from.
First, typically when humans are asked to identify frames in text they receive extensive training and
refer to extensive codebooks to inform their decisions. Second, coders are typically provided with a
list of frames to choose from to label the paragraphs rather than asked to group paragraphs together
that appear to use the same frame.
5As in the clustering exercise with the Congressional Record, the author and an undergraduate research assistant. The
undergraduate research assistant was only given the instructions shown on the screen.
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3.2.3.2 Evaluating the Human Clustering Validation
As a reminder, three samples are drawn and compared. Coders group the paragraph sets within each
sample, and then the proportion “correctly” grouped is calculated, the agreement rate. The agreement
rate is the proportion of paragraphs grouped in the same way using both the applied frame codes
from the computer or Media Frames Corpus and by the coders conducting the grouping task. The
three samples are: (1) the random sample of newspaper articles on immigration whose frame labels
came from humans, (2) the random sample from the Congressional Record only on immigration
whose frame labels came from the dynamic topic model, and (3) the stratified random sample from
the Congressional Record where 10 paragraph sets come from each issue area and whose frame
labels came from the dynamic topic model. For each, the same two coders read and grouped all the
paragraphs. Using the calculated agreement rate I preform a difference of proportions test between
the baseline set using the by hand clustering exercise of the news articles coded for frame use by
humans (Human-Human) and the proportion correctly grouped using the paragraphs clustered by the
computer from the Congressional Record (Computer-Human).
Table 3.4 presents the results of this exercise and the results of the difference of proportions
tests. The top half of the table presents the results from the first exercise focusing solely on the
immigration issue area, and the bottom half of the table presents the results from the second exercise
where a stratified random sample across all the issue areas is used. Within each row, the proportions
and tests for each coder and the coders combined are presented. As can be seen in the table, there
is variation in the proportion each coder correctly grouped in every category. Overall, among the
news articles, 0.72 or 72 percent of the paragraph sets from the news articles are correctly grouped.
Among the paragraphs from the Congressional Record solely on immigration, 0.68 or 68 percent
of the paragraph sets are correctly grouped. Among the paragraphs randomly sampled from all the
possible issue areas in the Congressional Record, 0.695 or 69.5 percent of the paragraphs sets are
correctly grouped. While these proportions may seem low, this is a difficult test, and a challenging
task for humans.6
6This exercise is similar to types of questions seen in standardized tests that students take to get into college for both
undergraduate (SAT and ACT) and graduate (ex. GRE) work. In those tests, they are used to discriminate between those
of higher or lower aptitude. The degree of difficulty in assessing connections varies across questions, and the ability to
correctly answer such questions depends on ability, practice, and training. As a result, here there should be variation in
agreement between coders and scores might be low.
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Human-Human (Baseline) Computer-Human
Coder N Agreement N Agreement Difference
Immigration Only
Coder 1 100 0.680 100 0.680 0.000
Coder 2 100 0.760 100 0.680 -0.080
Combined 200 0.720 200 0.680 -0.040
All Issue Areas
Coder 1 100 0.680 200 0.700 0.020
Coder 2 100 0.760 200 0.690 -0.070
Combined 200 0.720 400 0.695 -0.025
Note: None of the differences are statistically significant.
Table 3.4: Comparison of Paragraph Clusters on Immigration
If the latent concept identified by the dynamic topic model is the same as that coded for in
the newspaper articles—frames—then the calculated agreement either sample drawn from the
Congressional Record and that drawn from the newspapers should not be statistically significantly
different. If the latent concept identified by the dynamic topic is not frames, then the calculated
agreement should be statistically significantly lower than the agreement from the data set where
paragraphs were hand coded for frames. However, one difference between the documents I should
note is that on average the paragraphs drawn from the Congressional Record are more technical and
more difficult to understand than those drawn from newspapers. As a result, while there should be no
statistically significant difference between the groups if they are indeed capturing the same concept
(frames), I expect that the agreement for either sample drawn from the Congressional Record is
lower, but not statistically significantly different, than agreement for the newspaper articles.
In the final column of table 3.4, I show that the agreement rates are not statistically significantly
different between paragraph clusters whose frame was assigned by hand or by the computer.7
However, on average the agreement proportion is lower for the paragraph clusters drawn from the
Congressional Record (computer assigned frames). This provides support for my claim that the latent
concept identified is the frame rather than another random latent topic.
7This is true whether a one-tailed, which favors rejecting the null, or two-tailed test, which favors, accepting the null, is
conducted.
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3.3 Examining How Issues Are Discussed
With the frames identified in policy discussions, I can turn to analyzing in what ways they are used
differently across issue areas and by the political parties. To do so, I break the discussion in two.
First, I discuss how the use of frames varies across the 20 issue areas identified here. In the process,
I test the first hypothesis that states the frames on policy prescription/evaluation and the public
should be used across (almost) all issue areas. Then I discuss the variation in how frames are used
by the Democratic and Republican parties. In doing so, I test the last three hypotheses concerning
which party will use the vulnerable populations frame, economic frame, and security and defense
frame more. I should note that in this section I do not discuss or address the third way frames may
meaningfully vary: over time. This is discussed in chapter 4.
3.3.1 Differential Framing by Issue Area
First, I can examine how frame use differs by issue area and test the related two hypotheses.
Summaries of the results of the dynamic topic models and labeling process are presented in tables
3.5 and 3.6. Table 3.5 shows the number of issue areas that use each frame, while table 3.6 shows the
most used three frames for each issue area.
I posited that the policy prescription and evaluation frame, the political process frame, and the
public frame should be used across almost every issue area. This is shown in table 3.5, where the
public frame is seen to be used in 17 of the 20 issue areas and the policy prescription, the political
process frame is used in 20 of the 20 issue areas, and evaluation frame is seen to be used in 16 of the
20 issue areas. So, there is modest support for the first set of hypotheses: almost every issue area uses
the policy prescription and evaluations frame and the public frame. Additionally, the one frame that
is used in every single issue area is the political process frame. This makes sense because member
have to discuss the process to actually execute the process and one of the common complaints when
losing a legislative battle is about process.
However, as table 3.5 highlights, not all frames are used equally, which implies that different
issue areas see different frames used at different rates. To explore this further, I turn to table 3.6.
In the table, each set of the three most used frames for each issue area is distinct. For example,
for civil rights, the top three frames are health and safety, fairness and equality, and legality and
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Table 3.5: Number of Issue Areas Using Each Frame
Frame Number of Issue Areas
Political Process 20
Linked to Another Issue 19
The Public 17
Policy Prescription & Evaluation 16
Vulnerable Populations 15
Capacity & Resources 14
Economic 12
External Regulation & Reputation 11
Size of Government 11
Security & Defense 10
Fairness & Equality 9
Morality 9
Implications of Laws 8
Cultural Identity 5
Legality & Constitutionality 4
Other 3
Placing Blame 3
Health & Safety Concerns 2
constitutionality, while for the education the top three frames used are policy prescription and
evaluation, vulnerable populations, and the size of government. Additionally, while the political
process, linked to another issue, policy prescription and evaluation, and the public frames are used
in almost every issue area, three of the four are rarely the top three frames used for a given issue
area. Further, in some issue areas, none of the four make it into the top three frames used. Finally,
the frames posited to be most associated with the Republican party (economics and security and
defense) and the Democratic party (vulnerable populations) are not necessarily only used with those
issues thought to be owned or most associated by each party. For example, while the Democrats are
typically more associated with environmental policy, one of the frames—economics—posited to be
more associated with the Republican party is one of the top three most frames used to talk about
environmental policy.
3.3.2 Differential Framing by Political Party
In addition to examining what frames are used in which issue areas, I can look at relatively how often
frames are used overall across all issue areas by party and chamber. Table 3.7 shows the percent
of paragraphs that use each frame by chamber and party. The first column indicates the frame, the
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Table 3.6: Top 3 Frames Used by Issue Area
Issue Area Top 3 Frames
Agriculture Political Process (22.3%); Linked to Another Issue (16.95%); Eco-
nomic (16.46%)
Banking Linked to Another Issue (32.19%); The Public (22.33%); Policy
Prescription & Evaluation (21.29%)
Civil Rights Health & Safety Concerns (36.62%); Fairness & Equality (17.17%);
Legality & Constitutionality (16.89%)
Community Develop-
ment
Security & Defense (31.86%); Vulnerable Populations (28.7%); Polit-
ical Process (26.14%)
Defense Capacity & Resources (38.01%); The Public (28.16%); Political
Process (16.41%)
Education Policy Prescription & Evaluation (43.35%); Vulnerable Populations
(21.64%); Size of Government (8.72%)
Energy Policy Prescription & Evaluation (18.18%); The Public (16.13%);
Economic (15.41%)
Environment Linked to Another Issue (35.45%); Political Process (21.5%); Eco-
nomic (14.4%)
Government Opera-
tions
Political Process (44.54%); Capacity & Resources (28.43%); Policy
Prescription & Evaluation (17.95%)
Health Other (35.64%); Policy Prescription & Evaluation (19.62%); Implica-
tions of Laws (14.27%)
Immigration Security & Defense (36.2%); Policy Prescription & Evaluation
(32.61%); Linked to Another Issue (6.67%)
International Affairs Political Process (51.92%); The Public (22.98%); External Regulation
& Reputation (9.68%)
Labor Vulnerable Populations (28.05%); Political Process (20.07%); Policy
Prescription & Evaluation (18.46%)
Law & Crime Vulnerable Populations (25.99%); The Public (23.58%); Political
Process (12.87%)
Macroeconomics Political Process (30.32%); Economic (20.29%); Policy Prescription
& Evaluation (15.63%)
Public Lands Linked to Another Issue (25.53%); Political Process (25.28%); Vul-
nerable Populations (25.17%)
Technology, Science,
& Space
Vulnerable Populations (36.47%); The Public (18.15%); Linked to
Another Issue (9.76%)
Trade External Regulation & Reputation (29.13%); Political Process
(24.44%); Linked to Another Issue (19.37%)
Transportation Political Process (38.27%); Linked to Another Issue (32.59%); Policy
Prescription & Evaluation (14.07%)
Welfare Linked to Another Issue (27.53%); Political Process (24.54%); Vul-
nerable Populations (23.76%)
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second column provides the percent of paragraphs in a given chamber using that frame, the third
and fourth columns present that information broken down by party, and the fifth column indicates
which party uses the frame more if the difference is statistically significant. Statistical significance is
calculated using a difference in proportions test. For each chamber, frames are ordered according to
the size of the difference in rate of use from those used more by the Republican party to those used
more by the Democratic party.
Using table 3.7, the last three hypotheses concerning the relative rate of use of three specific
frames by the parties can be tested in pursuit of maintaining and building their brands. First, I
hypothesized that Democrats use the vulnerable populations frame more than Republicans. I find
support for this hypothesis, because Democrats in both chambers use the vulnerable populations
frame more than Republicans. According to a difference in proportions test, this difference is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Second, I hypothesized that Republicans use the economic
frame more Democrats. I find support for this hypothesis, because Republicans in both chambers use
the economic frame more than the Democrats. Once again, according to a difference in proportions
test, this difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Third, I hypothesized that Republicans
use the security and defense (or threat) frame more than Democrats. I once again find support for
this hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance. This supports the more general hypothesis that the
parties strategically choose frames to reinforce their brand.
Not only are the hypothesized frames used at different rates by the parties, but others are as well.
The Democratic party across the chambers uses a number of frames more than the Republican party
across both chambers. These are: policy prescription and evaluation and placing blame. The frames
consistently used more often by the Republican party are: legality and constitutionality, implications
of laws, and political process. The frames that are not consistently used by one party or the other are:
the public, capacity and resources, morality, fairness and equality, health and safety, cultural identity,
external regulation and reputation, linked to another issue, size of government, and other.
Additionally, as can be seen in table 3.7, the political process frame is used most often in both
chambers, with the policy prescription and evaluation frame being used second most often. In
the House, no other frame is used more than 10% of the time. However, the public, vulnerable
populations, economic, capacity and resources, and linked to another issue frames are all used
between 5 percent and 10 percent of the time in the House. In the Senate, the public frame and the
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Table 3.7: Percentage of Paragraphs Using Each Frame by Party and Chamber
Frame Total Democrat Republican Partisan Lean
House
Other 3.95 3.57 4.36 R
Economic 6.08 5.65 6.42 R
Legality & Constitutionality 1.19 0.92 1.48 R
Political Process 26.02 25.78 26.30 R
Security & Defense 3.48 3.39 3.58 R
Morality 2.08 1.99 2.17 R
Implications of Laws 1.59 1.58 1.59 R
Size of Government 2.81 2.81 2.82 R
The Public 9.06 8.89 9.24 —
Capacity & Resources 6.54 6.39 6.67 —
Placing Blame 0.10 0.10 0.09 D
Cultural Identity 0.18 0.22 0.14 D
External Regulation & Reputation 4.16 4.23 4.11 D
Health & Safety 0.88 0.98 0.78 D
Fairness & Equality 1.63 1.76 1.51 D
Linked to Another Issue 9.52 9.79 9.24 D
Vulnerable Populations 8.02 8.40 7.64 D
Policy Prescription & Evaluation 12.71 13.55 11.86 D
Senate
Political Process 22.16 21.90 22.40 R
Capacity & Resources 9.10 8.94 9.37 R
Security & Defense 3.17 3.02 3.39 R
Implications of Laws 2.31 2.15 2.51 R
Legality & Constitutionality 1.09 0.98 1.26 R
Linked to Another Issue 10.41 10.28 10.54 R
Fairness & Equality 1.89 1.81 1.99 R
Health & Safety 1.14 1.09 1.20 R
Economic 5.06 5.02 5.13 R
External Regulation & Reputation 3.09 3.07 3.13 R
Cultural Identity 0.49 0.49 0.50 R
Morality 2.92 2.95 2.92 D
Placing Blame 0.23 0.26 0.18 D
The Public 11.54 11.63 11.44 D
Size of Government 1.84 1.96 1.65 D
Vulnerable Populations 6.57 6.76 6.28 D
Other 3.74 3.99 3.48 D
Policy Prescription & Evaluation 13.24 13.71 12.65 D
Note: Frames ordered to range from used proportion more by the Republican party to used
proportionately more by the Democratic party. If a partisan lean is indicated, p-value is ¡0.05
according to a difference of proportions test.
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linked to another issue frame are used over 10 percent of the time, and capacity and resources is used
just under 10 percent of the time.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I extended previous studies of how the parties talk within Congress to whether frame
use varies by political party and by issue area. This is important, because how issues are discussed
shapes opinions about, evaluations of, and actions related to issues and policies. I posited that the
electoral and policy goals of the parties inform which frames and used both across issue areas and
between the parties. I showed that in line with expectations the Republican party uses the “economic”
and “security and defense” frames more than the Democratic party, and that the Democratic party
uses the vulnerable populations frame more than the Republican party. Additionally, I found that
both parties spend a preponderance of their time talking about the political process. This frame
includes discussion about how Congress and how a given bill should operate, lauding the spirit of
bipartisanship in some instances, and name-calling across the aisle in other instances.
Second, I posed and answered the methodological question: how can frames be cheaply and
quickly identified and measured in the Congressional Record? I show one way this can be done:
through careful processing of the documents, by isolating documents on different issue areas, and
by classifying paragraphs by frame. In doing so, I have: identified policy related speech on the
Congressional floor in each chamber, developed a way to identify frame used in each paragraph,
shown the reliability and validity of this measure with human coders and face validity tests, and
developed a measure of change in frames sets over time. However, while I show that the latent
concept identified by the dynamic topic model is most likely frames—at least for policy-relevant
paragraphs—I do not show that this is a general method that could be quickly and cheaply used
to identify and trace frames in other venues or other sets of documents. I have shown that in this
particular instance, focusing on policy speeches in the Congressional Record results in frames
being identified rather than another latent concept. Answering this question is important, because it
significantly lowers the costs of studying not just which issues are discussed but also how they are
discussed. This in turn facilitates future studies on the use of frames by members of Congress and
the parties.
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In the next chapter, I use the identified frames by issue area and Congress to measure change in
the set of frames used to discuss each issue area between Congresses. I use this measure to test a
theory that claims that greater change in the frame set should produce a higher likelihood of policy
change. I specifically test whether change in the frame set increases the probability of bill passage in
Congress by chamber.
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Chapter 4
Shifting Frames to Shifting Legislation
During the Vietnam War, the Defense Department decided that it should repatriate and detoxify
a portion of its chemical warfare supplies. A portion of the chemical weapons, specifically nerve-gas,
was stored in Okinawa, Japan. The proposed plan for weapons housed in Okinawa was to transport
them to the US via the port of Seattle, and then load the weapons onto a train for shipment to an
army depot in Oregon. Understandably, this plan displeased senators from those Northwestern states,
and they rallied to block its shipment and transport to their states. The uproar that resulted forced
the Department of Defense to change its plans: instead of shipping the chemical weapons to the
continental US, they would instead be shipped to Alaska. However, for the main architect of the
campaign against bringing the nerve gas to the Northwest, Senator Warren Magnuson, this was not
good enough.
In response to the altered plan, Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska proposed an amendment to
expressly forbid the Defense Department from transporting chemical weapons from Okinawa to the
US. When he did so, Magnuson devised a new strategy for passing the amendment and blocking
the shipment. Magnuson knew that the same arguments used to persuade other members to block
the shipment to the Continental US would not work; after all, Alaska was sufficiently far away and
the weapons would not have to be transported by train to a distant second location. To underscore
this shift, Magnuson’s senior colleague from Washington and partisan ally who would eventually
vote against Gravel’s amendment. As a result, Magnuson introduced a new argument into the debate,
an entirely new dimension of consideration of Gravel’s amendment; he connected the issue to the
Senate’s role in foreign affairs (Riker, 1986).
The Senate’s role in foreign affairs was the dominant issue of that month. The Senate had voiced
that desire in a considered amendment to an appropriations bill, which stated that the President
could not change the status of any territory involved in the peace treaty with Japan. However, the
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amendment seeking greater oversight on issues of foreign affairs was not dropped because the Senate
did not want additional oversight. Rather, it was dropped because it was deemed unfit to be a
part of an appropriations bill and instead should be included in substantive legislation. As a result,
Magnuson argued that this operation proposed by the Department of Defense was the President’s
way to avoid consulting the Senate on matters concerning Okinawa and the peace treaty with Japan.
The amendment narrowly passed by winning the support of those seeking to protect the Senate’s
prerogative. With a new argument introduced, the distribution of votes for the amendment in the
Senate shifted (Riker, 1986). Pursuing a sincere goal to affect a legislative outcome and by extension
policy, Magnuson used a heresthetical strategy to alter the discussion, shift considerations, and
change the outcome. However, this occurred before the current era of high levels of partisanship,
gridlock ridden chambers, and a 24 hour news cycle.
Fast forward a little over 40 years. The environment has changed, party plays a larger role, and
the chamber floor has become a platform to reach both internal and external audiences. Due to these
changes, discussion on the chamber floor may no longer matter for policy change. Additionally,
a casual glance at anecdotal evidence indicates that policy discussion may no longer matter (or
potentially even really exist) within Congress. Take two examples—one from the Senate in 2013
and one from the House in 2016. In 2013, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) held the Senate floor for a
17 hour fake filibuster to protest the expected vote to remove a provision in the budget that would
have defunded Obamacare. It was a fake filibuster because the end of debate and a vote had already
been scheduled before Cruz took the floor. While holding the floor, Cruz did not discuss policy
and did not put forward arguments as to why the Senate should or should not decide to include the
provision stripping funding from Obamacare programs. Hours after stepping down from the floor,
the Senate acted as it was predicted to: it stripped the amendment from the bill. Despite the lack of
its substantive content and the fact that Cruz’s “filibuster” would not impact whether a vote would
be held, Cruz captured the headlines. Cruz’s grandstanding was just that: a move to capture public
attention, not a sincere effort to push for or against a policy. And, in contrast to Warren Magnusons
shift in the debate about nerve gas, Senator Cruz’s actions had no impact on the final outcome of the
debate or the bill.
Similar instances can be found in the House. In 2016, in the wake of the Orlando night club
shooting, a group of House Democrats held a “sit-in” on the House floor led by Representative John
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Lewis (D-GA). Lewis called for the House to “rise-up” and do what the American people wanted:
pass gun control legislation that at the very least would restrict the ability of those on the “no-fly” list
to buy guns. The Democrats threatened to stay in the House floor’s well until the Republicans agreed
to hold a vote on the so-called “no fly, no buy” amendment. While occupying the well Democrats
made the same arguments that they had made before concerning gun regulations. Eventually, this
demand was met. A vote was held, and the amendment failed. Once again, these proceedings
garnered much media attention. While the effort may have been sincere, the eventual vote fell along
party lines. Party dominated discussion. Once again in contrast to Warren Magnuson’s shift in debate,
the Democrats did not change how they talked about the issue and did not affect policy even if they
did force a vote.
These contrasting stories raise the question: can shifts in the discussion in Congress still influence
the passage of legislation and policy? Alternatively, have partisan considerations and the evolving
nature of the institutions limited the influence of discussion?
I propose that the frames used in policy discussion still have a role—even if not all speech
surrounding policy is sincerely or realistically directed at persuading onlookers outside of the
chamber, or marginal or undecided legislators within the chamber. Frames influence policy by
highlighting specific dimensions of consideration while obscuring others. As a result, those pushing
for and against specific bills and policy change in an issue can selectively use frames to attempt to
shape the space within which the fate of a bill will be decided. Specifically, I test the hypothesis
that as the set of frames changes, then the probability of policy change within that issue area also
changes.
I test the proposed connection by identifying the same bill in separate Congressional sessions
and predicting whether the outcome of the bill changes given a different context. I identify the bills
that are the same using the text of the bill itself. Only bills that share at least 90% of their content
with another bill proposed in an adjacent Congressional session are used. By matching the bills, I
hold the policy considered constant, while allowing the context and strategies surrounding those bills
to change. As a result, I can better identify the effect of changing arguments on possible outcome
change. I show that a connection exists. Additionally, rather than tracing the effect of specific frames
on policy change, I introduce a measure of change in the frame set to capture how much change in
the discussion actually takes place. This allows me to avoid issues of how changing context may
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influence the strength of frames. In doing so, I provide evidence that frames are used systematically
to affect policy change in the form of legislation. This expands our current understanding of what
does or does not influence the probability of bill passage in the US Congress by reincorporating
rhetoric and heresthetic into the study of the legislative process in Congress.
4.1 Previous Studies on Policy Change & Bill Passage
Policy making and change in Congress occurs within a complex system that dooms most such efforts
from the outset. Multiple problems need to be solved at once for policy change to actually occur. For
example, enough relevant information about a problem needs to be in the hands of the members of
Congress, a member of Congress or coalition needs to take initiative to propose and shepherd a bill
through the process, and enough members need to be convinced that the policy change proposed in
that bill is an improvement over the status quo. Kingdon (1984) depicts this process as essentially
structured randomness: the system receives many inputs that occasionally and unpredictably result
in policy changing. However, when change occurs it follows a common pattern. Streams come
together during windows of opportunity, and change is typically guided by a policy entrepreneur.
Baumgartner and Jones (2010, 2015) argue that the process is not quite as random as it seems. Rather,
on average, policy changes incrementally but is occasionally explosive: there is a punctuation in
the status quo, which establishes a new status quo policy. Disproportion information processing by
members of Congress and the institution as a whole result in these punctuations. However, these are
general theories of policy change, not specific theories as to why specific types of change do or do
not happen.
Not only have many studied the general nature of policy change in Congress, many have
specifically studied what influences bill passage. They have identified a number of characteristics
that influence the process. First, the majority party wields tight control over the legislative agenda.
As a result, only bills primarily sponsored by the majority party have any probability of making their
way through the process; if the majority party places a higher priority on an issue, then bills within
it have a higher likelihood of passage; and bills belonging to issue areas that divide the majority
party are less likely to be considered (Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 2010; Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007;
Noel, 2014). Second, the institutional relationship between the two chambers of Congress and the
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presidency have been shown to matter—especially, whether bills are considered during divided or
unified government (Mayhew, 2005). Third, while scholars have found that more cosponsors do
not necessarily increase the likelihood of its passage, more cosponsors increases the probability
that it progresses through the process. Related to this, researchers have found that characteristics
of the primary sponsor matter (Krutz, 2005; Lee, 2000; Riker, 1962; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989;
Bawn et al., 2012; Carson, Lynch and Madonna, 2011). Fourth, others have studied the link between
public opinion and policy in Congress to evaluate the responsiveness of members to it (Lax and
Phillips, 2009; Maestas, 2000; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Calvo, 2007; Burstein, 2003). Finally, still
other researchers have examined how institutional rules and norms influence the probability of a bill
moving through the legislative process and of eventual passage. For example, the threat of a filibuster
or submission of a hold in the Senate can influence what language and amendments end up in a bill,
delay consideration, prolong consideration, or kill a bill (Koger, 2010; Curry, 2015; Binder, 1996;
Howard and Roberts, 2015). In sum, congressional scholars have noted a number of institutional
or party-based factors unrelated to the question of how issues are discussed. Therefore, any test
of my theory should control for these institutional factors as they have been found to be important
predictors of the odds of bill passage.
One aspect of the process that has been understudied is the role framing has in the production
of legislation in Congress, despite studies showing the power of framing to shape policy outside
of Congress and anecdotes of their power inside of Congress. An exception to this are the related
field of studies examining the role of information in bill passage and policy production. These
studies show that the amount of information—or the fear of new information being introduced—
influences bill outcomes and use of procedure by party leaders. For examples of this literature, see
Baumgartner and Jones (2014), Esterling (2009), or Curry (2015). However, these studies focus
on when and where information is introduced, not on how that information is packaged or how the
holistic discussion influences considerations. As a result, I add to the literature by incorporating
framing into explanations of policy change in Congress by explaining and exploring how issue
framing influences policy outcomes. In doing so, I do not say or claim that any previous explanations
are incorrect. Rather, I argue that a piece of the policy change puzzle has been missing.
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4.2 Relating Frames to Policy Change in Congress
Policy making in Congress begins with informal discussions about policy and legislation and formally
begins once legislation begins to be drafted. The drafted legislation may eventually be introduced in
the House or Senate. Once introduced, that specific bill may or may not be passed by the chamber. If
the chamber in which it is introduced passes it, then it is introduced into the other chamber, which is
then faced with the same choice: to pass or not to pass the bill. Shaping a bill’s progress through this
process are groups pushing for or against it. In each chamber, to shepherd a proposed bill through the
process, the proponents of a proposed bill organize and strategize to maximize the probability that
their bill is given consideration and eventually passed. Running counter to the efforts and strategy of
the proponents are the opponents of passage who want to maintain the status quo. However, not every
member of either chamber is actively participating in the back and forth between the opponents and
proponents; there is a third group of undecided or marginal legislators. The goal of the proponents
and opponents (or status quo protectors) is to attract as many of the undecided or marginal legislators
in third group to their side as possible. The strategies the proponents and opponents adopt take on
many forms. I focus on one specific strategy: the choice of frames used to transmit their messages
about an issue area and specifically about the bill they want to pass or block.
As discussed above, majority parties, divided government, and various elements of institutional
procedure have also been identified as important determinants of the legislative process for any bill.
Each informs and constrains a bill’s movement through the process, and each informs and constrains
the ability of the framing tactics to influence the process. Additionally, individual legislators belong
to political parties that coordinate strategy among its members to achieve party goals. Both parties
(and their members) pursue two goals simultaneously: an electoral goal and a policy goal (Koger and
Lebo, 2017; Carson et al., 2010; Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007). The leadership of each party
wants their party to gain or retain the majority in their chamber; this is the party’s electoral goal.
They pursue this goal by coordinating legislation and by coordinating messaging strategies. The first
allows them to show that they have done something while in office and can deliver on their promises,
while the second allows them to communicate why their ideas are better. While seeking to retain
the majority, the majority party will pursue a legislative agenda that aligns with its professed policy
preferences and goals and suppresses discussion of and consideration of bills relating to those issue
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areas that divide the party (Rohde, 2010; Aldrich, 1995; Noel, 2014; Cox and McCubbins, 2005,
2007). However, while policy goals are pursued simultaneously to the pursuit of electoral goals,
they are secondary to electoral goals. The majority party essentially controls agenda access at every
point in the process; as a result, they need to retain the majority to attempt to change policy through
legislation. Thus, its primary goal is electoral (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 2007).
However, this discussion obscures the importance of the individual legislator. In doing so, I
obscure the tension between the goals of individual members of Congress and the parties to which
they belong. This tension is what results in members that can be wooed to one side or the other. Just
as the parties have electoral and policy goals, individual members do as well. The primary goal of
each individual member is to be reelected to office. The secondary goal of each is to enact policy
that shifts the status quo policy closer to their preferences and/or closer to the preferences of their
constituents. If the same strategy and legislation could result in the reelection of every one of the
same party, then there would be no or little tension between the party and its members. However, as
has been seen many times, this is not the case. Passing some pieces of legislation may significantly
damage the reelection prospects of some members even while shoring up the reelection prospects
of others (Carson et al., 2010). As a result, individual members of a party may sometimes break
from the party line. Examples of this occurring range from members of the Freedom Caucus in the
House going rogue on party votes to pass major pieces of legislation such as the 2018 Farm Bill
and Senators Collins (R-ME), Murkowski (R-AK), and McCain (R-AZ) voting against legislation
seeking to repeal the Affordable Care Act.
Because of the tensions between party goals and the goals of individual legislators, there are
two ways policy change via legislation may be advanced or blocked. First, proponents or opponents
could convince the party leadership to intercede if they have not already. In this case, the majority
party leadership could sink the prospects of a bill by removing it from the agenda or whipping party
members to vote a certain way. Second, proponents or opponents could identify and target the few
legislators who fall on the margin. They identify those whose vote might change given a different
decision space. In pursuit of those legislators, both the proponents and opponents attempt to structure
the decision space to favor their position.
To pursue both goals, the parties must communicate to the public, to their members, and to the
other party information about what issue areas need to see policy change, possible policy change,
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proposed change in the form of legislation, and where they stand on those issue and bills. To craft
their message, the parties chose which frames to use; they construct their frame set. They do so both
for general discussion of an issue area and for the specific bills within it. Additionally, by definition,
the frames used to discuss bills within an issue area are a subset of those frames used to discuss that
issue area. Frames shape the decision space by connecting the specific policy proposals—the bill
and the status quo—to dimensions along which the preferences of individual legislators fall. By
using certain frames rather than others, specific dimensions are then used to consider and evaluate
legislation. Through the manipulation of the dimensions used to evaluate legislation, the distance
between the bill, status quo point, and legislators can be manipulated. For example, as seen in
chapter one, the use of certain frames rather than others resulted in a proposed bill to pass in one
circumstance and not pass in others. For another example, if legislators are considering a bill to
raise taxes, initially legislators may only discuss the amount they need to raise to balance the budget.
In this case, a legislator’s evaluation of the bill might be determined by the extent to which he or
she thinks the budget should be balanced by raising taxes rather than cutting funding. However, if
another legislator raises another consideration such as what the role of the federal government should
be or the fairness of the proposed taxes, evaluations of the bill may change.
Because each party’s dual goals underlie how every bill is evaluated, frames either implicitly or
explicitly map to dimensions associated with each. Essentially, the frames used inform considerations
of whether the policies proposed in the legislation seem acceptable themselves and how the passage
or failure to pass a bill may influence reelection prospects. As a result, the messaging strategies of
each party must assist the members of their own party to evaluate how changing the status quo in
an issue area and through the passage of various bills affects their electoral goals and their policy
goals. This means that the frames used in the discussion must either explicitly or implicitly inform
a member’s evaluation of how the public will view or views the issue area and/or bill, how taking
action might affect reelection prospects, and evaluation of the proposed policy change. For example,
on the chamber floor, a member may make a speech highlighting the ways in which a given bill will
harm the American people. She implicitly says that voting against the bill will hurt one’s reelection
prospects, while explicitly saying the bill is bad policy.
To use messaging to change policy, the parties, and specifically the proponents and opponents,
can change the frames they use and the rates at which they use those frames. By using different frames
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in the discussion, the evaluative dimensions used in the consideration of the policy alternatives change.
Some combinations of frames favor one team, while others favor the other team. To strategically
manipulate the construction of the discussion, proponents and opponents can rely on rhetorical
and heresthetical strategies. Rhetorical strategies involve a team altering the emphasis it places
on each argument used. Heresthetical strategies involve a team altering which arguments they
make. Both result in changes to the frame set but in different ways. Changing strategies result
in changing frame sets. Parties may change their strategies in response to shifting public opinion,
shifting media coverage, or after having failed to generate the policy change they wanted. Changing
discussion results in different considerations. Different considerations can influence the actions of
those belonging to the undecided group.
This does not mean that a brand new frame needs to be introduced. Instead, the amount of
attention given to different frames can change and produce similar results. Take for example the
debate on health care reform in 1993 and 1994 and again in 2009 and 2010. In each period, Democrats
and Republicans used frames and arguments that agreed with and promoted their position. Democratic
supporters of the legislation used speech on the floor to highlight the millions of Americans without
health insurance and how the proposed bill would address that issue. Republicans opposing the bill
brought attention to controversial portions of the law, such as the cost associated with it, and to the
possible unfairness in the political process the bill went through. While all of those frames were used
in both periods, they were given different amounts of attention and were used at different rates by
the parties (Staff, 2010a; Annas, 1995; Foster et al., 2014; Braun, 1995; Clymer, Pear and Toner,
1994). In the 1993/1994 debate, there was a more of an emphasis on the process than in 2009/2010,
and in 2009/2010, there was more of an emphasis on policy prescription and evaluation. No policy
change occurred in 1993/1994, but, with a change in the discussion in 2009/2010, health care reform
occurred.
This is complicated further because as a bill progresses through the process, the strategies of
each group shift. Within a single Congress where a bill is proposed and considered, as it advances
each step through the process (ex. consideration in committee, reported from committee, etc.), the
probability of passage increases. In this case, where the bill is advancing, the proponents may choose
to not change their frame set, because it appears to be working. Instead, they may turn to other
tactics to continue the bill’s momentum. Conversely, the opponents of the bill may attempt to shift
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the frame set used to publicly discuss the bill in order to shift the decision space. However, if moving
to repeated consideration of a bill, who seeks to shift the frame set changes dependent on what
happened in the previous round. This is because the losers in the previous round should change
the frame set to increase the probability of winning the second time. They know that if the same
conversation happens, then they are likely to lose again. So if a bill fails the first time it is introduced,
proponents will seek to change the bundle of frames used to discuss the issue, while opponents seek
to keep it constant. Alternatively, if a bill passes the first time, opponents will seek to change the
frame bundle used, while proponents seek to keep it constant.
Essentially, whichever side appears to be losing in the push to pass or block a bill will seek
to change the discussion by introducing new frames or shifting the attention placed on the frames
already in use. Here I focus on the second: change between two points in time or two Congresses. If
looking at whether the outcome of a bill changes upon reconsideration, then expectations should be
constructed with respect to what happened upon its previous consideration. If a bill failed when first
considered, then the proponents will seek to change the frame set. If they succeed, then the probability
of bill passage upon reconsideration should increase. This produces the following hypothesis to be
tested, which is:
H1: If a bill that failed upon first consideration is reconsidered, then, as the frame set
used to discuss a given issue area changes more, the probability of passage increases upon
reconsideration.
Important differences characterize the House and Senate. Specifically, two aspects of the
chambers may shape how frame use and policy change are connected. First, the size of each chamber
may matter. Smaller chambers may see a closer connection between or faster translation of the frames
used to policy change, because fewer legislators need to be targeted. To target more legislators, more
time is needed. As a result, it may take longer for the changes in the frame set to be felt in the House,
which has 435 members, than in the Senate, which only has 100. Second, the proportion needed to
take action and pass legislation may matter and varies in each chamber and sometimes for different
types of bills and resolutions. The higher the proportion needed, the longer it might take to reach
a point a vote can even take place. This is because with higher thresholds individual members can
play a greater role and reduce the ability of the parties to exert influence. As a result, action can
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easily be derailed, because the defection of a small number can halt the progression of a bill. On
average, the proportion need to conduct business in the Senate is higher than those in the House,
which means that it may take longer for the effects of changes to the frame set to be observed in the
Senate. Alternatively, these aspects of the two institutions may effectively negate each other. This
does not mean that if the frame changes there will be no effect. Rather, the observed effect may be
delayed and conditioned. There may be other institutional characteristics of the institutions that vary.
As a result, they will be treated separately in the analysis.
4.3 Constructing the Measures & Data
To test whether change in the discussion influences the likelihood of bill passage, I identify bill pairs
from adjacent Congresses (ex. 105th compared to the 104th) whose content is essentially the same
and which was proposed by a member of the majority party in the most recent of the two Congresses.
I restrict bills to those which are proposed by the majority party in the most recent Congress (ex.
proposed by a member of the majority party in the 105th), because only those bills proposed by the
majority party see a realistic probability of moving through the process. By identifying which bills
have the same content, I am able to hold the policy considered constant while varying the context
and environment. Through matching, I can pose the specific question of: how does a bill’s outcome
change when considered in different contexts? Further, this allows me to gain casual leverage on
how the policy discussion and the broader context influences bill passage. I examine change in bill
outcome in two ways: bill passage in the House and bill passage in the Senate.
I focus on bills introduced between the 104th and 112th Congresses, which are classified as
belonging to one of twenty general issue areas identified by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP).
The bill classifications themselves come from the Congressional Bills Project, which uses the CAP
coding scheme.1 As a reminder, the twenty possible general policy areas are: macroeconomics, civil
rights, health, agriculture, education, environment, energy, immigration, transportation, law and
crime and family issues, social welfare, community development, banking, defense, science and
space and technology, foreign trade, international affairs, government operations, and public lands.
1As stated before, the Comparative Agendas Project is a unified coding scheme for the comparison of agendas of
different venues (ex. Congressional bills and Congressional committee hears) and of different countries (ex. the United
States and the United Kingdom).
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However, four policy areas are excluded due to missingness on a number of variables. The excluded
policy areas are: agriculture, immigration, foreign trade, and public lands.
By focusing on this time period, I construct a difficult test for my theory: it is a period of high
polarization between the parties in the US (Theriault, 2008), a (high) reliance on “legislating in
the dark” (Curry, 2015), and increased procedural war fare in both the House and Senate (Smith,
2014; Theriault, 2008). This means that on average votes on bills are highly constrained by party
at every stage—both on the floor and in committee. As a result, if I find any evidence that a
connection between frames and bill outcomes, then a connection very likely exists and that estimates
are conservative. Before presenting the tests and results of the full results of the test, I need to further
develop each of the variables.
4.3.1 Tracking Legislation Across Congresses
The dependent variable of interest is change in policy. Here this is operationalized as change in
the passage of a bill between two Congresses. More specifically, I analyze whether the outcome
of the final version of a bill considered in a given chamber at time t-1 changes when considered
again at time t. By final version of a bill, I mean the official version of the bill at its latest point of
consideration. To do this, I identify which bills are essentially the same between adjacent Congresses.
To match bills between Congresses, I first scrape the bill text of the final version of a bill
considered by Congress. Using the text of each bill, I identify which bills are essentially copies of
each other by calculating the amount of content that a bill in the current Congress took from a bill
in the previous Congress. In doing so, I identify how much the final version of a bill considered
in Congress t copy and pasted from the previous Congress, t-1.2 The specific calculation I use to
estimate the degree of copying is a ratio of matches. A ratio of matches is the ratio of terms, in this
case tri-grams or three word strings, shared between two documents, bills in adjacent congresses.3
2A growing body of scholars have been using this and similar techniques to capture quantities of interest from the
diffusion of frames in the media (Bail, 2014) to tracing policy ideas in legislation (Wilkerson, Smith and Stramp, 2015) to
identifying copy and paste legislation (Garrett and Jansa, 2015).
3To pre-process the text, I lowercase the bills and generate a matrix of tri-grams used in each bill. Using this matrix,
bills are then compared by calculating a ratio of matches. The ratio of matches formula is: |A∩B||B| . This is the number of
terms shared between document A and document B divided by the number of terms in document B. It is a directional
formula that tells how much document B shares in common with document A. In these calculations, the bills from Congress
at t are treated as B documents, while the bills from Congress at t-1 are treated as A documents in the formula. I do this in
using the textreuse package (Mullen, 2016).
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The result is a single statistic ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 means there is no shared content and 1
indicates that everything is the same.
The final step in the matching process is deciding at what threshold two bills can be said to be
copies of each other. Here if the calculated ratio is greater than or equal to 0.90, then two bills are
said to be copied. This means that 90% or more of the content of the bill considered in the current
congress is the same as one or more bills introduced in the previous congress. This approach means
that any bills that are incorporated into other bills or that have been altered in the amendment process
in the more recent congress are not included.
For an example of this, compare the two following sentences:
• The president may from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union.
• The president shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union.
While all but one word in each sentence is the same in the two sentences, the actual meaning of the
two sentences are different due to that one word: may or shall. If uni-grams, or single words, are
used to compare the sentences, then the ratio of matches is: 0.94. However, if tri-grams or three word
strings are used, then the ratio of matches is: 0.83. In the first, they would be said to be copied, but in
the second, they are not. This is important for bill text because the language used between many bills
is very similar and it is the injection of a single word, as above, can create large differences in policy.
Using these matched pairs, two dependent variables are created that indicate whether and how
the bill outcome changed—one for the House and one for the Senate. There are four possibilities:
the bill fails to pass both times, the bill passes and then fails, the bill fails and then passes, or the
bill passes both times. Because the bill passing both times is an extremely rare event, the few bill
pairs that fall into this category are dropped from the analysis. The policy area mainly addressed
by each bill is provided by the Congressional Bills Project, which uses the Comparative Agendas
Project’s coding scheme. By narrowing the analysis to these few bills, I can better leverage how
changing strategies changes or does not change the outcome of a bill despite minimal variation. This
is summarized in Table 4.1. As can be seen, in the House, 395 bills saw a change in outcome, where
205 bills went from being passed when first considered and then failing and 190 bills went from
failing when first considered to passing. Additionally, 4620 bills did not see a change in outcome. In
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the Senate, only 164 saw a change in outcome, where 96 bills were passed when first considered and
then failed and 78 bills went from failing to passing. Additionally, 4848 bills did not see a change in
outcome.
Table 4.1: Summary of Bill Outcomes Between Congresses by Chamber
Failed:Failed Passed:Failed Failed:Passed Excluded
House 4620 205 190 8
Senate 4848 96 78 1
Note: Cells are the number of matched pairs.
4.3.2 Measuring Change in the Frame Set by Issue Area
With the dependent variables explained, I turn to an explanation of the primary independent variable
of interest. The primary independent variable of interest is change in the frame set between the
current and previous Congress. Because specific bills are not always discussed on the floor of
both or either chamber, to measure the change in the frame set, I focus on the general discussion
about the issue area rather than the specific bill. While this produces a noisier measure resulting
in a more difficult test, it still comports with the theoretical story told in this chapter and in this
dissertation. This is true for two reasons: (1) the frames used in the specific discussion of a bill
are simply a subset of those used in the general discussion, which means the measure captures the
same information, even if with somewhat more error; and (2) the general discussion constrains and
informs the specific considerations of a bill both directly and indirectly. As discussed in the first
chapter, traditionally, framing studies have focused on the use or change in use of specific frames as
in Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun (2008). However, this is a restrictive approach that requires
deep knowledge of the context of the discussion and the relative importance of the frames from
policy to policy or from year to year may change. As a result, to both sidestep these problems and
to better operationalize the concept of interest, I shift this measure to be the change in the frame
set measured as the sum of the absolute change in the proportion of speech using different frames.
For this measure, I use the Congressional Record that has been coded for issue area as defined by
the Comparative Agendas Project’s major topic codes and for frames according to a standardized
codebook. For information on how speeches in the Congressional Record are coded by issue area
and frame, see the discussions in the second and third chapters.
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Rather than looking at how usage of different specific frames change over time, as in traditional
studies of framing discussed in chapter one, the overall change in the entire frame set can be measured
and tracked. To do this, I construct a measure of frame set change. For a good and valid measure of
change in the frame set, it needs to have two characteristics. First, it needs to be a single statistic
of change between two time points. This means that the measure needs to be a summary of how
much the distribution of attention to different frames between two time periods is or is not the same.
Second, it needs to be scale invariant, which means that the measure should produce the same value
regardless of whether proportions or counts are used. If the measure is not scale invariant, then it
captures three concepts rather than one: change in attention to the issue, change in use of frames,
and change in the frame set. To this end, I calculate a measure of change centered on summarizing
the comparison of frame use between two time points by calculating the absolute change in the
proportional use of the frames.4
Change in frame set then is measured as the sum of the absolute difference of the proportional
use of each frame used to discuss a given issue area between two time points. To put this more
formally, I calculate:
f(A1, A2) =
I∑
i=1
|a1,i − a2,i| (4.2)
where f(A1, A2) indicates the function that takes two vectors at different time points, which is the
vector of the proportion of paragraphs that use each identified frame from the more recent Congress
(A1) and a previous Congress A2, and I indicates the frame. This results in a measure ranging from
0 to 2, where 0 indicates no change and 2 indicates complete change.
For example, assume there are three possible frames the two teams can choose to use or not use
at different rates. In the initial time period, they are each used at the same rate: 100 speeches per
frame. In the second time period, they are used at different rates and the last frame is not used at all:
4An alternative measure to this would be to calculate the cosine similarity between the two vectors and subtract that
value from 1 to transform the similarity measure into a dissimilarity measure. The frame vectors (At) are the proportion of
paragraphs by each identified latent frame. For this, the formula is:
f(At, At−l) = 1 − At · At−l||At|| ||At−l|| (4.1)
where f(At, At−l) indicates the function that takes two vectors at different time points, which is the vector of paragraph
that use each identified frame cluster from congress t and the previous congress t− 1. The result is a single statistic that
summarizes the amount of change in the frame set between two time points. The change in frame set measure ranges
from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates no change and 1 indicates no overlap or complete change between two points in time. This
measure is highly correlated with the calculation used.
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150 speeches using the first frame, 50 speeches using the second, and no speeches using the third.
First, the proportional use of the frames are calculated. Then the absolute difference in the use of the
frame in the different time periods is found. These differences are then summed. This is summarized
in table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Example Change in Frame Set Calculation
Current Period Previous Period
Frame Speeches Proportion Speeches Proportion —∆(Proportion)—
1 100 0.33 150 0.75 0.42
2 100 0.33 50 0.25 0.08
3 100 0.33 0 0.00 0.33
Total 0.83
Figure 4.1 presents one example of what this looks like for the macroeconomic policy topic using
two different comparison. The x-axis indicates the Congress at time t, while the y-axis indicates the
change in the frame set. The solid line shows the comparison between the frame set used at t (the
current congress) and t-1 (the previous congress). The dashed line shows the comparison between
the frames used at t and t-2. Because the score is the difference between two Congresses, the 104th
is dropped for both comparisons and the 105th is dropped for the second difference. (There are no
comparison points for those Congresses.) In the figure, it can be seen that the amount of change
varies over time and between the two comparisons. The line denoting the first difference sees peaks
in the amount of change in the 107th, 108th, 110th, and 112th congresses. Each of these time points
represents periods of significant policy change—especially in tax policy.
I calculate the change in the frame set separately for the House and Senate. Additionally, I
calculate the change between the current and the previous Congress and the change between the
current and two Congresses before. The second difference is calculated, because, as discussed in the
theory section, there is a possibility that the felt effect of changes to the frame set may be delayed.
Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics for these variables. As a reminder, these variables can
range between 0 and 2. Zero indicates no change, or the same frames are used at the same rate. Two
indicates that the frame set completely change, or that no frames used are the same.
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Figure 4.1: Change in the Frame Set Over Time, Macroeconomics
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Change in the Argument Set by Chamber & Team
Minimum Mean Maximum Standard Deviation
House, t and t-1 0.9 0.82 2.00 0.40
House, t and t-2 0.22 0.88 2.00 0.42
Senate, t and t-1 0.05 0.87 2.00 0.44
Senate, t and t-2 0.16 0.96 2.00 0.40
4.3.3 Additional Variables
Finally, control variables need to be defined to account for alternative explanations and the possible
unobserved structured variance by congress and policy. Summary statistics are seen in Table 4.4.
The first cluster of variables constructed are aimed at measuring the effect of changes to the coalition
supporting the bill and sponsor characteristics, which have been found to matter in previous studies.
To measure the change in the number of cosponsors the difference in the number of cosponsors
for a matched bill set between the previous and current Congress. This is done by subtracting the
number of cosponsors listed on the bill in Congress at time point t-1 from the number of cosponsors
listed on the bill in Congress at time point t. This variable ranges from -361 to 425, with a mean
of 1. The variable is then divided by 100 to make it comparable to the range of other variables.
Next, to measure the change in sponsor characteristics two sets of binary variables are created. First,
to measure majority party status of the sponsor, a binary variables are created: whether or not the
sponsor became a member of the minority party. The reference category is no change in party status.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Minimum Mean Maximum Standard Deviation
Change in Number of Cosponsors -361.00 1.58 423.00 45.49
Became Chair 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.30
No Longer Chair 0.00 0.09 1.00 0.29
Became a Member of the Maj. 0.00 0.24 1.00 0.43
Platform, House Maj. -0.11 0.00 0.17 0.03
Platform, House Min. -0.11 0.00 0.17 0.02
Platform, Senate Maj. -0.11 0.00 0.17 0.03
Platform, Senate Min. -0.11 0.00 0.17 0.02
Change in MIP -0.16 -0.00 0.24 0.04
Change in Mood 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.02
Second, to measure committee chairman status two binary variables are created: whether not not
the sponsor became a committee chairman and whether or not the sponsor is no longer a committee
chairman. The reference category is no change in committee chairman status. This information
comes from the Congressional Bills Project.
The second cluster of variables constructed are aimed at measuring change in importance of
a policy area to the majority and minority party. To do so, I use the change in the proportion of
sentences that each party devotes to a policy area in their party platform. Party platforms coded by
policy using the Comparative Agendas Project coding scheme (Wolbrecht, 2016). One downside to
this measure is that party platforms only change every four years, so the priority placed on different
issue areas stays constant across that period. However, because I need to include priorities of both
parties, this is the best data set available.
The third cluster of variables constructed are aimed at measuring pressure placed on Congress
by the public. This is done in two ways. First, to measure the change in importance of the policy
area to the public, I use the change in the proportion of respondents who say the policy area is
the “most important problem facing America today” from the Gallup poll coded to be in line with
the Comparative Agendas Project coding scheme. To calculate the change from one congress to
the next, the mean proportion from each congress is calculated, and then the previous congress’
average is subtracted from the current congress’ average. Negative values indicate a decrease in
importance, while positive values indicate an increased importance. Second, to measure change in
policy preferences in the public, I use the absolute value of the change in public policy mood for
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each general policy topic between each congress. Policy mood is the aggregate liberal/conservative
leaning of the population for a given policy area (Stimson, 2018).
Finally, I include a cluster of variables aimed at capturing the political environment. Previous
studies have shown that simply surviving the winnowing process that happens to the legislative
agenda is the most predictive factor as to whether or not a bill passes. To construct strict tests of the
connection between framing and bill outcomes that control for survival in the winnowing process, I
control for how the bill fared in committee for that chamber and what the other chamber did with
the bill. Each is a categorical variable with four categories: fail in both congresses, fail in the first
congress but pass in the second, pass in the first but fail in the second, and pass in both. These allow
me to condition on how congress has approached the bill in other ways before the final vote in that
chamber and possibly by how they anticipate the other chamber treating the bill. Additionally, I
control for whether change in the margin of control of the chamber, change in party control of that
chamber, change in party control of the other chamber, or change in party control of the presidency,
which conditions for whether passage is influenced by a change in party power.5
4.4 Testing the Possible Connections
To test the hypotheses, I fit two multinomial logistic regressions: one explaining the change (or lack
of change) for bill passage in the House and one for the Senate. In each regression, the reference
category is a bill failing to pass in both the previous and current Congress. As a reminder, the analysis
spans from the 104th through the 112th congresses (1995 through 2012). Because the dependent
variable is the change between the current and previous congresses and one independent variable is
the change between the current congress and two congresses ago, this means that comparisons are
made between seven pairs of congresses: 106th and 107th, 107th and 108th, 108th and 109th, 109th
and 110th, 110th and 111th, and 111th and 112th. The results of the regressions are presented in
table 4.5, where failure in both rounds is the reference category. Additionally, when compared to
models that contain the same variables and observations except for the change in frame set variables,
the models presented here fit better; the change in frame set variables add information.6 The first and
5Models are also fit excluding the variables controlling for progression through the process. The models result in
essentially the same result, although the models fit significantly worse.
6Regressions are shown in the appendix.
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second columns of table 4.5 present the results for the House, and the third and fourth columns present
the results for the Senate. Within each, the first of the two columns presented for the regression is the
probability that a bill passed when first considered and failed to pass upon reconsideration, and the
second of the two columns presented is the probability that a bill failed when first considered and
then passed when reconsidered.
First, I evaluate the central hypothesis of this chapter and dissertation in the House: when a bill
fails when first considered, as the frame set changes more, then the probability of policy change
increases upon reconsideration. Support for this hypothesis would be seen if either change in frame
set variable is statistically significant and positive when predicting that a bill that failed the first time
passes when reconsidered; a positive coefficient in the second column. This would indicate that as
the change in the set of frames used increases then the probability of a bill passing when considered
again increases. Additionally, I posited that there might be a delay in the influence of the change in
the frame set on the probability of passage, because there are physically more members in the House
than in the Senate. If there is a delayed effect, then the coefficients associated with the first difference
in change in the frame set should be statistically insignificant, but the coefficients associated with the
second difference should be statistically significant. Support for each of these hypotheses is found:
the coefficient associated with the change in the set of frames used between the current Congress
and two Congresses ago is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that as the frame set
increasingly changes, then the probability of a change in outcome increases. As the frame set used in
the House changes, the more likely it is that policy will change. Additionally, it indicates that there is
a delay in felt effect of the changing frame set on policy change in the House.
To evaluate the substantive significance of the influence of the change in the frame set (t and t-2)
on the probability that a bill that failed the first time it was considered is passed upon reconsideration,
I turn to interpreting the predicted probability of passage, which is presented in figure 4.2. In the
figure, the x-axis shows the range of the possible values of the change in the frame set between the
current Congress and two Congresses previous, and the y-axis presents the probability that a bill
that failed when first considered passed when considered in the following Congress. Additionally,
predicted probabilities are generated for three different circumstances: the bill was never reported
from committee in the House and never passed in the Senate, the bill failed to be and then was
reported from committee in the House and never passed in the Senate, and the bill failed to be
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Table 4.5: Explaining Change in Bill Outcomes by Chamber
In the House In the Senate
Pass:Fail Fail:Pass Pass:Fail Fail:Pass
Intercept −3.08∗∗ −5.27∗∗ −5.93∗∗ −6.09∗∗
(0.33) (0.37) (0.64) (0.58)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-1 0.09 −0.24 0.11 1.02∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.38)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-2 −1.23∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.15 −0.60
(0.35) (0.31) (0.49) (0.42)
∆ in Party Platform, Majority −3.07 12.42∗∗ −26.93∗∗ −6.91
(5.08) (3.70) (10.96) (5.77)
∆ in Party Platform, Minority −8.21 −5.22 11.14 6.02
(5.94) (5.94) (12.51) (9.20)
∆ in MIP −1.77 −0.43 2.79 6.57∗
(2.90) (2.80) (4.73) (3.85)
∆ in Public Mood 10.71∗ 13.21∗∗ −0.15 −2.95
(5.47) (4.44) (8.72) (6.76)
∆ in the Number of Cosponsors (in 100s) −0.74∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.09 0.27
(0.21) (0.19) (0.42) (0.26)
∆ in Party Control of the Senate −0.17 0.02 0.64∗∗ −0.54∗
(0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.31)
∆ in Party Control of the House −0.17 0.02 0.64∗∗ −0.54∗
(0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.31)
∆ in Party Control of the Presidency −0.08 −0.63∗∗ −0.70 −0.34
(0.32) (0.29) (0.48) (0.37)
∆ in Marginal Control < |0.001| 0.01 −0.03 < |0.001|
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
∆ in Sponsor Characteristics Y Y Y Y
Change in Reported from Committee
Reported then Not Reported 5.45∗∗ −10.29∗∗ 6.28∗∗ −8.34
(0.26) (< |0.001|) (0.36) (199.71)
Not Reported then Reported −10.33∗∗ 4.70∗∗ −11.63∗∗ 3.57∗∗
(< |0.001|) (0.23) (< |0.001|) (0.34)
Reported then Reported Again 4.45∗∗ −14.82∗∗ 30.43 −0.50
(1.00) (< |0.001|) (113.16) (6.26)
Other Chamber’s Change in Passage
Passed then Failed 1.06∗ −0.54 1.62∗∗ 0.75
(0.56) (1.10) (0.51) (0.80)
Failed then Passed 1.89∗∗ 4.43∗∗ −15.38 4.02∗∗
(0.76) (0.35) (115.22) (0.35)
Passed then Passed −3.46 2.87
(30.31) (1.99)
AIC 1629.72 818.33
BIC 1874.58 1076.14
Log Likelihood −776.86 −369.16
Deviance 1553.72 738.33
Num. obs. 4646 4653
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 4.2: Change in Probability of Bill Passage in the House Given Change in the Frame Set (t &
t-2) in Different Circumstances
and then was reported from committee in the House and failed and then did pass in the Senate.
Essentially, each is the change from the baseline of having failed to be reported from committee in
the House or failed to be passed in the Senate. Each is represented by a different line surround by its
associated 95% confidence intervals shown as the grey shading. All other values are held at their
means. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped.
From figure 4.2, a number of observations can be made about the probability of bill passage after
failing the first time across the possible range of values of the change in the frame set between the
current frame and two Congresses ago in different contexts. First, (change in) progression through
the legislative process greatly influences the predicted probability of passage. If a bill is reported
from committee upon reconsideration in the following Congress and passed in the Senate upon
reconsideration in the following Congress, then the probability of a bill passing after failing the
first time is almost certain. Conversely, if a bill fails to be reported from committee and fails to
99
pass in the Senate, then it is very unlikely to pass when reconsidered. Falling between these two
extremes is if a bill is reported from committee upon reconsideration but fails to pass in the Senate
upon reconsideration. Second, while the substantive influence of the change in the frame set is
small if either nothing changes or everything changes about the bill’s progression, it still has a small
and statistically significant effect. Additionally, the small substantive effect still might matter on
the margin: it moves the predicted probability by a point or two. Third, if a bill is reported from
committee upon reconsideration but is not passed in the Senate upon reconsideration, the change in
the frame set has a substantive effect on the probability of passage. The probability of passage ranges
from just under 0.40 to just above 0.75 across the possible range of change in the frame set, and
crosses the 0.50 line once change in the frame set is greater than 0.60. In sum, while the substantive
effect of the change in the frame set is conditioned by the context, it is persistently there and has the
possibility of influencing whether a bill passes in the House.
This is reinforced if the effect of the change in the frame set on the probability that a bill passes
and then fails in the House is examined. In this case, the parallel expectation to the one discussed
in the previous paragraph is: as the frame set changes more, then the probability that a bill passes
and then fails to pass decreases. The probability should decrease, because bill passage in this case
would still indicate policy change rather than stasis. Evidence of this would be seen if the coefficient
associated with either change in the frame set variable in the first column is negative and statistically
significant. Once again, support for the hypothesis is found.
Additionally, I can evaluate how the control variables relate to the change in bill passage. First,
change in the party platform of the majority appears to influence bill passage: as the majority party
increases the priority of an issue area, bills in that issue are more likely to pass. This is in line
with expectations set forward by those saying that the majority party will seek to promote their
party’s brand through legislation. Second, greater change in the public mood appears to increase
to the probability of passage. Third, change in the number of cosponsors seems to influence the
probability of passage. As the number of cosponsors increases, the probability that a bill passed in the
previous Congress and then failed to pass when reintroduced decreases. Conversely, as the number
of cosponsors increases, then the probability that a bill failed to pass when first considered and then
passes increases. Fourth, of the variables included to condition for change in party control of the
chambers and presidency, only change in the presidency is statistically significant: if the presidency
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changes party, then it is less likely that a bill that failed in one Congress and is then reintroduced
is less likely to pass than if the presidency remained the same party. This might be because if the
presidency changes party then members of Congress may decide to introduce new legislation rather
than reintroduce the same piece of legislation.
Secondly, I can evaluate the first hypothesis as it relates to the Senate: as the change in the frame
set increases, the probability of policy change in legislation should increase. As in the House, support
for this hypothesis would be seen if either of the coefficients in the second column within the Senate
regression are positive and statistically significant. Additionally, as in the House, there is a possibility
of delayed influence of the change in the frame set on the probability of passage, because of the
institutional characteristics of the chamber. Once again there is support for the hypothesis that change
in the frame set is connected to the probability of policy change: as change in the frame set between
the current and previous Congress increases, the probability of a bill passing upon reconsideration
increases. However, there is no delayed effect, which indicates that a delay in the felt effect of the
change maybe due to the size of the chamber rather than the proportion needed to take action.
To evaluate the substantive significance of the influence of the change in the frame set (t and t-1)
on the probability that a bill that failed the first time it was considered is passed upon reconsideration,
I once again turn to interpreting the predicted probability of passage, which is presented in figure 4.3.
As in the previous figure, the x-axis shows the range of values of the change in the frame set, and the
y-axis presents the probability that a bill that failed when first considered passed when considered in
the following Congress. Predicted probabilities are generated for three different circumstances: the
bill was never reported from committee in the House and never passed in the Senate; the bill was
reported from committee in the House and never passed in the Senate; and the bill was reported from
committee in the House and failed to and then did pass in the Senate. As before, each is the change
from the baseline of having failed to be reported from committee in the House or failed to be passed
in the Senate. 95% confidence intervals shown as the grey shading and are bootstrapped. As before,
all other values are held at their means.
From figure 4.3, a number of observation can be made. First, as in figure 4.2, distinct differences
in the probability of passage exist given the change in the progression of the bill. However, the
differences are less extreme than in the House. The probability that a bill passes when reconsidered
if is neither reported from committee upon reconsideration nor passing the House is almost 0. It
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Figure 4.3: Change in Probability of Bill Passage in the Senate Given Change in the Frame Set (t &
t-1) in Different Circumstances
marginally increases if it is reported from committee but the House does not pass it. It significantly
increases if the bill is reported out of committee in the Senate and if it passes the House upon
reconsideration. Second, while the substantive influence of the change in the frame set on passage
is negligible if the bill is not reported out of committee upon reconsideration nor is passed by the
House upon reconsideration, in the other circumstances presented there is a substantive effect. If a
bill is reported out of committee but is not passed by the House when reconsidered across the range
of possible values of frame set change, then the probability of passage increases by multiple points.
However, bill passage upon reconsideration still has a very low expected probability of occurring.
A large substantive effect is seen if a bill has been reported from committee in the Senate and it
passed in the House. In this circumstance, the probability of passage upon reconsideration after
failing the first time in the Senate ranges from approximately 0.10 to just under 0.50. In sum, while
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the substantive effect of the change in the frame set is conditioned by the context, it is persistently
observed and has the possibility of influencing whether a bill passes in the Senate.
Additionally, I can evaluate how the control variables relate to the change in the probability of
passage. First, change in party control of the House and Senate influence what is or is not passed in
the Senate. If the House or Senate changes party control, then the probability that a bill introduced in
the previous Congress that passed and then fails when reintroduced increases, and the probability
of passage after failure decreases. Second, sponsor characteristics appear to matter. If the sponsor
of a bill becomes the chair of a committee, then the probability that a bill that failed initially and
then passes increases. Conversely, if the sponsor of a bill is no longer a committee chair, then the
probability that a bill that failed initially and then passes decreases.
4.5 Conclusion
I proposed that frames structure the decision space where policies and their alternatives are considered
and decided between. Consistent support has been found in both the House and Senate that as the set
of frames changes more then the probability of a bill passing—policy change occurs—increases all
else equal. Additionally, the substantive effect of changes to the frame set used to discuss the general
issue area is conditioned by how the bill progresses through the process. However, institutional
characteristics influence the connection. Specifically, the size of the institution appears to condition
how long it takes for frame effects to be felt.
By shifting the unit of analysis from the use of a specific frame, to examining the composition
of and change in composition of the set of frames used, I could test whether there is a systematic
connection between framing and policy change. By matching bills between Congresses and identi-
fying bills that are essentially the same, I could control the policy considered, and test whether the
outcome of that policy changes in different circumstances. Specifically, I was able to test whether
greater change in the frame set makes policy change more likely. Leveraging these two shifts in the
standard ways to test whether framing influences policy change, I show that in both the House and
Senate a connection exists.
However, questions remain that are outside of the scope of the current study. Foremost among
these is when the frame set will change and who can change the frame set. Additionally, how the
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discussion within Congress relates to the conversation about the issue areas outside of Congress
should be explored; not just how much different issue areas are discussed, but also how they are
discussed.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The estate tax, also known as the inheritance tax or death tax, is a tax on the transfer of an estate
of a deceased person to one that is alive. Estate taxes are a common method for governments in
Western countries to fund large scale and expensive warfare, offset debt incurred by war, and for
reparations at the conclusion of a war (Scheve and Stasavage, 2012, 2016). In the US, the modern
estate tax was born from three previous taxes: a stamp tax instituted in 1797 to fund the navy, an
inheritance tax instituted in the build-up to the Civil War and continued afterwards to offset continued
costs, and a legacy tax instituted in 1898 to raise revenue for the Spanish-American War as part of the
1898 War Revenue Act. Each of these was repealed by the beginning of the 1900s as each war ended
and their costs offset: the stamp tax was repealed in 1872; the initial inheritance tax was repealed
in 1870; and the legacy tax was repealed in 1902 at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War.
The modern estate tax became law in 1916 as a part of the Revenue Act of 1916 and was justified by
the US’s involvement in the first world war (Jacobson, Raub and Johnson, 2007). Over time these
connections and justifications weakened.
Over 80 years later, on the precipice of and during extended and ongoing military action in the
Middle East,1 efforts were made to sharply reduce the intake of revenue through the estate tax and
multiple attempts were made to completely eliminate it. Aiding these efforts came a sharp change
in how the estate tax was discussed and framed. Rather than framing the estate tax as a way for
the rich to contribute their fair share to the war effort, those seeking to repeal or seriously restrict
the estate tax framed it as an unfair burden placed on taxpayers. Rather than framing the estate tax
as a practical solution to the problem of insufficient funds raised for the federal government, those
1The US invaded Afghanistan as a part of the War on Terror in 2001. After the initial invasion, troops were left in
country. Then the US invaded Iraq in 2003 increasing its presence again. While a number of agreements have been signed
between the US government and the governments of each country, either the agreement or surrounding situation have
consistently shown to be unstable. As a result, the US maintains military involvement to this day.
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seeking to repeal the tax cast it as a government overstep. With this change in framing, along with
economic and political changes, Congress proposed and voted to slowly phase out the estate tax
in 2001 as a part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (Jacobson, Raub and
Johnson, 2007; Meagher, 2014, 2013; Gravelle and Maguire, 2010).
Not only did the framing of the issue change over time, but the of discussion about the issue
fluctuated. In recent years, the Republican party has spent more time talking about the estate tax
than the Democrats, and it has spent more time proposing legislation to restrict the number of
people to whom it applies or to eliminate it than the Democratic party. Additionally, how each
of the parties framed the issue varied. Republicans have focused on the tax as one that hurts
vulnerable populations—family businesses, small farms, and taxpayers more generally—and the size
of government, while Democrats have focused on fairness and the capacity of the state.
As I have shown in this dissertation, these connections and differences are not isolated to a single
policy, such as the estate tax. Instead, these trends and connections are common and systematic.
Further, framing matters. Policy discussion and framing are powerful. Frames structure how we
think about issues. Frames tell us whether something is a problem. Frames tell us how to evaluate
proposed solutions to the problem. Additionally, variation in the amount of policy discussion and
frame use is explainable and predictable. Previous studies have shown this to be true outside of
Congress when testing the effect of frames, which are contained with arguments, on shaping attitudes
and influencing outcomes. This dissertation has shown that within Congress this is no less true. In
this chapter, I summarize the central findings of this dissertation, point to future questions to be
posed and studied, and briefly discuss the normative implications of this study.
5.1 What Have We Learned?
In this dissertation, I posed three questions: why does policy discussion vary across issue areas; why
does frame use vary by party; and do and how do changes in the frame set influence policy change?
First, I proposed that in pursuit of their electoral and policy goals the political parties in Congress
shape the message they transmit to the public, their members, and the other party. Empirically, this is
seen in two ways: (1) party goals influencing how much each party discusses different issue areas
(chapter 2); and (2) party goals influence which frames parties choose to use in their discussion of
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policy (chapter 3). In each case, they choose to discuss the issue areas that align with and further
their brand, and they choose to discuss those issues using frames that align with and further their
brand.
Then I proposed shifts in the frames used to discuss issues can influence policy change. Because
frames connect policy alternatives (i.e. a proposed bill and the status quo) to evaluative dimensions,
shifting the set of frames used and the rates at which they are used result in different evaluations of
bills. This in turn implies that as the frame set changes policy is more likely to change. Empirically,
this is observed if a greater change in the frame set results in an increased probability that a bill passes
after failing. I tested this by identifying multiple points the same bill is considered. Then I estimated
whether a bill is more likely to pass if the frame set changes, while controlling for progression
through the agenda, changes in party control of the chambers and presidency, changes in sponsor
characteristics and number of cosponsors, and changes in the context. In this test, I found support for
the claim that as the change in the frame set increases, the probability of policy change increases.
Thus, I showed that framing influences policy change in Congress by shaping the decision space
(chapter 4).
Not only did I present evidence that framing influences policy change, but I also introduced
new measures of framing on the Congressional floor. In combination, the measures facilitate tracing
frames used on the floor and the systematic study of framing. First, I identified frames used in the
Congressional Record over time using an unsupervised machine learning approach. In its own right
this measure can facilitate future studies on the use and effect of frames in Congress. As a technique,
the approach used to prepossess the speeches, fit separate models by issue area, and then validate the
content of the identified latent topics can be exported to other areas and corpora. Second, I shifted the
unit of analysis from the traditional one used when studying framing effects (trends in use of specific
frame) to the analysis of change (change in the set of frames predicts change in outcomes). In shifting
the unit of analysis, I shift from tracking individual frames and the quixotic quest of attempting
to separate out “powerful” or “influential” frames from other frames to tracking the change in the
aggregated set of frames. This innovation facilitates the identification of frames, then change can be
calculated, and then related to policy change. As a result, I make a problem that is intractable across
issues and unfeasible to include many issues in a single analysis to a tractable and feasible measure.
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5.1.1 Problems of Endogeneity
Considering the main focus of this dissertation on using changing frames sets to explain policy
change, questions of endogeneity arise. The set of frames used is not a passive receptor but rather
a result of a process. Similarly, bills do not exist in a vacuum; they are not passively affected by
what happens around them but also influence the environment within which they are considered. In
the messy system that is politics and policy change, casual arrows may run in many directions. It is
exceedingly difficult if not impossible to study all directions at once. Instead, I focused here on one
direction that the causal arrow may go: the influence of policy discussion on policy change.
By identifying bills whose content was the same but context in which they were considered
varied in chapter 4, I gained some leverage for testing this direction of the causal arrow. I leveraged
over time change rather than contemporaneous observations. While the test in chapter 4 does not
completely alleviate concerns, it does take steps to alleviate the problem. As a result, while I have
not ruled out the possibility that the changing set of bills considered influences how issue areas are
discussed, the results presented in this dissertation that the casual error does point in the suggested
direction: changes frames do influence changing policy.
5.2 Future Research Questions
While this dissertation has advanced our understanding of how framing influences policy by theoreti-
cally and analytically connecting changes to the frame set to policy change, many questions about
the process remain. I identify some of these questions here, and I note the advancements that could
be made by their future study.
5.2.1 Explaining the Changing Frame Set
In studying whether changes in the bundle of frames used to discuss an issue influences policy
change, I alluded to a number of reasons as to why the frame set might change. Namely, in the first
and fourth chapters, I posited that losers, those whose policy alternative was not chosen, will seek
to and will change the frame set associated with a given issue area and bill. They do so in hopes of
altering the decision space to shift the odds of policy change in their favor. However, I did not test
this because it fell outside of the scope of this study.
108
Additionally, a number of related questions are left unanswered that fall under the broad umbrella
of why the frame set changes. These range from when change is observed to who can change the
frame set to how such change happens. In addition to losing being a possible driving force for
when the frame set may change, changing public opinion, evolutions in the broader discourse,
exogenous shocks to the system, and changes in what party controls each chamber of Congress and
the presidency may all inform when and how the frame set may change. For example, as I showed in
chapter 3, each party uses different frames at different rates. These differences may translate into
changes in the frame set when the majority party changes in the House or in the Senate.
Better understanding who can change the frame set, when those changes occur, and why they
occur would contribute to our understanding of number of different phenomena. Areas of study
whose body of knowledge could be added to by such studies range from when policy change, what
type of change happens, to how the broader environment informs policy production. Foundations
for a theoretical understanding of this process can be drawn from studies on campaign tactics, party
branding, and issue evolution.
5.2.2 Connections to the Public Discussion
I focused on the public discussion of policy by members of Congress within the institution of
Congress—and specifically speeches on the Congressional floor—in this dissertation. However,
policy discussion occurs in many other venues, and by many others who are not members of Congress.
As a result, questions remaining as to how policy discussion on the Congressional floor relates to
the broader public discussion that occurs in the media and on social media remain both in terms of
how members of Congress talk in these other platforms and how others talk. Are the same frames
used at the same rates, or are there substantial differences? Regardless, why might those patterns be
observed? Additionally, it might be the case that each platform influences what is said and how it is
said on the other platforms as is suggested by Boydstun (2013). By exploring how policy discussion
relates across different platforms, a better understanding of how the media and the public inform, or
not, the policies drafted and enacted.
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5.3 Normative and Practical Implications
The results of this study can contribute to the ongoing conversations in academia, the media, think
tanks, and Congress about whether and to what extent the House and Senate are (non)functional
and/or not carrying out their intended purpose in the intended way. They do so by providing a better
understanding of why and in what ways policy discussion matters and by incidentally evaluating the
connection between public opinion and attention with what is discussed and policy change. I showed
evidence that policy discourse matters. This implies that while complaints by those in the minority
of a lack of deliberation and debate may or may not be political grandstanding their complaints
have their roots in a serious and identifiable concern: with more information, with more arguments
presented, and with more time comes greater uncertainty for bill passage. However, the content
of that discussion is not evaluated nor is the frequency of actual deliberation and debate during
final passage. Thus, additional consideration should possibly be given to the changing nature of the
content and frequency of debate during final passage. If this has degraded, but how the policy areas
are discussed still influences outcomes, then the deliberative capacity of the US Congress may indeed
be worse than before.
Additionally, the role shifts in public opinion play in each part of this study produce interesting
normative questions about connections between the public and their representatives in Congress.
Primarily, how does shifting public opinion influence what members of Congress talk about and
what they pass into law? In the second chapter, I showed that as the public and media increases
the importance they place on a general issue then the minority party increases how much it talks
about that general issue area. However, shifts in importance among the public and media do not
directly influence how much the majority party talks about general issue areas. This may indicate
that the minority party is more responsive than the majority party. Alternatively, it may indicate that
the minority party does not have to restrain itself when the media or public momentarily concerned
about a policy area, while the majority party does. In the fourth chapter, I showed that change in
public mood has a direct effect on the probability a bill that failed the first time would be passed in
the House, but not in the Senate. It may indicate that who holds the attention of members in each
chamber differs. One interpretation of this finding is that, members of the House are more affected
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by the swings in national feelings, while those in the Senate are less reactive. Perhaps, they still are
the saucer that cools the hot tea of the House.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in table A.1 for percent of the platform devoted to a general policy
area, party unity scores, proportion of the population believing a general policy area is the “most
important problem” facing the US today according to Gallup polling, and the adjusted number of
stories published in the New York Times about the general policy area. Additionally, summary
statistics for the possible dependent variables are presented. This includes both the operationalization
of the variables as presented in the body of the chapter and as presented in the alternative specifications
of the models in the appendix.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables in Models
Minimum Mean Maximum Standard Deviation
Independent Variables
Platform Pct. 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.04
Party Unity 0.83 0.90 0.97 0.03
Margin of Control 0.00 9.42 40.00 9.66
Number of Votes (100s) 0.00 0.25 2.74 0.31
Days in Committee (100s) 0.02 0.44 2.40 0.39
Number of Bills Introduced (1000s) 0.00 0.23 2.13 0.20
Proportion MIP 0.00 0.05 0.53 0.08
Adj. Stories 0.71 1.08 1.52 0.22
Dependent Variables
Number of Sentences 131 8,345 76,976 8,219
Number of Paragraphs 2,605 169,415 1,472,604 2,296
Number of Words 35 2,419 21,249 161,586
Note: Independent variables are adjusted to be on the same scale. Platform Percent,
party unity, and proportion MIP range from 0 to 1.
A.2 Are Alternative Specifications Robust?
A.2.1 Comparison to Null Models
One concern with the models presented in this chapter is that they may either be over fit or that the
explanatory variables included may actually not contribute to the explanatory power of the model.
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To test this, I fit the simplest version of the model for each regression. The simplest version of each
regression includes random effects for Congress, Topic, the lag of the dependent variable, and when
applicable an indicator for chamber. Table A.2 presents the null models for predicting the logged
number of sentences, while table 2.3 presents the null models for predicting the number of speakers.
Simply comparing the R2 values shows that the models presented in the chapter explain greater
variation in the dependent variable than the null models do. Calculating a log-likelihood ratio test
confirms this surface level comparison.
Table A.2: Explaining the Amount of Time on Policy, Restricted Model
House, Min. House, Maj. Senate, Min. Senate, Maj.
Intercept 5.57∗∗ 5.63∗∗ 8.63∗∗ 8.62∗∗
(0.30) (0.29) (0.21) (0.18)
Congress Y Y Y Y
Topic Y Y Y Y
AIC 837.12 763.01 717.83 676.85
BIC 950.38 886.39 850.25 792.68
Log Likelihood −388.86 −349.05 −324.25 −308.10
R2 0.72 0.75 0.63 0.60
Num. obs. 335 331 337 337
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
A.2.2 Alternative Measures of the Time Spent Discussing Policy
In the heart of the chapter, I chose to operationalize time spent discussing policy as the number
of sentences, because they are the smallest units within a speech that still transmits information.
It takes at least a sentence to actually transmit some sort of meaning, information, or frame to
someone. However, arguments can be made for two other ways to measure time spent discussing
policy: the number of paragraphs on policy or the number of words spoken about policy. The number
of paragraphs possibly makes sense as an alternative, because the identification of whether or not
policy is discussed is done on a paragraph by paragraph basis. The number of words possibly makes
sense as an alternative, because how much actual time is spent on the issue is in many ways governed
by how many words someone chooses to say. I do not consider the number of speeches as a viable
metric, because speeches on the chamber floor of either the House or the Senate can vary wildly in
their length. This is especially true of the speeches used in this analysis because they range from
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statements on the introduction of a bill, to one-minute speeches, to speeches given during floor debate
to name a few.
Because there are viable alternative measures of one of the key dependent variables studied in
this chapter, questions may arise as to whether or not the findings are robust or cherry picked. Table
A.3 and A.4 presents the regression results using the alternative measures of the dependent variables.
If the findings presented in this chapter are robust, the coefficients should point in the same direction
and gain the same level of statistical significance. Turning to an examination of the regressions using
the alternative dependent variables, essentially the same findings are seen; the choice of sentences as
a measure of time spent discussing policy is robust. Additionally, each explain the vast majority of
the variation in the dependent variable. This should be unsurprising, because they are three measures
capturing the same concept and are highly correlated. More specifically, the correlation between any
pair is above 0.99.
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Table A.3: Explaining the Amount of Time on Policy, Log(Number of Paragraphs)
In the House In the Senate
Minority Majority Minority Majority
Intercept 1.07∗∗ 0.65∗ < |0.001| 2.22∗∗
(0.28) (0.37) (< |0.001|) (0.27)
The Other Party’s Agenda
Log(# of Sentences, Other Party) 0.44∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.73∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Party Platform
Proportion of the Party Platform 3.20∗∗ 6.39∗∗ 2.25∗∗ 2.22∗∗
(1.57) (1.72) (0.78) (0.81)
The Legislative Agenda
# of Bills Introduced (1000s) 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.09
(0.21) (0.20) (0.11) (0.10)
Days in Committee Hearings 0.29 0.31 0.06 −0.01
(0.21) (0.20) (0.11) (0.10)
# of Votes (100s) −0.16 0.42∗∗ 0.09 0.65∗∗
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Control Variables
MIP Proportion 3.83∗∗ 1.01 1.16∗∗ −0.71∗
(0.78) (0.73) (0.40) (0.37)
NYT Index 0.68∗∗ 0.25 −0.21 0.09
(0.22) (0.28) (0.17) (0.16)
President Majority, Same Party < |0.001| −0.14 1.26∗∗ −0.20∗∗
(< |0.001|) (0.11) (0.29) (0.06)
Both Chambers, Same Party −0.64∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 1.39∗∗ −0.13
(0.17) (0.21) (0.34) (0.12)
President Party*Chamber Party 0.06 < |0.001| −1.17∗∗ < |0.001|
(0.09) < |0.001| (0.32) (< |0.001|)
Republican Party 0.01 0.02 −0.70∗∗ −0.51∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07)
Election Year −0.01 0.07 −0.09 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
Year Y Y Y Y
Issue Area Y Y Y Y
AIC 752.80 695.81 324.03 277.83
BIC 868.51 839.60 464.04 417.54
Log Likelihood −346.41 −310.64 −125.93 −102.91
R2 0.79 0.81 0.89 0.88
Num. obs. 350 350 358 358
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table A.4: Explaining the Amount of Time on Policy, Log(Number of Words)
In the House In the Senate
Minority Majority Minority Majority
Intercept 2.41∗∗ 2.15∗∗ < |0.001| < |0.001|
(0.34) (0.42) (< |0.001|) (< |0.001|)
The Other Party’s Platform
Log(# of Sentences, Other Party) 0.43∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.74∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Party Platform
Proportion of the Party Platform 3.19∗∗ 6.03∗∗ 2.06∗∗ 1.91∗∗
(1.61) (1.78) (0.77) (0.78)
The Legislative Agenda
# of Bills Introduced (1000s) 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.08
(0.22) (0.21) (0.11) (0.10)
Days in Committee Hearings 0.35∗ 0.30 0.05 < |0.001|
(0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.10)
# of Votes (100s) −0.20 0.49∗∗ 0.06 0.65∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17)
Control Variables
MIP Proportion 3.85∗∗ 1.01 1.16∗∗ −0.63∗
(0.79) (0.75) (0.39) (0.36)
NYT Index 0.70∗∗ 0.32 −0.16 0.06
(0.23) (0.29) (0.17) (0.16)
President Majority, Same Party < |0.001| −0.13 1.79∗∗ 3.12∗∗
(< |0.001|) (0.12) (0.41) (0.35)
Both Chambers, Same Party −0.53∗∗ 0.42∗ 1.91∗∗ 3.19∗∗
(0.17) (0.22) (0.45) (0.41)
President Party*Chamber Party −0.01 < |0.001| −1.72∗∗ −3.30∗∗
(0.09) (< |0.001|) (0.43) (0.38)
Republican Party < |0.001| 0.07 −0.65∗∗ −0.49∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07)
Election Year −0.01 0.07 −0.09 0.03
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05)
Year Y Y Y Y
Issue Area Y Y Y Y
AIC 772.01 717.06 321.14 272.73
BIC 887.61 862.11 459.77 412.01
Log Likelihood −356.04 −320.93 −124.84 −100.47
R2 0.79 0.81 0.89 0.88
Num. obs. 350 350 358 358
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Comparison to Null Models
To test whether the change in the frame set variables add anything to the explanation of bill passage
above and beyond standard explanations, I fit the same models presented in table 4.5 without the
change in the frame set variables. I then compare the fit statistics. The null models are presented in
tables B.1 and B.2. Each of the fully specified models fit better across all of the fit statistics than the
null models: the AIC and BIC of the fully specified models are lower than in the null model, which
indicates that the fully specified model fits better; and the log likelihood of the fully specified models
are higher than the null models. Additionally, according to log likelihood ratio tests calculated for
each set of models, the fully specified models fit statistically significantly better than the null models.
B.2 Comparison to Models without Agenda Controls
To test whether the change in the frame set variables add anything to the explanation of bill passage
above and beyond standard explanations, I fit the same models presented in table 4.5 without the
change in the frame set variables. I then compare the fit statistics. These models are presented in
table B.3. The results in the models in table B.3 are essentially the same as those presented in table
4.5. However, the models presented in table B.3 preform significantly worse than those presented in
table 4.5.
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Table B.1: Explaining Change in Bill Outcomes in the House
Full Model Null Model
Pass:Fail Fail:Pass Pass:Fail Fail:Pass
Intercept −3.08∗∗ −5.27∗∗ −3.99∗∗ −4.74∗∗
(0.33) (0.37) (0.22) (0.23)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-1 0.09 −0.24
(0.29) (0.29)
Change in Frame Set, t and t-2 −1.23∗∗ 0.85∗∗
(0.35) (0.31)
Change in Party Platform, Majority −3.07 12.42∗∗ 4.36 8.15∗∗
(5.08) (3.70) (4.21) (2.96)
Change in Party Platform, Minority −8.21 −5.22 −11.45∗∗ −3.96
(5.94) (5.94) (5.56) (4.96)
Change in MIP −1.77 −0.43 0.15 −2.50
(2.90) (2.80) (2.75) (2.63)
Change in Public Mood 10.71∗ 13.21∗∗ 6.22 13.21∗∗
(5.47) (4.44) (4.90) (4.28)
Change in the Number of Cosponsors −0.74∗∗ 0.39∗∗ −0.75∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17)
Change in Party Control of the Senate −0.17 0.02 −0.11 −0.01
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Change in Party Control of the House −0.17 0.02 −0.11 −0.01
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Change in Party Control of the Presidency −0.08 −0.63∗∗ −0.10 −0.59∗∗
(0.32) (0.29) (0.30) (0.27)
Change in Marginal Control < |0.001| 0.01 < |0.001| 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sponsor Became a Part of the Majority −1.21∗∗ −0.10 −1.20∗∗ 0.01
(0.28) (0.22) (0.27) (0.21)
Sponsor No Longer Chair of a Committee −0.21 0.48 −0.26 0.66∗∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33)
Sponsor Became Chair of a Committee −0.71∗∗ −0.31 −0.62∗∗ −0.22
(0.32) (0.26) (0.30) (0.25)
Change in Being Reported from Committee
Reported then Not Reported 5.45∗∗ −10.29∗∗ 5.35∗∗ −13.92∗∗
(0.26) (< |0.001|) (0.24) (< |0.001|)
Not Reported then Reported −10.33∗∗ 4.70∗∗ −13.68∗∗ 4.64∗∗
(< |0.001|) (0.23) (< |0.001|) (0.22)
Reported then Reported Again 4.45∗∗ −14.82∗∗ 4.40∗∗ −10.76∗∗
(1.00) (< |0.001|) (0.99) (< |0.001|)
Other Chamber’s Change in Passage
Passed then Failed 1.06∗ −0.54 1.20∗∗ −0.56
(0.56) (1.10) (0.52) (1.08)
Failed then Passed 1.89∗∗ 4.43∗∗ 1.85∗∗ 4.36∗∗
(0.76) (0.35) (0.76) (0.33)
AIC 1629.72 1753.11
BIC 1874.58 1974.80
Log Likelihood −776.86 −842.56
Deviance 1553.72 1685.11
Num. obs. 4646 5015
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table B.2: Explaining Change in Bill Outcomes in the Senate
Full Model Null Model
Pass:Fail Fail:Pass Pass:Fail Fail:Pass
Intercept −5.93∗∗ −6.09∗∗ −5.75∗∗ −5.65∗∗
(0.64) (0.58) (0.39) (0.36)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-1 0.11 1.02∗∗
(0.39) (0.38)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-2 0.15 −0.60
(0.49) (0.42)
∆ in Party Platform, Majority −26.93∗∗ −6.91 −24.81∗∗ −1.37
(10.96) (5.77) (10.25) (4.95)
∆ in Party Platform, Minority 11.14 6.02 8.58 1.68
(12.51) (9.20) (11.35) (7.41)
∆ in MIP 2.79 6.57∗ 1.97 3.83
(4.73) (3.85) (4.43) (3.61)
∆ in Public Mood −0.15 −2.95 0.61 −0.62
(8.72) (6.76) (8.35) (6.18)
∆ in the Number of Cosponsors 0.09 0.27 0.08 0.10
(0.42) (0.26) (0.41) (0.24)
∆ in Party Control of the Senate 0.64∗∗ −0.54∗ 0.61∗∗ −0.61∗∗
(0.22) (0.31) (0.21) (0.30)
∆ in Party Control of the House 0.64∗∗ −0.54∗ 0.61∗∗ −0.61∗∗
(0.22) (0.31) (0.21) (0.30)
∆ in Party Control of the Presidency −0.70 −0.34 −0.69 −0.47
(0.48) (0.37) (0.46) (0.36)
∆ in Marginal Control −0.03 < |0.001| −0.03 −0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Sponsor Became a Part of the Majority −0.45 −0.36 −0.39 −0.40
(0.36) (0.31) (0.35) (0.30)
Sponsor No Longer Chair of a Committee 0.20 −31.77∗∗ 0.37 −1.55
(0.46) (< |0.001|) (0.44) (1.04)
Sponsor Became Chair of a Committee −0.58 1.20∗∗ −0.52 1.14∗∗
(0.48) (0.31) (0.47) (0.30)
Change in Being Reported from Committee
Reported then Not Reported 6.28∗∗ −8.34 6.20∗∗ −6.51
(0.36) (199.71) (0.34) (66.42)
Not Reported then Reported −11.63∗∗ 3.57∗∗ −8.12 3.57∗∗
(< |0.001|) (0.34) (91.83) (0.32)
Reported then Reported Again 30.43 −0.50 21.42 −0.29
(113.16) (6.26) (73.96) (273.99)
Other Chamber’s Change in Passage
Passed then Failed 1.62∗∗ 0.75 1.98∗∗ 0.63
(0.51) (0.80) (0.47) (0.79)
Failed then Passed −15.38 4.02∗∗ −8.98 3.94∗∗
(115.22) (0.35) (49.76) (0.33)
Passed then Passed Again −3.46 2.87 −5.58 2.59
(30.31) (1.99) (86.66) (1.91)
AIC 818.33 818.33 876.93 876.93
BIC 1076.14 1076.14 1111.70 1111.70
Log Likelihood −369.16 −369.16 −402.46 −402.46
Deviance 738.33 738.33 804.93 804.93
Num. obs. 4653 4653 5022 5022
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table B.3: Explaining Change in Bill Outcome by Chamber, No Agenda Controls
In the House In the Senate
Pass:Fail Fail:Pass Pass:Fail Fail:Pass
Intercept −2.29∗∗ −3.88∗∗ −4.05∗∗ −4.70∗∗
(0.23) (0.26) (0.39) (0.42)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-1 0.15 −0.19 0.04 0.49∗
(0.21) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29)
∆ in Frame Set, t and t-2 −0.74∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.09 −0.10
(0.24) (0.23) (0.33) (0.33)
∆ in Party Platform, Majority −6.06∗ 9.41∗∗ −13.61∗∗ −2.78
(3.67) (2.66) (6.04) (4.50)
∆ in Party Platform, Minority −6.64 −0.88 11.73∗ 7.28
(4.18) (4.59) (6.87) (6.65)
∆ in MIP −2.77 −0.22 0.99 1.25
(1.89) (2.10) (2.91) (3.20)
∆ in Public Mood 5.58 8.75∗∗ −0.81 4.23
(3.78) (3.26) (5.35) (5.29)
∆ in the Number of Cosponsors −1.17∗∗ 0.68∗∗ −0.15 0.51∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22)
∆ in Party Control of the Senate 0.06 −0.11 0.57∗∗ −0.66∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.27)
∆ in Party Control of the House 0.06 −0.11 0.57∗∗ −0.66∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.27)
∆ in Party Control of the Presidency 0.10 −0.49∗∗ −0.35 −0.44
(0.22) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30)
∆ in Marginal Control < |0.001| 0.01 0.04 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Sponsor Became a Part of the Maj. −1.75∗∗ −0.09 −0.55∗∗ −0.13
(0.23) (0.17) (0.25) (0.24)
Sponsor No Longer Chair of a Cmte 0.04 0.26 0.88∗∗ −47.90∗∗
(0.22) (0.27) (0.28) (< |0.001|)
Sponsor Became Chair of a Cmte −0.78∗∗ 0.35∗ −0.38 1.36∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.32) (0.24)
AIC 2905.23 2905.23 1594.56 1594.56
BIC 3085.65 3085.65 1775.03 1775.03
Log Likelihood −1424.61 −1424.61 −769.28 −769.28
Deviance 2849.23 2849.23 1538.56 1538.56
Num. obs. 4646 4646 4653 4653
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Appendix C
Applying CAP Topic Codes
C.1 Gathering the Data
Rhetoric and heresthetic are measured by what is recorded in the Congressional Record. The
Congressional Record is the official log of speeches given on the floor of the House of Representatives,
the floor of the Senate, and extensions of remarks to those recorded speeches submitted at a later date.
The electronic version of the Record (.txt files published on line) began in 1995 with the start of the
104th Congress.1 The electronic version of the Record can either be downloaded speech by speech
from congress.gov or in bulk from the Government Printing Office (GPO).2 For this project, it was
downloaded in bulk in batches from the GPO and tagged for its composite parts, such as speaker or
text of the speech itself. Then the downloaded and processed files are transformed into flat files by
year. The processes behind these steps are unpacked below.
First, the raw speeches are downloaded in batches from the GPO, and the composite parts of
each speech are tagged. To do this, I use a version of the Sunlight Foundation’s Congressional
Record scraper modified and written by Judd, Drinkard, Carbaugh, and Young (2017).3 The output
of this process is a series of folders organized by year and day. Three sets of files are downloaded
or produced: PDF files of how the speech appears in the hard copy of the Record, HTML files of
the raw text, and JSON files of the processed text files. The JSON files contain tagged speeches,
which include information on: the kind of statement, speaker bioguide id, text, turn, speaker, and
item number. Multiple components within a given speech are tagged. Examples of these are: the
title, reading of a bill, and the text of what is said.
Figure C.1 shows how an entry is broken down into its composite parts. Each (blue) rectangle
indicates the largest sub-unit in a speech that may or may not be further broken down between text
1Earlier versions of the record are accessible as PDF files or in hard copy only. Thus, these years are excluded.
2For the raw files: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=
CREC.
3Their GitHub page (downloaded on 12/11/2017) can be found at: https://github.com/unitedstates/congressional-record.
121
Figure C.1: Sample Congressional Floor Speech
and meta data. Each (red) circle indicates the sub-sub-unit within an overarching part. As can be seen
in the figure, there are multiple parts identified in a single speech. The top most box is identified as
the speech title, the second is the speaker, the third the location of the speech, the fourth the date, and
finally the fifth is the speech itself. Within the speaker box, two pieces of information are extracted:
speaker name and state. Within the speech itself, two pieces of information are extracted: speaker
name and speech text.
The downloaded JSON files are transformed into a series of flat files where each paragraph of
the speech is an observation. This allows each observation to have only one speaker. Then speeches
are aggregated into larger “speech segments” by collapsing the flat files by speaker and speech. This
is done to maximize the variance in how issues are discussed and the amount of text used for the
classification algorithms. Two additional steps are taken. First, observations where the speaker is
listed as “The PRESIDING OFFICER,” “The SPEAKER pro tempore,” or ”The CHAIRMAN” are
deleted. This is done because these are typically very short procedural statements that do not vary by
policy area. Second, all observations with no associated text are eliminated.
As a result, each year has its own flat file, which includes whatever meta-data is available. For
an example of the first three rows of the produced at file, see table C.1. In table C.1, the first column
provides a numeric indicator, the second column provides a match id based on the page number of
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where the given speech is printed, the third column provides the full id based on the page number
and placement of a given speech in the printed copy of the Record, the fourth column provides the
bioguide id of the speaker, the fifth column provides the official title of the speech, the sixth column
provides the name of the speaker, and the seventh column indicates the kind of entry in the JSON file.
Finally, in the last column, a truncated speech segment can be seen.
C.2 Known Policy Issue Area Codes
To begin identifying what policy topics — if any — are discussed in each of the speeches, I identify
speech segments where the policy topic (including a “no policy” topic code) is known and apply the
relevant code. Policy topics are defined using the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) coding scheme
for “major topic” codes, which includes 20 possible general codes. In addition to the 20 policy topic
codes, I add a code for “no policy topic.” The inclusion of a “no policy” code is important, because
not all speeches that lack policy content are excluded at this point.4 This means there are a total of
21 possible codes that a speech could be given: no policy topic, macroeconomics, civil rights and
liberties, health, agriculture, labor and employment, education, environment, energy, immigration,
transportation, law and crime, social welfare, community development, banking, defense, science
and technology, foreign trade, international affairs, government operations, and public lands. (Brief
definitions of each of these categories can be found in section 2.6, which is the conclusion of this
section.) Identifying and tagging speeches that have known codes is done in three stages. These
are: (1) merging in CAP codes already assigned to one-minute speeches given on the House Floor
(Hughes 2016); (2) merging in CAP codes from the Congressional Bills project using mentions of
bill titles and numbers in speech titles; and (3) using a dictionary of known non-policy speech types.
C.2.1 Merging One Minute Speech CAP Codes
First, topic codes are applied to the identifiable one-minute speeches in the dataset using the Hughes
dataset (Hughes 2016). A one minute speech, or ‘one minute,’ is a specific type of speech given on
the House floor where any member of Congress can request to take the floor for sixty seconds and
4In order to properly train a machine learner to identify CAP policy topics, there must also be a code for speeches that I
know include no policy content.
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Table C.1: Example Data Frame, First 2 Entries from 1995
match id id bioguide title speaker kind text
text 1 E1 CREC-
1995-01-
04-pt1-
PgE1
S001044 Reform Im-
migration
Laws
Mr.
STUMP
speech Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, today, this
rst day of the 104th Congress, I am in-
troducing a package of three immigra-
tion reform bills that deserve top prior-
ity as the new Congress works to make
America a better place to live. As I am
sure many of my colleagues in this
body experienced on the campaign
trail last year, Americans are deeply
concerned about immigration and its
impact on their lives. They are anxious
about the changing face of this coun-
try and the problems associ- ated with
our system of immigration. I don’t
blame them. On any given day, there
are countless news reports about the
destructive consequences of our dys-
functional immigration policies. But
one need not rely on the media for an
understanding of this issue, as more
and more Americans are getting first-
hand knowledge of the ill-effects of
out-of-control immigration. [[TRUN-
CATED]]
text2 E1-2 CREC-
1995-01-
04-pt1-
PgE1-2
T000350 REPEAL
OF SEC-
TION
903
Mr. TRAFI-
CANT
speech Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, the
United States taxes the income of its
citizens and corporations whether it
is earned at home or abroad. The
U.S. foreign tax credit provides relief
to U.S. tax-payers from the double-
taxation so they will not determine
where a company invests. Neverthe-
less, when Congress adopted the sec-
tion 903 of the Internal Revenue Code,
an unfair tax advantage was given to
companies that invest abroad. For that
reason, I have introduced legislation to
repeal section 903. Mr. Speaker, sec-
tion 903 extends credibility to those
foreign taxes imposed in lieu of for-
eign income taxes. This means that
all foreign taxes such as foreign sales,
excise, and value added taxes are cred-
itable as business costs towards their
foreign taxes paid. There is no con-
straint on the type of foreign tax that
can be credited. This leaves domestic
U.S. companies at a distinct disadvan-
tage. They are only able to deduct
taxes that are in lieu of income taxes.
[[TRUNCATED]]
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talk about anything; it is one of the few times for non-legislative debate to take place in the House.5
Tyler Hughes coded every one minute speech according to the major topic codes in the Comparative
Agendas Project codebook, and included an additional no policy topic code, using a mixture of hand
coding and machine learning6 (Hughes 2016). The Hughes data set contains 27,768 one-minutes
given between 1995 and 2012.
Using identifiers provided in the Hughes dataset, I merge the CAP codes into the dataset of
processed speech segments I download from the GPO. However, the identifiers provided in the
Hughes dataset are not consistent over time and do not consistently match what information is
available in constructed Congressional Record dataset. As a result, not all one-minute speeches
matched between the two data sets.7 From this, 22,050 speeches are given CAP topic codes —
79.40% are merged.
C.2.2 Merging Congressional Bills Project CAP Codes Using Speech Titles
Next, the text of the speech titles are used to identify which policy topic — if any — is discussed.
This approach relies on three aspects of floor speeches. These are: (1) germaneness, which constrains
many types of floor speeches to be directly related to the bill they mention; (2) the limited number of
ways bills are typically discussed; and (3) signaling to the other members of Congress, the media, or
their constituents as to its content. In combination, these three characteristics mean that if a speech is
given the title of a specific bill it should discuss that bill. Further, if we know what policy topic the
bill addresses, then we should know the policy topic of any speech explicitly discussing that bill.
5For additional information on one minutes, see one of the various reports produced by the Congressional
Research Office on their use and associated practices. For one such report published in 2015, use this URL:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30135.pdf.
6The already coded documents come from Tyler Hughes’ data set of one minutes given on the House Floor between
the 101st (1989/1990) and 112th Congress (2011/2012). There are 43,859 speeches in total. Of these speeches, just over
11,000 were coded by hand, while the remaining documents were assigned codes based on a machine learning algorithm.
His machine learning algorithm classifies documents with an accuracy above 90%.
7Except for the 112th Congress, over 80% of the one minutes given in each Congress were matched between the data
sets. The match percentage for the 112th Congress is so low, because none of the speeches given in 2011 could be matched.
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Following with this logic, speeches mentioning a bill’s short title, popular title,8 9 full title, or
bill number10 (ex. HR 1) in the speech title are classified as discussing whatever CAP major topic
code the relevant bill is labeled as.11 The bill number, short title, and popular title were chosen as
potential identifiers, because they are the most common ways that Members of Congress refer to
specific bills in discussion. Additionally, if more than one bill is mentioned in the title and the two
(or more) bills belong to conflicting topic codes, then a code is not applied and the topic of the speech
remains unknown.
C.2.3 Procedural Speeches Where No Policy Topic is Discussed
Finally, speeches are classified as discussing “no topic” if their title appears in one of two “no issue
area discussed” dictionaries. I created the first of the two dictionaries by identifying what speech
titles appeared most frequently and determined whether they were simply generic titles associated
with substantive policy speeches or routine titles that indicate a procedural speech with no policy
relevant content. To make this distinction clear, take three example speech titles that frequently
appear in the data set: “THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE,” “HEALTH CARE REFORM,” and
“PERSONAL EXPLANATION.” The first belongs to the macroeconomics topic, the second to the
health topic, and the last to the no policy topic. All are generic speech titles, but are generic for
different reasons. The first two are simply common topics of discussion for members generally and
especially coordinated caucuses resulting the speech titles being reused many times, while the third
indicates a procedural non-policy relevant speech. As a result, neither of the first two titles appear in
the dictionary, while the third does. The excluded speech titles, along with brief explanations as to
what they are in italics below the procedural speech title, are:
• PERSONAL EXPLANATION
A “personal explanation is a statement as to how a Member of Congress would have voted if
they had been in attendance for a vote and why they were missing for the vote. For example:
“Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained on February 4, 1998 for the vote on H.J. Res. 107,
8Short and popular titles of bills come from congress.gov and are matched by bill number to the codes in the
Congressional Bills Project dataset.
9A short title of a bill is an alternative, official, shorter title of a bill or portion of a bill than the official full title. A
popular title of a bill is an information title of a bill.
10Bill numbers and full titles come from the Congressional Bills Project.
11Bill topic codes come from the Congressional Bills Project, which uses the CAP coding scheme.
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Fees and Sanctions Relating to Health Care Task Force. Had I been present, I would have
voted aye.
• RECESS
A “recess speech is a statement that a given chamber of Congress will enter into recess and a
declaration of the next meeting time. For example: “The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease).
Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until approximately
8:40 p.m. for the purpose of receiving in joint session the President of the United States.
• ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE
An “announcement by the speaker pro tempore is a statement by the speaker pro tempore
informing the relevant bodies of some procedure. For example: “The Chair will recognize
Members for Special Orders until 5:30 p.m., at which time the Chair will declare the House in
recess.
• THE JOURNAL
A statement on “the journal is made by the speaker pro tempore and announces the approval
of the previous sessions entries. For example: “The Chair has examined the Journal of the last
days proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof. Pursuant to clause 1, rule
I, the Journal stands approved.
• MORNING BUSINESS
A “morning business speech outlines the who will talk for some portion of the morning session.
For example: “The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be a period for the transaction
of the morning business, not to exceed the hour of 2 p.m., with Senators permitted to speak
therein for up to 10 minutes.
• ADJOURNMENT
An “adjournment speech is a motion to adjourn. For example: “Mr. Speaker, I move that the
House do now adjourn.
• PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
A “pledge of allegiance speech is a request for a member of Congress to lead the chamber in
the pledge of allegiance and the member doing so. For example: “Will the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Solomon) come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.
• APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE
An “appointment of acting president pro tempore is the reading of a statement that appoints the
(next) acting president pro tempore. For example: “The clerk will please read a communication
to the Senate from the President pro tempore [Mr. Thurmond].
• PROGRAM
A “program speech is a summary of the business in the following session or sessions. For
example: “As agreed to previously, tomorrow morning the Senate will debate, in executive
session, the nominations of 3 judges. Also by consent, there will be 3 consecutive votes on
the confirmation of those nominations following the weekly policy luncheons beginning 2:15
Wednesday afternoon. Following those votes, the Senate will be in a period for the transaction
of morning business.
• SCHEDULE
A “schedule speech outlines the schedule for the day. For example: “Mr. President, this
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morning the Senate will proceed to executive session to begin 2 hours of debate on the
nomination of three judges on the Executive Calendar: Ann L. Aiken to be United States
District Judge for the District of Oregon, Barry G. Silverman to be United States District Judge
for the Ninth Circuit, and Richard W. Story to be United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Georgia. Following that debate, as previously ordered, the Senate will recess from
12:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. for the weekly policy luncheons to meet. As ordered, at 2:15 p.m.
the Senate will begin a series of rollcall votes on the aforementioned judicial nominations.
Following those votes, the Senate will be in a period for the transaction of morning business
with Senator Coverdell or his designee in control of the first 90 minutes, and Senator Daschle
or his designee in control of the next 90 minutes. As a reminder to all Members, the Senate
will not be in session on Friday, and no rollcall votes will occur on Monday, February 2nd. So
I thank my colleagues for their attention.
• SPECIAL ORDERS
A “special orders speech recognizes individuals to talk on the floor. For example: Under the
Speakers announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the
following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each. The gentleman from Guam (Mr.
Underwood) is recognized for 5 minutes.
• RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
A “recognition of the majority leader speech is simply the recognition by the president pro
tempore of the majority leader. For example: “The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The able
majority leader, Senator Lott of Mississippi, is recognized. Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr.
President. Welcome back, Mr. President. It is a pleasure to see you presiding in the Chair as
we begin this new year. Mr. President, I say to the Chaplain, we look forward to hearing your
prayers throughout the year.
• GENERAL LEAVE
A “general leave speech is a request in the senate for the ability to revise an extend statements
on pieces of legislation. For example: “Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on S. 1564, the Senate bill just passed. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Iowa?
• AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET An “authority for committees to meet speech
is a request and granting of a committee to meet. For example: “Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President,
the Finance Committee requests unanimous consent to con- duct a hearing on Wednesday,
January 28, 1998 beginning at 10:00 a.m. in room 215 Dirksen. Also hearing on confirmation
on pending nominations. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
• RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER
A “recognition of the acting majority leader speech is simply the recognition by the president
pro tempore of the acting majority leader. For example: “The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
able acting majority leader is recognized. Mr. HATCH. Thank you, Mr. President.
• RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME
A “reservation of leader time speech is an acknowledgment that the member of the leadership
retains their time. For example: “The PRESIDING OFFICER. Leadership time is reserved.
• Election of Speaker
The “Election of Speaker” speeches are those given in support or opposition to those running
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for Speaker of the house. While they contain information about alliances and politicking, they
do not contain policy relevant information.
I created a second dictionary with the aim to identify commemorative speeches. Commemorative
speeches are those that Members of Congress make to recognize specific groups or individuals. These
speeches do not contain policy relevant content, and are used for a separate purpose. Typically, these
speeches are given to honor and/or mention specific constituents or constituency groups (ex. a boy
scout troop or local school football team). However, they also are used to honor Members that retire
from office or die in office. As a result, speech titles containing any of the following are tagged as
containing“no policy topic:”
“tribute to”, “commemorating”, “remembering”, “recognizing”, “honoring”, “in recognition
of”, “commending and congratulating”, “commending the”, “commemoration of”,”congratulating”,
“in special recognition of”, “in honor of”,”in remembrance of”, “tribute to”, “celebrating”,
“anniversary of the”, “the life of”, “in honor of”,”finalist for the”, “the passing of congress-
woman”, “the passing of congressman”, “the passing of senator”,”retirement of”, “expressing
sorrow of”, “to commemorate the”,“in memory of”, “saluting the”, “a proclamation honoring”,
and “expressing the condolences”
C.2.4 Summary of the Resulting Labels
The result of this process is 236,039 speech segments (including no topic) of the 562,750 speech
segments (42%). The results of applying known codes to the speech segments can be further broken
down by where the labels come from and by year. This is presented in table C.2. In the table, the first
column indicates the Congress, the second column indicates the year, the third column indicates the
total number of speech segments, the fourth column presents the count with labels assigned using
speech titles, the fifth column presents the count with labels assigned from the Hughes dataset, the
sixth and seventh columns present the count and percent of speech segments with labels assigned,
and the eighth and ninth columns present the count and percent of the speech-speaker documents
that remain unlabeled at this point.
As the table shows, between 33% and 54% of speech segments are classified in any given year.
In every case, the majority of speech segments are given their labels from their titles. Inversely, this
means that between 46% and 67% of speech segments still need to be labeled for any given year.
To classify the remaining 58% of the speeches, the labeled speeches are used to train a predictive
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algorithms, so that the computer can predict labels for the remaining unlabeled speech segments.
The labeled speech segments are leveraged to train machine learning algorithms.
Table C.2: Summary of Where Known Labels Come From & Coverage
Labeled Doc. Unlabeled Doc.
Cong. Year Total From Hughes From Titles N Percent N Percent
104 1995 44,021 3,049 11,464 14,402 33% 29,619 67%
1996 28,931 1,509 9,658 11,088 38% 17,843 62%
105 1997 31,253 1,271 9,792 11,008 35% 20,245 65%
1998 31,893 1,392 12,526 13,812 43% 18,081 57%
106 1999 34,121 1,343 12,162 13,452 39% 20,669 61%
2000 31,555 957 11,850 12,740 40% 18,815 60%
107 2001 31,172 701 11,799 12,454 40% 18,718 60%
2002 26,764 543 12,030 12,538 47% 14,226 53%
108 2003 34,306 835 12,334 12,998 38% 21,308 62%
2004 27,807 854 10,357 11,096 40% 16,711 60%
109 2005 33,369 1364 12,768 13,963 42% 19,406 58%
2006 26,926 1,106 11,877 12,866 48% 14,060 52%
110 2007 38,785 1,405 16,909 18,221 47% 20,564 53%
2008 27,875 1,079 13,111 14,059 50% 13,816 50%
111 2009 35,731 2,060 13,113 14,969 42% 20,762 58%
2010 27,416 1,647 12,836 14,282 52% 13,134 48%
112 2011 28,195 — 9,966 9,966 35% 18,229 65%
2012 22,630 935 11,3 42 12,125 54% 10,505 46%
Total 562,750 22,050 215,894 236,039 42% 326,711 58%
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C.2.5 (CAP) Topic Codes and Definitions
The issue area codes applied and associated descriptions are below. These have been adapted from the
U.S. version of the CAP codebook. For the original codebook, see the original at this URL: http://
comparativeagendas.s3.amazonaws.com/codebookfiles/Topics_Codebook_2014.
pdf.
• Macroeconomics
This includes general domestic macroeconomic issues, inflation, prices, interest rates, unem-
ployment rates, monetary supply, national budget and debt, taxation, tax policy,industrial
policy, and price control.
• Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties
This includes general issues related to rights and liberties, ethnic and racial group discrimina-
tion, gender discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, age discrimination, handicap or
disease dis- crimination, voting rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, right to privacy,
access to government information, and protected conduct of anti-government activities.
• Health
This includes general health policy issues, health care (reform), insurance reform, insurance
availability and cost, regulation of the drug industry/medical devices/clinical labs, regulation
of facility construc- tion, regulation of and payments to facilities, provider and insurer payment
and regulation, medical liability, fraud, training of medical professionals, disease prevention,
health promotion, infant and child health, mental illness, longterm care, prescription drug
coverage and costs, substance use and abuse, and research.
• Agriculture
This includes general agriculture policy, trade, subsidies to farmers and ranchers, disaster
insurance, food inspection and safety, marketing research and promotion, animal and crop
disease, pest control, domesticated animal welfare, fisheries, and research and development.
• Labor and Employment
This includes general labor issues, worker safety (including OSHA), training, workforce
development, employee benefits, labor unions, employee relations, fair labor standards, youth
employment, parental leave, migrant and seasonal workers, and farm workers.
• Education
This includes general issues related to education, higher education, elementary and secondary
education, education of underprivileged students, vocational education, special education,
educational excellence, arts and humanities, and research and development.
• Environment
This includes general environment issues, drinking water safety, waste disposal, hazardous
waste (and toxic chemical) regulations, air pollution, global warming, noise pollution, recy-
cling, indoor environ- mental hazards, species and forest protection, pollution in waterways,
conservation of waterways, land and water conservation, and research and development.
131
• Energy
This includes general energy issues, nuclear energy and regulations, electricity and hydroelec-
tricity, natural gas and oil, coal, alternative and renewable energy, energy conservation, and
research and development.
• Immigration
This includes gneral immigration and refugee issues such as INS enforcement of immigration
laws, legalization procedures of illegal immigrants, immigration of refugees, and citizenship
issues.
• Transportation
This includes general transportation issues, mass transportation and safety, highway construc-
tion/ maintenance/safety, air control/safety/transportation, railroad transportation and safety,
truck and automobile transportation and safety, maritime issues, public works, infrastructure
development, and research and development.
• Law, Crime and Family Issues
This includes general law and crime issues, executive branch agencies dealing with law and
crime, white collar crime, organized crime, illegal drug production/trafficking/control, court
administration, prisons, juvenile crime, juvenile justice system, child abuse and pornography,
family issues, policy, fire control, weapons control, criminal code, civil code, riots, crime
prevention, and crime control.
• Social Welfare
This includes general social welfare issues, food stamps, food assistance, nutrition monitoring
programs, assistance for low-income families and individuals, elderly issues, elderly assistance
programs (including Social Security), assistance to the disabled and handicapped, social
services, and volunteer associations.
• Community Development and Housing Issues
This includes general housing issues, housing and community development, urban economic
develop- ment, general urban issues, rural housing, rural economic development, low and
middle income housing programs, veterans housing assistance, military housing programs,
elderly and handicapped housing, housing assistance for homeless, and secondary mortgage
market.
• Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce
This includes general domestic commerce issues, financial institution regulation, U.S. banking
system, securities and commodities regulation, consumer finance, mortgages, credit cards,
insurance regulation, bankruptcy, corporate mergers, antitrust regulation, corporate man-
agement issues, small business issues, copyrights, patents, domestic disaster relief, tourism,
consumer safety, consumer fraud, and sports and gambling regulation.
• Defense
This includes general defense issues, defense alliances, U.S. security assistance, military
intelligence, espionage, military readiness, coordination of armed services,national stockpiles
of strategic materi- als, arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, military aid, weapons sales,
manpower, military personnel and dependents, veteran affairs, procurement, weapons system
acquisitions and evaluation, military installations, construction, land transfers, national guard
and reserves, hazardous waste disposal, civil defense, homeland security, civilian personnel,
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oversight of contractors, war related issues, relief of claims against the U.S. military, and
research and development.
• Space, Science, Technology, and Communications
This include general science related issues, space exploration, commercial use of space, scien-
tific cooperation, telephone and telecommunication regulation, broadcast industry regulation,
weather forecasting, NOAA, oceanography, computer industry, and research development.
• Foreign Trade
This includes general foreign trade issues, trade negotiations, trade disputes, trade agreements,
export promotion and regulation, international private business investments, productivity and
competitiveness of U.S. business, tariff and import restrictions, import regulation, exchange
rates, and related issues.
• International Affairs and Foreign Aid
This includes general international affairs issues, foreign aid, international resources exploita-
tion, re- sources agreements, developing countries issues, international finance, economic
development, Western Europe and the EU, international canal issues, other country/region spe-
cific issues, human rights, inter- national organizations other than finance, terrorism/hijacking,
and U.S. diplomats/embassies/citizens abroad.
• Government Operations
This includes general government operations, intergovernmental relations, government effi-
ciency, bu- reaucratic oversight, postal service issues, government employee benefits, civil
service issues, nomi- nations and appointments, U.S. mint, government procurement, gov-
ernment property management, IRS administration, presidential impeachment and scandal,
federal government branch relations and administrative issues, Congressional operations,
regulation of political campaigns, census, District of Columbia affairs, relief of claims against
the government, and federal holidays.
• Public Lands and Water Management
This includes general public lands issues, national parks and sites, Native American affairs,
natural resources, water resources, and U.S. dependencies and territorial issues.
C.3 Training a Supervised Machine Learning Algorithm
Using the speech segments with known labels, I train and validate a supervised machine learning
algorithm to classify the unlabeled speech segments. Supervised machine learning uses documents
with known topics of discussion to train a computer to classify documents where the topic of
discussion is unknown. The basic assumption when using supervised machine learning is that the
labeled documents used to train the algorithm are representative of the broader set of documents.
While only certain types of speeches enter into the labeled set here, they do represent the broader set
of speeches by spanning the range of ways someone may speak on the floors of Congress — speeches
given during both constrained and unconstrained floor time. The three general steps are: (1) dividing
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the labeled documents into the training and testing set; (2) generating the document-feature matrix;
and (3) training and evaluating the model. The division of the already labeled documents into a
“training and “testing set is important, because the “training set is used to fit the predictive algorithm,
while the “testing set of unseen but labeled documents is used to evaluate how accurate the model is.
C.3.1 Creating the Training Set and Document-Feature Matrix
The associations the computer and model find between words and topics are only as informative as
those existing in the set of documents used to train the model or algorithm. As a result, constructing
an informative training set is the key to generating a well performing and accurate model. To evaluate
the trained algorithm, metrics summarizing how well each model classifies the speeches in the testing
set — the speeches not used to train the model — are calculated. When constructing the training set
or sets, a sample representing the heterogeneity of the documents needs to be included. The training
set will be constructed with an eye towards combating potentially problematic variation by issue area
by drawing a stratified random sample of documents by policy topic. The result is a stratified random
sample of 118,021 documents, which amounts to 50% of the speech segments that are labeled.12
This leaves 118,018 documents in the testing set.
Finally, the documents need to become a matrix summarizing their contents: a document feature
matrix (DFM) needs to be constructed. The DFM consists of two smaller document feature matrices
bound together. In a document feature matrix, the documents are the observations, and the individual
terms are the variables or features. The two sources of information are: a DFM of the text of the
speeches themselves and a DFM of the titles of the speeches. The speeches and titles are processed
in essentially the same manner: lower casing, stemming, punctuation removal, and number removal.
Both the unigrams (single words) and bigrams (two words next to each other) are used as features.
Additionally, rather than simply the counts of individuals features being used as variables, a tf·idf
representatio13 is used. The last step in the process is to limit the features to those that appear in at
least three documents. The result is 1,862,893 features being used. The quanteda package in is
used for pre-processing the data (Benoit & Nulty 2013).
12A variety of sample sizes are experimented with, and 50% is found to produce the most accurate model.
13Term frequency · inverse document frequency, tf·idf, is a weight supposed to capture the relative importance of a
term. Additionally, the use of term frequency rather than a weighting of the terms is experimented with, however performs
uniformly worse.
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C.3.2 The Algorithm
The training set is then used to estimate an algorithm that in turn predicts the labels of the unseen and
unknown speeches. The algorithm used is summarized in the gray box below. I use a combination
of techniques and models to build the classification algorithm including a support vector machine,
LASSO logistic regression, and constructed decision rules. An SVM identifies the maximum-
margin hyper-plane(s) that gives the greatest separation between the classes. When performing a
classification task that has more than two classes, it does so via pairwise comparisons of each set
of classes (Witten, Frank, Hall & Pal 2016, Friedman, Hastie & Tibshirani 2001). While a number
of different kernels can be used in the estimation function to identify the hyperplanes, I choose to
use a linear kernel here.14 A LASSO logistic regression is a special case of an elastic net logistic
regression that uses the L1 penalty. The regularization process assists in variable selection by driving
some possible coefficients to 0 (Friedman, Hastie & Tibshirani 2001).15 A summary of the steps of
the algorithm is presented here:
1. Construct the training set by drawing a stratified sample of speech-speaker documents.
2. Using the training set, fit an SVM that simultaneously predicts all twenty-one codes.
3. Using the training set, fit twenty-one binary LASSO logistic regressions. The training set
actually used to fit the regression should include all instances of the relevant topic code and an
equal number of other instances randomly drawn from the broader training set.
4. Repeat step 3 five times resulting in a bootstrap of five classifiers for each topic code. Treat
each of the resulting predictions as votes for whether each document is of that topic.
5. From the binary classifier predicting no policy classification, identify whether the document is
on a policy topic.
6. If the document is on a policy topic, from the series of binary classifiers, identify which topic
received the most votes for the document being of that topic and whether there are multiple
topics that have the same number of maximum votes.
14The use of radial and polynomial kernels are tested. However, they perform worse.
15The glmnet package is used to fit the LASSO logistic regressions, while the e1071 package is used to fit the SVM.
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7. If only one topic receives the maximum number of votes, then assign that topic.
8. For those where no single maximum exists, use the label applied by the SVM.
C.3.3 Validating the Algorithm
The resulting training algorithm is then validated using a number of metrics. Each evaluates how
well the algorithm classifies the unseen but labeled documents. There are 118,021 speech segments
that fall into this category.
First, the overall accuracy of the model and Cohen’s Kappa are examined. Accuracy is calculated
by simply dividing the number of documents correctly labeled by the total number of documents.
While a score closer to 1 (all documents correctly classified) is always better than one farther away,
ideally the accuracy of the model should match or exceed the degree of agreement one would require
of two human coders looking at the same document. Ideally, this will be at least 90%. The overall
accuracy of this process is 94.32%, which means that 94.32% of the unseen but labeled speech
segments are correctly classified using the algorithm.16 Additionally, the Cohen’s Kappa can be
calculated for the performance of the overall algorithm. Convention says that a Cohen’s Kappa
between 0.811 indicates almost perfect performance (Landis and Koch, 1977). Further, intuitively it
provides a score for how much better the algorithm performs than simply random chance. Here the
Kappa is 0.92. This means that the overall accuracy of the algorithm and Cohen’s Kappa exceed the
minimum thresholds set out above for when looking at the overall not individual topic evaluations.
Second, the performance of the model with respect to each policy issue area is evaluated in
two ways: by comparing balanced accuracy measures and by comparing f-scores. An f-score is
the harmonic mean of the precision and recall of the model. The benefit to comparing the f-score
in addition to the accuracies is that an f-score is driven to 0 if the model only predicts one of the
possible classes and ranges between 0 (no predictive power) and 1 (perfectly predictive). As with
accuracy scores, while a score closer to 1 is always better than one farther away, ideally the f-scores
should match or exceed the degree of agreement one would require of two human coders looking at
the same document. F-scores mimic the calculation of various inter-coder reliability scores. Here we
16Additionally, each step of the process also has its own associated accuracy rate. The SVM by itself classified 87.06%
of the unseen but labeled documents correctly. The rotating LASSO correctly classified 97.15% of those documents with
only one maximum that are unseen but labeled. Of these, the no topic LASSO logistic classifier has an accuracy of 99%
and the overall accuracy of the LASSO logistic classifiers for all those possibly on a policy topic is 94.62%.
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might consider the appropriate comparison to be to Fleiss Kappa and Krippendorffs Alpha — each
of which are recommended for situations where more than two coders are compared. Conventionally,
if Fleiss’ Kappa, is seen to be less than 0.40 coders have poor agreement, between 0.60 and 0.74
indicates intermediate or good agreement, and over 0.75 indicates excellent agreement (Fleiss, 1981).
Additionally, if Krippendorff’s Alpha, is observed to be above 0.667 it is acceptable, and a value
above 0.80 is good (Krippendorff, 2012, 2004). Thus, we would want to see f-scores above 0.80 to
be very confident in its performance, while scores above 0.75 would still be acceptable.
Table C.3 presents the accuracy and f-scores for each CAP topic. As can be seen, the balanced
accuracy for each topic code is above 90%. All of the f-scores are above the 0.75 threshold.
Additionally, all but two classes have f-scores above 0.80. The two below 0.80 are the social welfare
and the international affairs topics. As a result, on average, we can have confidence that the trained
algorithm is performing well and classifying unseen documents successfully both when evaluated
with respect to each topic as seen in table C.3 and overall as discussed in the previous paragraphs.
Table C.3: Evaluation by Policy Topic
Precision Recall F1 Balanced Accuracy
1) Macroeconomics 0.85 0.90 0.87 0.94
2) Civil Rights 0.91 0.81 0.86 0.90
3) Health 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.95
4) Agriculture 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.95
5) Labor and Employment 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.92
6) Education 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.96
7) Environment 0.86 0.83 0.85 0.92
8) Energy 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.95
9) Immigration 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.94
10) Transportation 0.97 0.91 0.94 0.96
12) Law, Crime, and Family 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.94
13) Social Welfare 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.89
14) Community Development 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.94
15) Banking 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.95
16) Defense 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.96
17) Space, Science, and Technology 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.95
18) Foreign Trade 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.97
19) International Affairs 0.67 0.89 0.76 0.94
20) Government Operations 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.93
21) Public Lands 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.95
22) No Policy 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
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Appendix D
Identifying Speech Types & Arguments
Once the speeches are classified into policy topics, I identify how speakers are using their time:
on policy or procedure. Additionally, speeches are broken down by paragraph to facilitate the
identification, because a single speech can contain multiple arguments about the given policy and a
mixture of policy and procedure. There are 4,261,184 paragraphs in the dataset. This ranges from
66,983 to 672,748 for a single policy topic, with a mean of 213,059 and a standard deviation of
157,363.
To identify the latent arguments in the Congressional Record, I estimate a separate dynamic topic
model (DTM) for each policy topic; this allows for the aspects of language that change over time to
be incorporated into the process and holds the general topic of discussion constant. I specifically use
the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) implementation developed and validated by
Before discussing the steps of the process in greater depth, how the number of topics k is
identified needs to be detailed. The number of topics k that the DTM and each nested topic model
should identify is the only parameter that needs to be chosen by the user. As do
A separate DTM is fit for each policy topic. As a result, for each of the twenty policy topics these
steps are repeated. First, the text must be binned by Congress, and then the word2vec associations
are calculated using all of the documents at once. Second, a word2vec representation is of all of the
text is generated. Only terms appearing in at least five paragraphs are used to generate the matrix.
For each year, then, the documents are (pre)processed to create a document-term matrix. In a
document-term matrix, the documents make up the observations and the terms make up the variables.
The values in the matrix are the representation of the text the computer uses in the estimation of the
model. In this case, English stop words are removed from the documents, a normalized tf·idf (term
frequency-inverse document frequency) representation is used, and terms appearing in less than 5
documents are removed. Additionally, uni-grams (single words), bi-grams (strings of two contiguous
words), tri-grams (strings of three contiguous words), four-grams (strings of four contiguous words),
and five-grams (strings of five contiguous words) are used. This is done, because, unlike topics,
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arguments require multiple words strung together to be meaningful. Using n-grams, assists in more
closely approximating this real world semantic structure. Next, a topic model for each year is fit
using the same NMF approach. At this stage the number of potential latent topics allowed to emerge
ranged from 3 to 30. To choose the number of latent topics, I choose the number of frames that
maximizes the coherence measure.
Once the documents in each year are processed and topic models been fit, the identified latent
topics need to be aligned and smoothed, which are the last two steps in the process. Using the
individually fit topic models, the number of latent topics across the years needs to be identified. The
model searches over a range from 20 to 60 possible topics in an increment of 1. To choose, once
again maximum coherence is used. Finally, the latent topics are assigned to every document, and the
top terms for each identified latent topics are output. Only the primary latent topic is assigned, which
means each paragraph receives exactly one label.
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